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Summary of the work in this thesis 
 
Limited understanding of influenza transmission has been a frequent 
obstacle during the development of pandemic influenza infection 
prevention and mitigation strategies. The science is hotly debated, 
especially the relative importance of transmission via large droplets or 
aerosols. Clarification of the relative importance of different modes of 
transmission is critical for the refinement of evidence-based infection 
control advice and has been called for by the European Center for Disease 
Control (ECDC), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the US 
Institute of Medicine. 
 
The primary aims of this thesis were to investigate influenza transmission; 
i) by obtaining data concerning viral shedding and the  presence of 
influenza virus in the near environment of infected individuals and ii) 
through the exploration of a human challenge model to study 
transmission.  
 
Two major clinical studies have been performed; 
 Shedding and environmental deposition of novel A (H1N1) pandemic 
influenza virus. The primary aims of the study were to correlate the 
DPRXQWRIYLUXVGHWHFWHGLQDVXEMHFW¶VQRVHZLWKWKDWUHFRYHUHGIURP
his/her immediate environment (on surfaces and in the air) and with 
symptom duration and severity. Adults and children, both in hospital 
and from the community, who had symptoms of influenza infection 
were enrolled. Information about symptoms was collected and samples 
were taken including nose swabs, swabs from surfaces and air 
samples. Forty two subjects infected with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
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were recruited and followed up. The mean duration of nasal viral 
shedding was 6.2 days (by PCR) and 4.6 days (by culture). Over 25% 
of cases remained potentially infectious for at least 5 days. Symptom 
scores and viral shedding were poorly correlated. From surface swabs 
collected in the vicinity of 40 subjects, 15 (38%) subject locations were 
contaminated with virus. Overall 36 of 662 (5.4%) surface swabs 
taken were positive for influenza, two (0.3%) yielded viable virus.  
Subjects yielding positive surface samples had significantly higher 
nasal viral loads on illness Day 3 and more prominent respiratory 
symptom scores. Room air was sampled in the vicinity of 12 subjects 
and PCR positive samples were obtained from five (42%). Particles 
VPDOOHQRXJKWRUHDFKWKHGLVWDOOXQJPZHUHIRXQGWRFRQWDLQ
virus.  
 
 Use of a human influenza challenge model to assess person-to-person 
transmission: Proof-of-concept study. The primary aim of this study 
was to establish that an experimentally induced influenza infection is 
transmissible. Healthy subjects deemed sero-susceptible to influenza 
A/H3N2/Wisconsin/67/2005 were intranasally inoculated (Donors) and 
when symptoms began, further sero-susceptible subjects (Recipients) 
ZHUHH[SRVHGWR'RQRUVGXULQJDQµ([SRVXUH(YHQW¶Subjects were in 
close contact, e.g. playing games and eating meals together, for a total 
of 28 hours during a 2 day period. Samples were collected to confirm 
infection status. Among 24 healthy adult subjects, nine were 
UDQGRPLVHGWRWKHµ'RQRU¶JURXSDQGWRWKHµ5HFLSLHQW¶ group. 
Following inoculation 5 out of 9 Donors (55%) developed illness and 7 
out of 9 (78%) were proven to be infected. After exposure, 5 out of 15 
Recipients developed symptoms and 3 out of 15 were proven to be 
infected. Three others were found to be non sero-susceptible prior to 
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exposure. The overall attack rate in Recipients was 20% but was 25% 
after adjustment for pre-exposure immunity. 
 
The contact, droplet and aerosol routes of influenza transmission are all 
likely to have a role. This thesis shows that transmission of influenza via 
surfaces may be less important than current infection control policies and 
public guidance documents imply. Air sampling results add to the 
accumulating evidence that supports the potential for aerosol transmission 
of influenza. The human challenge model could be used to investigate 
routes of influenza transmission further and a study funded by the Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) is planned. 
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1.1 Global Health Threat 
 
Influenza is recognised as a significant threat to human health across the 
world. This threat comes from annual epidemics (seasonal influenza) and 
less frequent pandemics. It is estimated that seasonal influenza causes 4 
million episodes of severe illness and between 250,000 and 500,000 
deaths every year (WHO 2011a). In industrialised countries, it is the 
elderly and those with co-morbidities who bear the brunt of disease 
mortality and morbidity (Thompson et al, 2004; Mullooly et al, 2007). As 
well as causing illness it also exacts an economic burden through 
healthcare costs and lost productivity. In the United States (US) in 2003, 
the total costs associated with influenza were estimated to be $87 billion 
(Molinari et al, 2007). 
 
It is pandemic influenza however, that has the potential to cause a major, 
global health emergency causing severe illness and significant societal 
disruption. In order to have pandemic potential a virus must satisfy the 
following criteria; i) be of a novel sub-type, i.e. the haemagglutinin is 
unrelated to immediate (pre-pandemic) predecessors; ii) little or no pre-
existing population immunity should exist; iii) causes significant clinical 
illness; and iv) exhibit efficient person to person spread (WHO 2009a). 
These factors will allow a virus to infect many and spread rapidly. 
Estimating deaths from pandemic influenza is difficult. Data from the US 
suggest that mortality during the 2009 pandemic was comparable to a 
severe seasonal epidemic, though the years of life lost may have been 
higher due to relative impact on young adults. Viboud et al estimate that 
between 7,500 and 44,100 deaths were attributable to the A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus in the US during May-December 2009, and that between 334,000 
and 1,973,000 years of life were lost. This range of years of life lost 
3 
 
includes at its lower bound the impact of a typical influenza epidemic 
dominated by the more virulent H3N2 subtype, and at its upper bound the 
impact of the 1968 pandemic (Viboud et al, 2010). Extrapolating these 
figures to the rest of the world indicates that approximately 500,000 
people may have died. This compares with estimates of at least 50 million 
deaths in the 1918 pandemic (Potter 2001). The reasons for the huge 
mortality rates seen in 1918/1919 are not completely understood but may 
include factors such as viral virulence, secondary bacterial infections, poor 
healthcare and lack of antibiotics and the occurrence of the pandemic 
during wartime (which saw mass movements of people and poor standards 
of living). 
 
Despite advances in our knowledge about influenza and the ability to treat 
infection and its complications, the emergence in 1997, of avian influenza 
infections in man associated with mortality rates of over 50%, have led to 
fears that a pandemic on the scale of 1918 could occur at any time. The 
impact that such a disease would have on the connected and globalised 
world we see today could be enormous. As a result preparations to plan 
for and mitigate the threat posed by an avian related influenza pandemic 
have taken place and are on-going. Planning efforts have been 
spearheaded by WHO which has defined six phases of preparedness. Key 
actions during the inter-pandemic periods (phases 1 and 2) include 
producing, implementing and exercising national preparedness and 
response plans, whilst features of the response during a pandemic (phase 
6) include containment of the emerging virus and strategies to mitigate 
the effects on society (WHO 2009b).  
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1.2 Virology 
 
Influenza belongs to the Orthomyxoviridae family of ribonucleic acid (RNA) 
viruses. Three types of influenza exist; A, B and C which are classified 
serologically based on major antigenic differences. Influenza A has a 
diverse array of animal hosts including birds, humans, horses, pigs and 
marine mammals. Influenza B and C on the other hand are essentially 
restricted to humans. Influenza A causes the most common and the most 
serious infections and has the potential for both epidemic and pandemic 
spread. In contrast influenza B and C tend to cause milder disease and do 
not cause pandemics (Zambon 2001). The discussion that follows is 
largely limited to influenza A. 
 
Influenza A is an enveloped virus that possesses negative sense RNA 
which is organised into eight gene segments that encode nine structural 
and one or two non-structural proteins. The virus exists in many different 
subtypes, based on antigenic differences in its envelope glycoproteins 
which either possess haemagglutinin (HA) or neuraminidase (NA) activity. 
Sixteen HA and nine NA subtypes have been identified to date (Obenauer 
et al, 2006). These glycoproteins have a critical role to play in binding host 
cell receptors. The HA proteins project from the envelope surface creating 
a host cell receptor binding site, whilst the NA protein has enzymatic 
activity which removes terminal sialic acids from glycoproteins and plays a 
role in the release of progeny virus from infected cells. Only HA types 1, 2 
and 3 and NA types 1 and 2 are currently responsible for stable (as 
opposed to sporadic) human infections. 
 
Avian influenza viruses in aquatic birds serve as the main reservoir for all 
known subtypes of influenza A. Interspecies transmission of influenza can 
5 
 
occur but it is restricted by certain host factors. The determinants of host 
specificity are not entirely clear but almost certainly involve the HA and NA 
glycoproteins as well as the polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2). The role of 
HA has been shown by studying the receptors on epithelial cells. In man 
influenza viruses have a preference for receptors showing sialic acid ± 
JDODFWRVHOLQNDJHVRIĮZKHUHDVDYLDQYLUXVHVLQFRPSDULVRQVKRZ
SUHIHUHQFHIRUĮOLQNDJHV (Zambon 2001). Interestingly the pig shows 
ĮDQGĮW\SHUHFHSWors in respiratory epithelial cells which explains 
why this animal is susceptible to both human and avian viruses (Ito et al, 
1998).  
 
Human adapted strains are thought to arise through two separate 
mechanisms; i) direct transmission from birds with subsequent virus 
adaptation in a human host, ii) transmission from birds via an 
LQWHUPHGLDWHKRVWHJDSLJ,QWKLVLQVWDQFHWKHSLJVHUYHVDVDµPL[LQJ
YHVVHO¶IRUDYLDQDQGKXPDQYLUXVHVZKHUHYLUDO51$FDQEHH[FKDQJHG
resulting in a reassorted virus capable of causing human disease 
(Scholtissek et al, 1985; Kida et al, 1994). 
 
The evolutionary success of influenza can be ascribed to two main factors 
(Webster et al, 1997); 
1. The animal reservoir in birds and the large number of possible strains 
2. The ability of the virus to undergo genetic change 
 
Two processes allow for genetic variation of the virus; antigenic drift and 
antigenic shift. The changes that result can allow the virus to evade 
humoral immunity and this provides a selection advantage. Antigenic drift 
is brought about by the infidelity of the RNA polymerase. This leads to 
amino acid changes in the major antigenic proteins HA and NA (other 
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proteins are more conserved) with the result that every 1-2 years, the 
predominant strain of influenza A is replaced by a variant able to evade 
existing antibody responses. Antigenic shift is the result of viral 
reassortment, a process facilitated by the segmented nature of the viral 
genome. Reassortment occurs when two different viruses meet in the 
same cell and exchange genetic material. The 1957/58 pandemic for 
example, was caused by a reassortment event between a human H1N1 
virus and an avian H2N2 virus. The HA, NA and polymerase basic 1 (PB1) 
genes of the avian virus combined with the five remaining human origin 
genes to create an H2N2 reassortant virus capable of causing disease and 
being transmitted by humans (Scholtissek et al, 1978). Such viruses may 
not have the ability to infect human cells initially but given evolutionary 
time, adaptations may occur and indeed the 1918 pandemic virus may 
have originated in this way (Taubenberger et al, 1997). 
 
 
1.3 Pathology 
 
In humans influenza viruses replicate in epithelial cells lining both the 
upper and lower respiratory tree. Non fatal cases tend to involve the upper 
tract whilst most fatal cases are associated with pneumonia (Taubenberger 
and Morens 2008). The HA molecules bind to cell surface receptors and 
once the virus has gained entry to a cell, replication occurs followed by 
release of progeny virus. This process ultimately leads to cell death by a 
number of mechanisms including loss of critical cellular proteins and 
apoptosis. 
  
It is likely that cell death and associated inflammation are the cause of the 
typical respiratory tract symptoms whilst systemic effects such as fever 
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and myalgia are caused by inflammatory mediators such as cytokines. 
Concomitant bacterial infection can often complicate the picture and 
organisms such as Staphylococcus aureus, Haemophilus influenzae and 
Streptococcus pneumonia are frequently implicated. The well recognized 
propensity to bacterial super-infection may be related to impairment of 
ciliary clearance mechanisms, increased bacterial adherence to epithelial 
linings and defects in neutrophil and mononuclear cells caused by virus 
infection (Treanor 2010). The host response to infection involves both 
innate and adaptive responses. Adaptive responses include the production 
of strain-specific antibodies, which exert selective pressure on circulating 
influenza viruses and which drive antigenic drift of seasonal influenza 
viruses, especially in the hemagglutinin molecule. This antigenic drift 
necessitates updating of seasonal influenza vaccines regularly in order to 
match the circulating strains. Infection also induces virus-specific T cell 
responses which are mainly directed to conserved proteins. Both T cell and 
to a lesser extent antibody mediated immunity contribute to so-called 
heterosubtypic immunity; immune responses which show cross-reactivity 
with a variety of influenza A viruses of different subtypes and may afford 
protection against antigenically distinct, influenza viruses (Kreitjz et al, 
2011. 
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1.4 Epidemiology 
 
In general three distinct epidemiological forms of influenza disease are 
recognized; local outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics. 
 
1.4.1 Epidemics 
An influenza epidemic is defined as an outbreak of the disease, with 
numbers of cases above that normally expected in a given population over 
a given period of time. The HPA has defined the baseline threshold for 
µQRUPDOVHDVRQDODFWLYLW\¶in England as 30 GP consultations per week/ 
100,000 population. The epidemic threshold would be reached if the 
number of consultations surpassed 200 per week/100,000 (HPA 2012). 
They are usually associated with minor antigenic changes (drift) of 
previously circulating viruses. The number of cases rises sharply over 2-3 
weeks and peaks at around week 6. Epidemics tends to finish rather 
abruptly, the reasons for this are not entirely clear and cannot be 
attributed solely to a lack of susceptible persons. The typical attack rate 
during an epidemic is 10-20% of susceptible persons though this can be 
higher in specific age groups e.g. schoolchildren. Clinically an epidemic is 
characterized by an increase in febrile respiratory illness in children, 
followed by influenza like illness (ILI) in adults which triggers an increase 
in hospital admissions [typically exacerbations of Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease (COPD) and pneumonia] and work absenteeism (Monto 
and Kioumehr 1975; Glezen et al, 1987).  
 
Until 2009, strains of influenza A H1N1 and H3N2 had been co-circulating 
worldwide. In the years immediately prior to 2009 influenza activity in the 
United Kingdom (UK), as measured by General Practitioner (GP) 
consultation rates had been low (Fleming and Elliot 2008). In fact the last 
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time the UK experienced an epidemic was in 2000 (Figure 1.1). This 
reflects the degree of population immunity that built up due to continuing 
presence of both subtypes and a lack of significant antigenic drift. It 
remains to be seen what the effect of the 2009 pandemic and the 
resultant dominance of the H1N1 subtype will have on outbreaks in the 
coming years. 
 
Excess deaths are well known to occur during influenza seasons but 
estimating the true burden that influenza exacts on populations is not 
straightforward and a variety of measures such as GP consultations, 
hospitalisations and deaths are used to illustrate it. The data generated 
however is often insensitive, being complicated by the often non specific 
nature of influenza illness, lack of microbiological diagnosis and secondary 
infections/complications which can lead to inaccurate hospital episode 
records and death certification. Data from between 1996 and 2004 have 
been used to provide estimates of disease burden in the UK (Pitman et al, 
2007). Between 10,500 ± 25,000 deaths, 800,000 GP consultations and 
28,000 hospital admissions were attributable to influenza (A+B) annually. 
The elderly account for the majority of deaths whilst the young, 
particularly pre-school children, suffer the highest attack rates. 
Hospitalisations and death rates are very much more increased in those 
ZKRKDYHXQGHUO\LQJµKLJKULVN¶FRQGLWLRQVZKLFKFRPSOLFDWHLQIOXHQ]D
infection e.g. chronic cardiac, pulmonary and renal conditions, diabetes 
and immunosuppressed states (Barker and Mullooly 1980). In ageing 
populations such as those seen in many developed countries, such 
conditions are more prevalent and this has been associated with increasing 
hospitalization and death rates over recent decades (Thompson et al, 
2003). The predominance of the H3N2 subtype over the last two decades 
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has played a significant role as this has been shown to be a more virulent 
virus than H1N1 (Kaji et al, 2003; Thompson et al, 2003).  
 
Figure 1.1: Excess winter deaths, England and Wales, 1999/2000±
2009/2010. Source; (Office for National Statistics 2010). 
 
 
 
 
1.4.2 Pandemics 
Influenza pandemics have affected man throughout history; it has been 
speculated that since 1500 there have been at least 14 (Potter 2001; 
Taubenberger and Morens 2009). Two conditions must be met for an 
outbreak of influenza to be called a pandemic. The first is that the virus 
must be novel (specifically the HA) and the second is that the virus having 
originated in a specific location must spread around the world. Spread is 
facilitated by the presence of susceptible populations that have no 
significant pre-existing immunity. Clinical attack rates in the range of 25-
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40% are seen. The pandemic of 1918-19 is thought to have affected 25% 
RIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQDQGFDXVHGWKHdeath of at least 50 million 
people (Johnson and Mueller 2002) whilst the pandemics of 1957-58 and 
1968-69 are thought to have been responsible for the deaths of 1 and 0.5 
million people respectively (Potter 2001). The occurrence and severity of 
pandemics can be difficult to predict as exemplified by the 2009 pandemic. 
Preparedness activities prior to 2009 had focused on a pandemic virus 
originating in Asia (because of the high density and close proximity of pig, 
bird and human populations) and had assumed that high attack and 
mortality rates would be encountered. Instead, disease emerged in Mexico 
(the origins of the virus itself remain uncertain) and it was ultimately 
observed to be a mild infection in the vast majority (Writing Committee of 
the WHO Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Pandemic Influenza 2010). 
 
1.4.3 Epidemiological uncertainties 
Some epidemiological aspects of influenza remain uncertain; for example, 
where does the virus reside during periods of relative inactivity? What 
forces determine the appearance of epidemics? Why are epidemics so 
explosive?  
 
For some infectious diseases (e.g. measles) outbreaks can be predicted. 
Infections appear when levels of population immunity fall below certain 
thresholds, i.e. a certain proportion of susceptible individuals exist. 
Influenza however, does not necessarily show such simple dynamics. The 
fact that the virus is not antigenically stable and the influence of host and 
environmental factors make the epidemiology of influenza more 
complicated. A case in point is the seasonality of influenza. 
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Both influenza outbreaks and epidemics show marked seasonality. In 
temperate parts of the world viruses are thought to persist at low levels 
throughout the year but exhibit a marked increase most often in winter. 
Influenza also occurs in tropical climates; however, here infections tend to 
occur more evenly throughout the year. The reasons for this seasonality in 
temperate zones remain to be conclusively proven and many theories 
abound (Lofgren et al, 2007; Cannell et al, 2008; Lowen et al, 2008; 
Tamerius et al, 2010).  
 Environmental conditions ± transmission of influenza is affected by 
temperature and humidity (Lowen et al, 2007) with absolute humidity 
being most strongly associated (Shaman and Kohn 2009); low 
temperature and low humidity are known to favour virus survival 
(McDevitt et al, 2010 & Hood 1963). Reduced levels of UV light in 
winter time may facilitate airborne virus survival (but only outdoors) 
(Sagripanti and Lytle 2007). Prevailing air currents may carry airborne 
virus across the globe at certain times of the year (Hammond et al, 
1989). 
 Host susceptibility ± it has been suggested that host resistance to 
infection wanes in winter;  the effect of temperature and humidity on 
airways (Shadrin et al, 1977) and levels of vitamin D (Cannel et al, 
2008) and melatonin (Dowell 2001) have been implicated. Viral 
interference (the inhibition of influenza infection caused by infection 
with other respiratory viruses) has also been proposed as a factor 
(Linde et al, 2009). 
 Contact rates ± people tend to spend more time indoors during winter 
time or rainy seasons and schools (which are regarded as important 
transmission sites) are closed for prolonged periods during summer 
(Lofgren et al, 2007). 
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It is unlikely that one theory alone can explain the phenomenon and it 
may well be a complex interaction of mechanisms that is responsible. 
 
1.5 Influenza Transmission and Infection Control 
 
A key part of protecting the public from the threat of influenza is being 
able to prevent or reduce the spread of infection. Mitigation strategies can 
be population orientated (e.g. vaccination and social distancing) or more 
individualised (e.g. hand hygiene and the use of face masks) but the 
success of each is largely influenced by the nature of infection 
transmission. Furthermore, during a pandemic many non-pharmaceutical 
interventions may assume greater significance in limiting transmission 
than pharmaceutical interventions (e.g. vaccines and antivirals) which may 
not be available to all. 
 
1.5.1 Transmission 
Influenza is a disease of the respiratory tract and this is reflected in the 
symptoms caused by infection, e.g. cough, sore throat, blocked nose. 
Infection spreads when virus from the respiratory tract of one person is 
transmitted to the respiratory tract of another person. Infection 
transmission can occur by three routes, all of which begin with the 
production of virus containing particles by actions such as coughing and 
sneezing. It is the size and fate of these particles that determines which 
route(s) of infection may act; 
 Large droplets; these particles can deposit on mucous surfaces of the 
upper respiratory tract (URT) such as the mouth and nose. They can 
be inspired but not respired (they are too large to reach the lungs). 
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 Droplet nuclei (hereafter referred to as aerosols); these particles are 
small enough to be respired and reach the lower respiratory tract (LRT) 
and they may also deposit on surfaces in the URT. 
 Contact transmission; Particles are collected on the hand(s) and then 
transferred to mucous membranes of the upper respiratory tract. This 
can occur as a result of direct contact with an infected person or via 
contact with particles which have been deposited in the environment 
e.g. on surfaces. 
 
1.5.2 Infection Control 
Two broad categories of infection control precautions can be considered in 
healthcare settings. Standard infection control precautions should be 
followed during every encounter between a healthcare professional and a 
patient on the basis that many transmissible infections may not be 
immediately evident. Standard precautions include environmental hygiene, 
hand hygiene and the use of personal protective equipment (gloves and 
aprons). Transmission based infection control precautions build on 
standard precautions and include measures to protect against specific 
types of transmission when a particular infection is suspected or has been 
FRQILUPHG7KHVHVSHFLILFSUHFDXWLRQVFRYHUGURSOHWFRQWDFWDQGµDLUERUQH¶
(referring to aerosol) transmission. 
 
Although the relative importance of the routes of influenza transmission 
are hotly debated, practically (and historically) influenza is regarded as 
being transmitted primarily by the droplet and/or contact route of 
transmission and infection control guidance from different countries 
reflects this (Department of Health 2009; CDC 2010b). On this basis the 
following standard and droplet based infection control precautions are 
recommended to prevent or reduce the transmission of influenza (NB 
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whilst these precautions are aimed primarily at healthcare settings, many 
of them are also applicable to the wider community): 
 Distancing; close contact between people has been consistently 
demonstrated in epidemiological studies to be associated with influenza 
transmission and this observation has led to a number of 
recommendations. 
¾ Those with acute symptoms of influenza are advised to isolate 
themselves from others. This might involve taking time off work or 
school and staying at home. In a healthcare setting this would 
entail placing patients in isolation rooms or cohorting a group of 
patients in a specific area. 
¾ %DVHGRQNQRZOHGJHRIKRZIDUGURSOHWVFDQVSUHDGDµVDIHW\
GLVWDQFH¶RIbetween 1-2m around infected patients is used; within 
this zone facemasks should be worn. 
 Environmental hygiene; settled droplets pose a risk for contact 
transmission and simple cleaning of commonly touched surfaces with 
water and detergents or other household cleaning agents can 
effectively remove virus. 
 Respiratory hygiene includes the use of hands and tissues to catch 
respiratory droplets that are released during coughing and sneezing. 
Tissues should be thrown away and hands washed after each event. 
 Hand hygiene has been shown to be effective in reducing a variety of 
respiratory and gastrointestinal infections. By removing virus from 
hands, the contact route of transmission is interrupted. 
 Personal protective equipment includes the use of disposable gloves 
DQGDSURQVWRSUHYHQWFRQWDPLQDWLRQRIWKHZHDUHU¶VKDQGVDQGFORWKHV
respectively. 
 Surgical face masks (SFMs) were initially used by healthcare workers 
(HCWs) undertaking surgical procedures to help maintain a sterile field 
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but their use to protect HCWs from infectious patients is also 
longstanding, dating back to the 1918 pandemic. SFMs act as a barrier 
to droplets and can be used in two ways to prevent/reduce influenza 
transmission. They can be worn by an infected person to block the 
release of droplets or they can be worn by a susceptible person to 
prevent droplets reaching their URT. By virtue of the fact that they 
cover the nose and mouth they can also reduce hand to face contact 
and therefore contact transmission. The use of masks is not generally 
recommended for the public for a number of reasons including the fact 
that if not used or disposed of properly they could pose an infection 
risk themselves. 
 
In some circumstances the use of aerosol (airborne) precautions in 
addition to standard and droplet precautions should be put in place, for 
example when known aerosol generating procedures are taking place (e.g. 
tracheal intubation, bronchoscopy). These precautions might include the 
use of ventilation systems, ultraviolet light and respirators. Respirators are 
face masks that are designed to protect the wearer from aerosols. They 
are able to filter out the small particles (droplet nuclei) that constitute an 
aerosol whereas SFMs in general do not. Respirators however, do have 
some drawbacks; they are relatively expensive compared to SFMs, they 
require the wearer to undergo a fit test to ensure that a mask fits and 
functions properly and they can be uncomfortable to wear for prolonged 
periods.  
 
Influenza poses some specific challenges to infection control. Firstly, the 
pressures brought to bear on healthcare systems during a pandemic may 
be enormous, magnifying the need to prevent nosocomial infection and to 
reassure and protect staff. Secondly, there may be instances during a 
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pandemic when the general public are advised to practice transmission 
based precautions (e.g. use of SFMs) and finally pharmaceutical control of 
disease (through vaccination or antivirals) may be deficient because of 
poor uptake, unavailability or sub-optimal response. The importance 
therefore of evidence based non-pharmaceutical infection control 
recommendations, especially in the setting of a disease causing high 
morbidity and mortality cannot be overstated. However, a critical question 
for influenza infection control is what is the relative significance of each of 
the routes of transmission? The answer to this question is unknown and in 
particular the role played by aerosols is unclear. This has led to 
considerable debate about the need to protect HCWs from aerosol 
transmission of influenza and which face masks to use. It is not surprising 
that the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC), the US Institute of 
Medicine (IOM), and the WHO have all prioritized understanding the 
modes of influenza transmission as an important requirement for 
pandemic planning (ECDC 2007; IOM 2007; WHO 2009c). 
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1.6 Exploring Transmission Research Gaps 
 
To provide the best infection control advice we need to know the precise 
details about how influenza is transmitted and the factors that may affect 
this. Nearly a century has passed since the first studies of influenza 
transmission were conducted and many questions remain unanswered, for 
example; 
 What is the relative significance of the different routes of influenza 
transmission? 
 Do transmission routes differ in different settings? 
 What is the extent and significance of virus deposition in the 
environment? 
 What environmental factors influence transmission? 
 What is the relative effectiveness of hand hygiene, SFMs and 
respirators in preventing transmission? 
 What other interventions may be used to reduce transmission? 
 How important is transmission from asymptomatic and pre-
symptomatic individuals? 
 
The research contained within this thesis has attempted to explore some 
of these questions, including consideration of how best to answer them. In 
the next section, the current evidence base concerning influenza 
transmission is examined with a particular focus on influenza 
epidemiology, determinants of transmission and routes of transmission. 
This literature review provides the platform on which further study can be 
built. Research undertaken that contributes to this thesis, along with 
discussion is presented in Chapters 3-5, before a final section draws 
conclusions and looks to the future. 
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Reducing the impact and spread of influenza epidemics and pandemics is 
central to national and international preparedness plans. Mitigation 
strategies can include vaccination, antiviral use and social distancing, but 
their effectiveness is highly dependent on a precise and detailed 
knowledge of both the epidemiology (dynamics) and biology 
(determinants) of influenza transmission. Similarly the effectiveness of 
more individualised infection control recommendations such as hand 
hygiene and the use of face masks depend on how infection is transmitted. 
What follows is a review of the literature and evidence base that underpins 
our current understanding of influenza transmission and it is from this 
platform that the investigations conducted as part of this thesis were 
developed. It begins with an overview of influenza epidemiology and 
explores other factors affecting person-to-person transmission before 
going on to consider routes of transmission in more detail. 
 
2.1 Influenza Epidemiology 
 
A range of specific measurements have been defined in order to assess 
the transmissibility of an infectious disease. For influenza most of these 
measurements have been calculated in relation to household transmission; 
the home is regarded as the place where the frequency and intensity of 
infectious contact is highest. These measurements offer insights into the 
complex nature of disease transmission and have a crucial role to play in 
our attempts to control disease. 
 
2.1.1 Reproductive number 
The reproductive number (R0) is defined as the average number of 
secondary cases which one typical infected case would produce in a 
completely susceptible population. It gives a measure of how a disease 
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might spread through a population; an R0 of >1 means that a disease will 
spread whilst an R0 <1 means that a disease will die out. R0 depends on 
the characteristics of the infectious agent (e.g. infectivity and duration of 
infectiousness) and of the population (e.g. population density and social 
mixing patterns). It can therefore differ between infections in the same 
population but also for the same infection in different populations. Measles 
is regarded as a highly transmissible disease. In England and Wales the R0 
has been estimated to be between 14-18, i.e. on average one infected 
case will pass on the infection to 14-18 others (Anderson and May 1982). 
The coronavirus that caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) epidemics in 2003 was estimated to have a R0 of between 2-5 
over a range of countries that were affected (Wallinga and Teunis 2004). 
Influenza by comparison often has a R0 of <2 but because of genetic 
variation of the influenza virus brought about by antigenic drift and shift 
this can vary both between and within epidemics/pandemics. Based on 
historical estimates and empiric data the R0 of influenza can be classified 
DVKLJK§PRGHUDWH§DQGORZ§SDQGHPLFYLUXVHVWHQGWRKDYH
higher values whilst viruses that circulate during inter-pandemic periods 
have lower ones (Ferguson et al, 2006). A review of studies that reported 
the R0 for the 2009 pandemic virus showed a range of 1.2±2.3 with a 
median of 1.5 (Boelle et al, 2011).  
 
2.1.2 Serial Interval 
The serial interval (SI) is defined as the duration of time between the 
onset of symptoms in an index case and the onset of symptoms in a 
secondary case. It is composed of the infectious period and the incubation 
SHULRGDQGLVLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWUDQVPLVVLRQPRGHOVDVWKHµJHQHUDWLRQ
WLPH¶DYHUDJHWLPHEHWZHHQWKHLQIHFWLRQRIDQLQIHFWRUDQGWKHLQIHFWLRQ
of their infectees). Estimates will be virus, host and methodology (e.g. 
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laboratory v clinical diagnosis, management of confounders) specific. 
Estimates for influenza range from 1-2 days (1918 pandemic (Sertsou et 
al, 2006)), 2-3 days [2009 pandemic (Boelle et al, 2011)] and 3-4 days 
(seasonal influenza in France (Viboud et al, 2004)). Cowling et al 
estimated an SI of 3.6 in Hong Kong during 2007 and,  based on 
estimates that the incubation period of influenza is 1.4 days (Lessler et al, 
2009), they suggest that the infectious period may be around 2 days 
(Cowling et al, 2009b). This is backed up by data generated during the 
2009 pandemic. Donnelly et al observed an SI of 2.9 days and estimated 
that 82% of household transmissions occurred with 2 days of illness in the 
index case (Donnelly et al, 2011). France et al (using slightly different 
methodology) derived an estimate for the serial interval of 3 days in a 
school based outbreak in New York. They noted that 50% of secondary 
cases occurred within 3 days of illness onset in the index case giving an 
infectious period of 1.6 days in this group (France et al, 2010). 
 
2.1.3 Secondary Attack Rate 
The secondary attack rate (SAR) is the proportion of household contacts in 
whom illness occurs after the onset of symptoms in an index case. 
Traditionally SAR has been used to measure household transmission but it 
is recognised that this can be difficult to do because it is hard to separate 
out true secondary infections from co-primary, tertiary and community 
acquired infections (Kemper 1980). The term µsubsequent attack rate¶ has 
been proposed as an umbrella term to account for these issues (Cannell et 
al, 2008) while others have attempted to account for confounding of the 
true SAR through the use of modelling (Longini et al, 1982; Cauchemez et 
al, 2009a; Donnelly et al, 2011). 
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Numerous estimates of the SAR for influenza have been derived from 
empiric household data and they range from 8-45% (Longini et al, 1982; 
Viboud et al, 2004; Cauchemez et al, 2009a; Yang et al, 2009; Cowling et 
al, 2010a; France et al, 2010; Papenburg et al, 2010). However, 
considerable variation exits in both the circumstances and methodologies 
used to generate them e.g. virus subtype, social structure, population 
immunity, environmental factors, how cases were recruited and defined, 
number of households observed, % of household members who were 
children and statistical methods employed.  
 
2.1.4 Utility of epidemiologic data 
Data that describe the epidemiology of influenza transmission provide a 
fascinating insight into the dynamics of transmission and serve to highlight 
the considerable variation that occurs between outbreaks. Crucially, these 
data can be used to plan and assess the potential effectiveness of a 
variety of infection control strategies;  
 R0 can be used to estimate attack rates and the speed of spread of 
infection nationally and internationally. It is possible to incorporate 
these data into models that predict the effectiveness of specific 
mitigation strategies, e.g. antivirals, travel restrictions, school closure 
and vaccination (Ferguson et al, 2006; Yang et al, 2009). 
 Knowledge of the SI of a disease can help inform infection control 
policy at an individual level. Diseases with a short SI (e.g. influenza) 
can be difficult to control as there is little time to prevent onward 
transmission whereas it is easier to interrupt the spread of infection 
caused by diseases with a longer SI (e.g. SARS). Both pharmacological 
interventions (e.g. antivirals) and non-pharmacological interventions 
(e.g. hand hygiene, face masks) used to combat the spread of 
influenza should be implemented as early as possible. Data showing 
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that the infectious period for influenza is usually no longer than 2 days 
are used to determine advice on self isolation (CDC 2009a). The SI 
also has important consequences for research into interventions; if 
interventions cannot be deployed early enough any effect might be 
significantly underestimated.  
 Several authors have attempted to estimate the origin of infection in 
household members; Yang et al estimate that 30-40% occur within the 
household and 20% in schools (Yang et al, 2009); Ferguson et al 
estimate that 30% occur in households, 33% in the general community 
and 37% in schools and workplaces (Ferguson et al, 2006) whilst 
Donnelly et al estimate that 23% of infections arise outside of the 
household (Donnelly et al, 2011). Using data from an epidemic in 
1977-78, Longini et al estimated that the probability that an individual 
would become infected via a community source was 13% compared to 
15% for a household source. Again, these data can be used to help 
select the most appropriate intervention strategies. 
 
An important issue is the unpredictability of the transmission dynamics of 
the next pandemic. Models are based on assumptions and include 
estimates such as R0 and the effectiveness of antivirals to reduce an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLQIHFWLRXVSHULRG:KLOVWHVWLPDWHVFDQEHPDGHWUXHYDOXHV
are only ever known after the event and it requires considered judgement 
to implement policies based on assumptions that could have a major 
impact on the well being of populations in real time. 
 
Epidemiologic data also pose some intriguing questions about the 
transmission of influenza. Whilst it is clear that it can be a highly infectious 
virus, the SARs often observed and calculated (usually in the region of 
25%) are surprisingly low. Furthermore, most households do not see 
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multiple cases. Mann et al found that 73% of infected family members 
were actually index cases (Mann et al, 1981), i.e. infection did not result 
from contact with an ill patient in a household whilst Hope-Simpson in a 
study spanning 8 years noted that 70% of households only had one 
influenza case (Hope-Simpson 1979). As a comparison SARs of 58%, 70% 
and 71% have been observed for rhinovirus, measles and varicella 
respectively (Fox et al, 1975; Narain et al, 1989; Seward et al, 2004). 
However, there are instances where SARs for influenza have appeared to 
be greater than 50% (Blumenfeld et al, 1959; Moser et al, 1979). This 
suggests that considerable variation in the transmission of influenza 
infection from sick to well people can exist.  
 
In an attempt to explain these observations, Cannell et al propose that 
infected individuals are either good or bad transmitters, with a minority of 
good transmitters being responsible for spread of most infection (Cannell 
et al, 2008). This might also explain some of the variations seen in R0, SIs 
and SARs (as findings could depend on the proportion of good transmitters 
in a given population) and the fact that epidemics seem to end so abruptly 
(as a minority population of immune susceptible good transmitters are 
used up). There is good evidence to show that heterogeneity of 
infectiousness exists for a number of diseases. The concept of super-
spreading, transmission of directly transmitted infections (e.g. measles, 
influenza and SARS) to an unusually large numbers of secondary cases 
from a source case, has been advanced by several authors (Woolhouse et 
al, 1997; Lloyd-Smith et al, 2005). 
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2.2 Factors Affecting Person-to-Person Transmission 
 
Transmission of an infectious disease is the process by which an infectious 
organism moves from one host to another and causes disease. There are 
many factors which contribute to and influence this process and to 
appreciate them one must first understand the basic pathophysiology of a 
disease process. 
 
Influenza replicates in epithelial cells throughout the respiratory tree (both 
upper and lower tracts) (Zambon 2001). Human viruses preferentially bind 
to cell surface receptors (sialyloligosaccharides) terminated by a N-
acetylsialic acid linked to galactose by an Į(2,6)-linkage (Rogers and 
Paulson 1983). The predominance of these receptors in different tissues 
reflects the tropism seen, e.g. Į(2,6) are found mainly in the human 
respiratory tract (Shinya et al, 2006). As a result both virus entry and exit 
in humans occurs through the respiratory tract i.e. mouth and nose. Virus 
is released from a host during events such as coughing and sneezing 
ZKLFKSURGXFHDµUHVSLUDWRU\VSUD\¶RIGLIIHUHQWVL]HGSDUWLFOHVRQZKLFh 
virus travels. It has also been shown the particles are released during 
talking and breathing (Papineni and Rosenthal 1997; Xie et al, 2009). 
Virus gains entry to a new host via respiration (droplet nuclei) and/or 
inhalation (droplets and droplet nuclei) and/or direct contact (droplets) 
and/or indirect contact (settled droplets). From here the target epithelial 
cells can be reached. The potential of the conjunctiva to mediate 
transmission of human influenza viruses remains uncertain (Weber and 
Stilianakis 2008) though data from tropism experiments with pandemic 
H1N1 (Chan et al, 2010b) and outbreaks of avian H7 viruses in humans 
that are marked by conjunctivitis confirms the presence of Į
receptors in the eye (Olofsson et al, 2005).  There is very little evidence to 
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suggest that the faecal-oral or waterborne route of transmission occurs in 
humans, in contrast to transmission that occurs amongst birds (Webster et 
al, 1978; WHO 2007). By considering the transmission pathway outlined 
above we can see that factors related to the virus, the environment and 
the host all contribute to transmission (Figure 2.1). To formulate and 
implement effective influenza control measures such as personal hygiene, 
social distancing and infection control it is critical to understand the above 
factors as each of these in turn can influence the route(s) of transmission 
that are active. 
 
Figure 2.1: Factors that affect influenza transmission. 
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2.2.1 Viral Factors  
The ability of different viral subtypes to infect and replicate in cells in the 
human respiratory tree varies. This has been attributed to differential 
binding of viruses to sialic acid receptors in the respiratory tree, and has 
been used to explain the observation that human infection with avian 
H5N1 viruses appears to predominate in the LRT and why human to 
human transmission is hardly seen (Shinya et al, 2006), though some 
studies suggest a more complex picture (Nicholls et al, 2008). Through the 
use of animal models a better understanding of the viral determinants of 
transmission is developing. The HA and polymerase proteins seem to be 
important, though the variety and interplay of traits is intricate, some 
seeming to hinder transmission whilst others permit it through different 
routes. (Belser et al, 2010). 
 
2.2.2 Environmental Conditions 
The ability of virus to survive outside the human body is critical for 
infection transmission to occur. For example, virus must survive in air or 
on surfaces to be able to transmit via aerosols and indirect contact 
respectively. Variables such as temperature and humidity have been 
shown to affect this (Wells and Brown 1936; Loosli et al, 1943; McDevitt 
et al, 2010). Furthermore the influence of temperature and humidity has 
been demonstrated in transmission experiments between animals (Lowen 
et al, 2007; Lowen et al, 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Human Factors (infector/infectee) 
 Immunity 
Levels of immunity (both humoral and cell mediated) to particular viral 
subtypes in a population may explain in part the different rates of infection 
seen. In seasonal influenza, the burden of illness typically falls upon the 
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young and the elderly, either because of deficient immunity or a 
susceptibility to complications of influenza infection (Barker and Mullooly 
1980; Thompson et al, 2003; Mullooly et al, 2007; Pitman et al, 2007). 
Because pandemic viruses are antigenically novel, a lack of pre-existing 
immunity in a population will be expected. However, the 2009 pandemic 
was notable for the fact that a significant proportion (about a third) of the 
population over the age of 65 had cross reactive antibodies compared to 
LQ\RXQJHUDGXOWVDQGYHU\OLWWOHLQFKLOGUHQ(Hancock et al, 2009; 
Miller et al, 2010). Immunocompromised individuals are known to have a 
higher frequency of influenza infections (Kunisaki and Janoff 2009) and 
once infected they can shed virus for a prolonged period (Hayden 1997; 
Lee et al, 2009). 
 
 Age 
A recurring risk factor for transmission is young age; both young age of 
index cases (Viboud et al, 2004; Cauchemez et al, 2009a) and young age 
of contacts (Viboud et al, 2004; France et al, 2010; Papenburg et al, 
2010) have been significantly associated with transmission. Viboud et al 
estimate that 40-48% of transmissions in a household are attributable to 
sick children (Viboud et al, 2004). Longini et al found that the probability 
of community infection was higher in households with children compared 
to those without suggesting that schools and nurseries play an important 
role in disease spread (Longini et al, 1982). In addition, a study that 
looked at social contact networks in young people found evidence of 
super-spreaders (Glass and Glass 2008). The importance of children in the 
spread of viral respiratory infections, including influenza, is widely 
recognised (Monto 2002; McLean et al, 2010) and may be explained by a 
number of factors including increased numbers of contacts, lower levels of  
immunity (Longini et al, 1988), increased duration and levels of viral 
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shedding (Frank et al, 1981; Welliver et al, 2001; Sato et al, 2005; Cao et 
al, 2009; To et al, 2010) and poor respiratory and hand hygiene.  
 
 Viral shedding 
An individual who sheds more virus (via droplets and aerosols) into the 
HQYLURQPHQWRUZKR¶VGXUDWLRQof viral shedding is longer than average 
could be more infectious. The dynamics of viral shedding are important 
factors, highly relevant to estimates of the period of infectivity and to 
therapeutic management. Shedding is determined by measurement of the 
qXDQWLW\RIYLUXVUHFRYHUDEOHIURPWKHSDWLHQW¶VQDVRSKDU\Q[,WLVZHOO
established that viral titres in nasopharyngeal samples taken from adults 
are proportional to symptom severity and decline steadily from symptom 
onset (Boivin et al, 2000; Treanor et al, 2000; Lee et al, 2009; Lau et al, 
2010; Ng et al, 2010). Studies of patients infected with influenza A in the 
community show that the mean duration of viral shedding [detected by 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR)] for seasonal influenza A viruses is 5-6 
days from symptom onset (Lau et al, 2010; Ng et al, 2010) compared with 
culture methods which are normally negative by Day 6 (Boivin et al, 2000; 
Lau et al, 2010).  It is also well documented that children, patients with 
chronic illnesses, hospitalised patients and those who are 
immunocompromised can shed live virus for longer periods (Frank et al, 
1981; Sato et al, 2005; Leekha et al, 2007; Lee et al, 2009). Use of 
systemic steroid by patients with asthma or COPD can also prolong 
shedding (Lee et al, 2009).  
 
Whilst PCR is almost certainly a more sensitive measure of viral shedding 
because it detects both viable and non-viable virus, it is not possible to 
distinguish between them. Thus it can only illustrate the potential for 
viable (infectious) virus to be present. As this is the most common method 
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of assessing viral shedding in clinical practice, its interpretation can create 
problems in deciding whether a patient is infectious or not. However, there 
have also been difficulties in deciphering studies looking at live virus 
because of the range of techniques used for detection (cell lines, animal 
models and human beings) and variation in sensitivities between and even 
within such methods, e.g. a human infective dose is likely to differ from a 
tissue culture infectious dose. 
 
Despite these issues, knowledge of viral shedding patterns can be useful in 
determining the optimal impact of a range of infection control measures;  
 Self-isolation ± Based on the duration of viral shedding and estimates 
of the infectious period, guidelines suggest that infected individuals 
should self- isolate themselves until they have been free of fever for 24 
hours whilst hospitalised individuals should be isolated for 7 days from 
the onset of illness (CDC 2009a). Self-isolation means avoiding 
unnecessary contact with others, particularly individuals who might be 
at high risk of becoming infected or of developing complications from 
infection. This often means taking time off work or school. This advice 
could potentially have a big impact on populations, for example the 
economic impact of lost work days. Therefore, a careful balance must 
be struck between safety and practicality and this may well differ 
between settings.  
 Antivirals ± Antiviral drugs have been shown to reduce both the 
amount and duration of viral shedding and earlier treatment (within 48 
hours) leads to a bigger effect (Nicholson et al, 2000; Treanor et al, 
2000; Aoki et al, 2003; Baccam et al, 2006; Lee et al, 2009; Li et al, 
2010; Ling et al, 2010). Antivirals are also associated with reduced 
symptom severity and accelerated symptom resolution (Nicholson et 
al, 2000; Treanor et al, 2000). Despite these findings however, an 
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effect on infectiousness has been difficult to prove (Halloran et al, 
2007; Ng et al, 2010). 
 
An important feature of infection in some individuals is that they shed 
virus but do not experience symptoms. This may happen early in the 
course of infection before symptoms begin (pre-symptomatic shedding) or 
exist throughout the course of an infection if symptoms do not develop 
(asymptomatic shedding). Such individuals may not seek treatment or 
self-isolate and therefore may be an important group.  Models have 
typically assumed that asymptomatic or subclinical infections make up 33-
50% of all infections (Longini et al, 2004; Ferguson et al, 2006) though 
empiric data obtained during the 2009 pandemic showed asymptomatic 
infection rates of 8-18% (Lau et al, 2010; Papenburg et al, 2010; Suess et 
al, 2010; Cook et al, 2010) with a subclinical rate of 25% (Lau et al, 
2010). Lau et al estimated that 1-8% of infectiousness occurred prior to 
illness onset (Lau et al, 2010). However, the amount and duration of viral 
shedding from asymptomatic patients can be low (Cowling et al, 2010a; 
Lau et al, 2010) and it remains to be shown that asymptomatic individuals 
effectively transmit influenza (Patrozou and Mermel 2009). 
 
2.2.4 Setting 
Each setting reflects a specific combination of source cases, susceptible 
individuals and environmental conditions. Transmission within a household 
is commonly measured; attack rates in the region of 20% are seen and 
are determined by the size of the household, the presence of children and 
the number of susceptible occupants (Longini et al, 1982). Schools are 
often thought of as being focus for spread in the community. This is 
fuelled by high attack rates and infectiousness of children (Cauchemez et 
al, 2009a; Chen and Liao 2008). School closure can be an effective 
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mitigation strategy (Cauchemez et al, 2009b). Closed environments such 
as nursing homes and military camps are often reported to have attack 
rates greater than 40% (Balkovic et al, 1980; Patriarca et al, 1987; 
Earhart et al, 2001; Liu et al, 2009) (though one must be aware of 
reporting bias) and high attack rates have been reported in healthcare 
facilities (Horcajada et al, 2003). Travel can be responsible for the spread 
of viruses across large distances and the mode of travel can be associated 
with infection risk; outbreaks have been reported on aeroplanes, buses 
and trains (Moser et al, 1979; Han et al, 2009; Baker et al, 2010; Cui et 
al, 2011). 
 
 
2.3 Routes of Transmission 
 
Despite the fact that influenza has impacted on human health for at least 
several centuries (Potter 2001) and that the virus was first identified in 
humans in 1933 (Smith et al, 1933), remarkably little is known definitively 
about its modes of transmission. Thus, important health policy and 
infection control issues remain unresolved. These shortcomings have been 
exposed in national and international pandemic preparedness activities 
over recent years and during the 2009 pandemic itself. 
 
2.3.1 Definitions 
One of the difficulties that arises in the reviewing the literature on 
influenza is the inconsistency and variety of terms that are used to refer to 
the modes of transmission. Traditionally the standard definitions used by 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to describe modes of infectious 
disease transmission (Garner 1996) have included;  
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 Direct Contact ± transmission via direct physical contact; for example a 
kiss. 
 Indirect Contact ± transmission via an intermediate object such as a 
fomite or a hand. 
 Droplet ± droplets are particles >5µm and are generated from the 
respiratory tract. They act like ballistic particles and hence some view 
them as a form of direct contact. 
 Airborne ± transmission by bioaerosols; particles <5µm (droplet nuclei) 
that can remain suspended in air, travel long distances (>6ft) and 
deposit in the lung. 
 
Airborne transmission has generally been used to refer to infections that 
spread over long distances, for example tuberculosis. It is only droplet 
nuclei in aerosols that remain suspended for prolonged periods in the air 
and can travel over long distances (>2m) but some confusion can arise 
because; i) there is no absolute cut-off between droplet nuclei and 
droplets, particles lie on a continuum with larger particles tending towards 
droplet behaviour. Furthermore, all aerosolised particles are dynamic, that 
is they change size as water is exchanged (taken up or released) with the 
atmosphere and this is dependent upon factors such as humidity, 
temperature and airflows; ii) droplets could be considered to be airborne 
as they travel through the air (although only for a short period of time and 
over short distances) and iii) droplet nuclei can transmit infection over 
short distances as well as long. In fact, because droplet nuclei are more 
concentrated nearer their source, they are more likely to transmit over 
short distances than long. 
 
The following terms which are based on working definitions used  by 
Weber and Stilianakis in a review of influenza transmission (Weber and 
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Stilianakis 2008) and those used at a CDC workshop on influenza 
transmission (CDC 2010a) will be used in this thesis (Figure 2.2). 
 Droplet transmission: Transmission of influenza through the air by 
droplet particles (>20µm) emitted by an infected host (e.g. by 
coughing) which deposit directly on to mucous membranes. It is likely 
that an infectious virus particle will reach its target cell by inhalation 
more commonly than by direct contact. 
 Aerosol transmission: Transmission of influenza through the air by 
droplet nuclei (<10µm) which can be respired.  Particles penetrate 
proximal airways to reach the lung and can initiate infection there. The 
behaviour of SDUWLFOHVPDQGPLVGLIILFXOWWRSUHGLFWWKH\
DUHFRQVLGHUHGWROLHLQDµJUH\]RQH¶ 
 Contact transmission: Comprising direct and indirect contact (as 
defined above) 
 
A sound understanding of the basic science of influenza transmission is 
key to developing evidence-based policies for infection prevention and 
control. At present opinions are sharply divided on the importance of 
aerosol versus droplet transmission (Tellier 2006; Brankston et al, 2007). 
The uncertainty about the importance of different mechanisms of influenza 
transmission and the best means to prevent spread was reflected in the 
diverse approaches adopted by different countries in response to the 2009 
pandemic. For example, the UK in line with WHO, recommended droplet as 
opposed to aerosol infection control precautions (i.e. SFMs rather than 
respirators) for HCWs for most close contact with patients (Department of 
Health 2009; WHO 2009d), whereas US (CDC 2009c; CDC 2009e) and 
French (Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale 2009) guidance 
recommended respirators for all forms of close contact. At present there is 
little in the way of firm evidence with which to formulate guidance for 
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healthcare workers as to the level of risk reduction provided by the 
different types of protective equipment. 
 
Figure 2.2: Routes of influenza transmission. 
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Footnote: The figure shows the release of a respiratory spray, its 
composition in terms of particle sizes and the routes of transmission that 
may result. LRT = Lower Respiratory Tract, URT = Upper Respiratory Tract 
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2.4 Influenza Transmission Evidence Base 
 
The evidence base on influenza transmission is largely derived from six 
core categories of study: 
1. Studies assessing influenza virus deposition and survival in the 
environment that inform the biologic plausibility of the proposed routes 
of transmission. 
2. Studies examining the epidemiology of disease in hospitals, nursing 
homes and other closed or semi-closed settings. From these data, 
inferences are drawn about modes of transmission that could have 
produced the pattern of disease observed. 
3. Prospective pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) 
studies in the setting of natural infection. 
4. Human influenza challenge studies; infection, initiated by a number of 
routes, and subsequent patterns of viral shedding have been described 
for experimentally infected individuals in a relatively small number of 
studies. 
5. Animal models of transmission; information generated from 
experimental studies in different animal models can provide useful 
insights, however, any extrapolation to humans relies on assuming 
transmission mechanisms and behaviours are similar in humans and 
other animals. 
6. Modelling has been used to explore the relative contributions that each 
route of transmission may have. 
 
The evidence relating to each category of evidence is presented below and 
table summaries of reviewed studies can be found in Appendices 2.1±2.6.  
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2.5 Biologic plausibility for the proposed routes of transmission 
 
2.5.1 Contact transmission 
For contact transmission to occur; i) viable virus is released from a host; 
ii) virus must survive for a period of time on hands or fomites; and iii) an 
infectious dose of virus must be delivered to a site where infection 
initiation can occur. There exists significant heterogeneity in the design 
and methods of studies that have examined virus survival and it is difficult 
to draw unifying conclusions. Variations take the form of; virus strains 
examined, concentrations of inocula used, manner of inoculation, 
populations studied, environmental conditions, sampling methods and 
detection techniques. Efficient sampling and detection are vital as viable 
virus is easily lost during experimental manipulations. This is likely to pose 
a greater challenge outside the setting of controlled laboratory 
experiments. Furthermore, whilst laboratory based studies are useful for 
defining parameters of what may be possible, the relationship between 
ODERUDWRU\VWXGLHVDQGZKDWKDSSHQVLQµQDWXUDO¶FRQGLWLRQVLVGLIILFXOWWR
judge.  
 
Despite some limitations, there is good evidence to confirm the ability of 
influenza to remain viable on fomites (Bean et al, 1982; Thomas et al, 
2008; Shaman and Kohn 2009). Survival on hard non-porous surfaces 
where drying times are longer than those of porous surfaces usually 
extends well beyond 24 hours. However, the ability to survive does not 
necessarily equate to the ability to infect and whilst studies have shown 
that virus can be found on fomites, particularly around children (Boone 
and Gerba 2005; Bright et al, 2010; Simmerman et al, 2010), none have 
found live virus or established whether infection transmission from such 
fomites occurs. 
39 
 
The importance of environmental conditions is illustrated by a study which 
demonstrated that influenza virus survival is affected by temperature, 
relative humidity (RH) and exposure time after being deposited on a 
stainless steel surface; viral inactivation increased with rising temperature 
(55 to 650C) and RH (25 to 75%) (McDevitt et al, 2010). 
 
The microenvironments of viruses are also important. Thomas et al 
studied virus survival on banknotes; survival time was prolonged when 
viruses were inoculated on to banknotes after being mixed with respiratory 
mucous (Thomas et al, 2008). At the patient level, inter- and intra-patient 
variation complicates the issue; patients will shed virus at different titres 
during the course of their illness, some will patients will shed more than 
others and environmental conditions may differ. 
 
There is evidence that virus can survive on hands for at least 5 minutes. 
In a study by Grayson et al, the hands of 20 volunteers were 
contaminated with virus. After 2 minutes, a 3-4 log reduction in virus (as 
measured by PCR and culture) was seen, though interestingly little further 
reduction was seen after an hour (Grayson et al, 2009). Thomas et al 
contaminated the fingertips of six volunteers. In the first part of the study 
the effect of time was assessed; virus was detected on 100%, 28-44% 
and 11% of fingertips after 1, 5 and 30 minutes respectively. It was then 
shown that bigger volumes of inoculums led to more virus being detected 
at 15 minutes and that if the viral inoculums were spread on the fingertip 
(rather than being left as a drop) survival was less (Thomas et al, 2010). 
Bean et al showed that virus can be transferred from deliberately 
contaminated fomites to hands but that within 5 minutes titres had fallen 
by at least two logs (Bean et al, 1982). Although survival on hands 
appears significantly reduced compared to some fomites this may not be 
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VLJQLILFDQWLIKDQGVIUHTXHQWO\µFROOHFW¶ virus and then deposit it on mucous 
membranes [face touching has been shown to occur at a rate of 15.7 
events per hour (Nicas and Best 2008)]. As part of a randomised trial in 
Thailand to investigate hand hygiene, the hands of 149 infected patients 
were swabbed (on Day 3 of illness). Fifteen out of 90 (16.7%) index cases 
and 1 out of 59 (1.7%) household contacts were positive by PCR. Only one 
(0.7%) was culture positive (Simmerman et al, 2010). Another obstacle is 
that the infectious dose of influenza transmitted in this way is not known. 
Even if viable virus is detected, is enough of it present to cause infection? 
 
Based on their data and making certain assumptions (e.g. a 50% human 
infectious dose = 30-127 TCID50 and the transference of a 0.01-0.02mL 
inoculum from surface to hand) Bean et al conclude that a person 
shedding large quantities of virus (>105.0 TCID50/mL) could transmit 
infection via stainless steel for 2 hours and via tissues for a few minutes 
(Bean et al, 1982).  
 
Despite the above, there is currently little direct evidence to confirm that 
infection transmission can occur via the contact route. 
 
2.5.2 Droplet Transmission 
This route of transmission is reliant on close contact so that a droplet 
carrying infectious virus, expelled from an infected individual, comes into 
contact with the respiratory tract of a susceptible individual. It is mediated 
by large droplets (considered to be particles >20µm and detected up to a 
size of 1000µm) which behave like ballistic particles after being generated 
by activities such as coughing and sneezing (Nicas and Sun 2006; Weber 
and Stilianakis 2008; Gralton et al, 2010). It has been shown that the vast 
majority of pathogens emitted in a cough will be carried by large droplets 
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(Lidwell 1990; Nicas et al, 2005; Chao et al, 2009). The distance these 
particles travel is determined by their initial velocity, their terminal 
velocity and gravitational acceleration. It has been estimated that particles 
>150µm can travel >60cm (Nicas and Sun 2006). So, although the 
majority of droplets expelled during a cough or sneeze will settle to the 
ground quickly and not reach a susceptible host, they remain important as 
any droplets that do reach target cells can carry a high pathogen load. 
Droplets reach respiratory epithelial cells via direct contact or inhalation; 
the latter is perhaps more likely to deliver an infectious particle than 
contact as the probability that a cough or sneeze is perfectly directed so 
that particles land directly on epithelial cells is small (Nicas and Sun 
2006). Initiation of infection following the inhalation of particles is 
dependent on several factors such as infectious dose [thought to be higher 
in the URT than the LRT (Tellier 2006)], nose or mouth breathing, tidal 
volume, breathing rate and timing so that an inspiratory breath in a 
susceptible contact occurs immediately after particle generation by an 
infected case. So, whilst the basic concept of droplet transmission may at 
first be readily accepted, the constraining factors mentioned have actually 
led some to consider it a rare event (Atkinson and Wein 2008). 
 
2.5.3 Aerosol Transmission 
Bioaerosols (aerosols that contain living organisms) can be generated by 
actions such as coughing, talking and breathing and may transmit 
infection on being inhaled. Gralton et al propose that the spread of 
infection by aerosolised particles is dependent on; the clinical 
manifestation of disease, the site of infection, the presence of pathogen 
and the type of pathogen (Gralton et al, 2010). The process of disease 
transmission via aerosols has been reviewed in depth (Nicas et al, 2005; 
Tang et al, 2006; Gralton et al, 2010). For influenza viruses to be 
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transmitted from human to human by the aerosol route they will need to 
be emitted from an infected individual in particles that can then be inhaled 
to the LRT of the exposed individual so bringing the virus into contact with 
target cells. In addition, the concentration of these particles must be high 
enough to deliver an infectious dose. Furthermore, the virus must survive 
the stresses of aerosolisation and be able to survive in the air for long 
enough to permit transmission. The behaviour of a virus within aerosol 
particles depends on the behaviour of the particle (aerosol physics) and 
the reaction of the virus to being in aerosol form (aerosol stability).  
 
 Bioaerosol production 
In a single sneeze, the total volume of particleVǋPKDVEHHQ
estimated at 1.2 x 10-5 mL (Nicas et al, 2005). Virus concentration from 
nasal washes has been shown to be as high as 107 TCID50/mL (Murphy et 
al, 1973). Hence, a patient with a titre of 10
7 TCID50/mL of nasal secretion 
would generate 120 TCID50 in aerosols in a single sneeze (assuming that a 
sneeze equates to a nasal wash in terms of the amount of virus 
µUHOHDVHG¶*LYHQWKDWWKHDHURVROHuman Infectious Dose (HID50) is 0.6 to 
3 TCID50 (Alford et al, 1966) a single sneeze could create a significant 
infectious aerosol (Tellier 2007).  
 
Using data from Chao et al who examined particle size distributions 
generated by a cough (Chao et al, 2009), it can be shown that if patients 
have low titres of virus in respiratory secretions, the vast majority of virus 
will be present in large particles. However, if patients are excreting higher 
titres then the presence of virus in particles of <10µm is feasible. For 
example if the original titre is 107 TCID50/mL then virus will be present in 
DOOSDUWLFOHVPEXWRQO\LQDIUDFWLRQRISDUWLFOHVP(50% at 
9µm, 4% at 4µm) when a patient coughs (Killingley et al, 2011b). This 
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could imply that aerosol transmission is more likely at the beginning of 
infection when patients typically excrete higher titres of virus and that 
children are important aerosol transmitters as they excrete higher titres of 
virus than adults.  
 
Another obstacle to understanding the nuances of bioaerosol production is 
that individuals differ in the numbers and sizes of particles produced 
during breathing, coughing, sneezing and talking (Papineni and Rosenthal 
1997; Edwards et al, 2004; Xie et al, 2009; Holmgren et al, 2010). 
Differences can arise from a number of factors including 
behaviour/activities, viral shedding, symptoms and presence of co-
infections. 
 
 Virus survival in aerosols 
There is evidence to suggest that virus can remain viable (and therefore 
infectious) in aerosols long enough to permit infection transmission 
(Weber and Stilianakis 2008). Studies performed over 40 years ago 
showed that artificially aerosolised influenza could be recovered from the 
air (by using infection in animals as a detection method) for up to 24 
hours after release (Wells and Brown 1936; Loosli et al, 1943). Overall 
investigators have found that survival is prolonged at low RH and this has 
lent support to the idea that low RH in indoor environments during winter 
time promotes virus survival and transmission. However, methodological 
limitations to the reviewed studies should be noted. For example the size 
of aerosols used varied and the use of small particles (<3µm) may stress 
the virus to a higher degree than during natural generation which may 
lead to an underestimate of survival. 
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 Detecting bioaerosols 
Despite the above, the detection of live virus in aerosols, released into the 
natural environment by humans (a key step to confirm plausibility) has 
not been shown before. However, the evolution of the materials and 
methods used to collect bioaerosols is contributing to progress in this field; 
a comprehensive review of methods was published in 2008 (Verreault et 
al, 2008). Contemporary efforts to detect influenza virus in aerosols have 
been successfully achieved by a number of groups, both in the laboratory 
(Blachere et al, 2007; Pyankov et al, 2007; Fabian et al, 2009a) and from 
around patients (Fabian et al, 2008; Blachere et al, 2009; Lindsley et al, 
2010a). Fabian and colleagues developed a technique to look for influenza 
virus in the exhaled breath of infected patients. Patients were asked to 
directly breathe into a device that collects filtered samples and employs 
optical particle counting and airflow data. Influenza was detected by PCR 
in 4 out of 13 samples collected from patients confirmed to be infected 
(Fabian et al, 2008). Blachere et al have described the use of a two stage, 
cyclone-based bioaerosol sampler. Following aerosolisation of influenza 
virus they were able to successfully collect and detect virus (by PCR). At 
the same time collected particles were size fractionated allowing particles 
of a respirable size to be identified (Blachere et al, 2007). They went on to 
test the samplers, which can be worn by individuals, in medical care 
facilities in the US. Both stationary and personal samplers collected air 
particles containing influenza A virus (they were also able to detect 
Influenza B and rhinovirus in the second study) (Blachere et al, 2009; 
Lindsley et al, 2010a).  
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2.6 Outbreak Investigations 
 
The primary function of an outbreak investigation is to instigate control 
and prevention measures, though the investigation itself can lead to 
opportunities to gain additional knowledge about the disease, for example 
spectrum of illness, transmission characteristics and incubation periods. 
Influenza outbreak reports are extremely heterogeneous, each relates to a 
specific situation with a variety of key factors including virus strain, human 
hosts, environmental setting and environmental conditions. 
Several reports are discussed in more detail below: 
 
 A prospective observational study took place during the 1957/58 
pandemic in the US which centred on a hospital in California that had a 
building where UV lights had been installed. One hundred and fifty 
patients resided in this unit, principally patients with tuberculosis and 
other chronic respiratory diseases. The UV lights were being used to 
disinfect the air of M. tuberculosis. Another hospital building housing 
250 patients with respiratory disease but without UV lights served as a 
control. Serological assessments were done before and after the 
second wave of an epidemic that struck in January 1958. Both clinical 
illness and serologically confirmed infection rates were reduced in the 
patients housed under UV lights (2% v 19%)  (McLean 1961). These 
data appear to make a compelling argument for effect of UV light on 
bioaerosols and suggest in turn that influenza is transmitted via 
aerosols (UV light cannot penetrate larger particles and will not affect 
virus associated with them). However, as the author acknowledges, 
this was not a controlled experiment and several confounders may 
have existed. For example, no mention is made of patient movements, 
length of stays and there are no descriptions of cases. In addition, the 
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environments on the two wards may have been different with respect 
to ventilation (e.g. airflows, open windows) and staff illness and 
movement between wards are not discussed in any detail. Because of 
these factors we cannot be sure that differences in attack rates seen 
were solely due to the effect of UV irradiation. 
 
 An outbreak aboard a grounded aircraft that occurred in Alaska in 1977 
is reported by Moser (Moser et al, 1979) with further information 
provided by Gregg (Gregg 1980). A total of 54 people were on board 
the aircraft at some point during its 4.5 hour grounding for a 
mechanical fault; 53 were followed up. The index case was a 21 year 
old female who was symptomatic with fever and cough. She was 
subsequently found to have seroconverted to an H3N2 influenza virus. 
30 passengers and crew stayed on the aircraft for the entire time, this 
includes the index case who lay across two seats and did not move 
about the plane. The exposure time for others varied as passengers 
were allowed to leave the aircraft and wait in the terminal building. In 
total 38 (72%) people became ill; 8 out of 31 were culture positive and 
20 out of 22 were serologically positive. Individuals with greater than 3 
hours of exposure had an attack rate (AR) of 86% whilst less than 3 
hours of exposure gave a 54% AR. This outbreak featured a single 
source of infection, a high AR and a small, enclosed space in which the 
ventilation system had been switched off. The authors concluded that 
³H[SRVXUHWRODUJHDHURVROV´ZDVOLNHO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRULQIHFWLRQ
transmission. Large is not defined in this instance but it seems most 
likely that they are referring to aerosol transmission as opposed to 
droplet. We may speculate that the index case was emitting a large 
bioaerosol load (a so called super-emitter); this might help explain the 
high AR. However, it is difficult to completely exclude the droplet and 
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contact routes of infection; patients were able to move around the 
aircraft and thus close proximities to the index case could have 
occurred though the index case herself remained stationary and is not 
reported to have had direct contact with anyone else. 
 
 Morens et al reported on an outbreak in a nursing home residence in 
Hawaii that occurred in 1989 (Morens and Rash 1995). Each of the 
home¶s 12 rooms contained one to four beds. Among 39 residents, 11 
became clinically ill (28%); of these five were bedfast (11 were bedfast 
in total); six were virologically confirmed to have influenza and six died 
(three of whom were virologically confirmed). Infection control 
measures were instituted but only after more than 2 weeks from the 
onset of symptoms in the first case. An outbreak investigation revealed 
the following ARs in residents; 
o Those needing skilled nursing care 34% vs. those needing 
intermediate care 10%. 
o Bedfast 45% vs. non bedfast 21%. 
o Tube fed or frequently suctioned 38% vs. others 13%. 
o Those who were mobile and socialised with other residents had 
lower ARs than bedfast or tube fed patients.  
In addition, it was noted that individual staff were in contact with more 
nursing home residents than was normal. The authors commented that 
WKHµVSDWLDODQGWHPSRUDOSDWWHUQVRIRQVHWQRWW\SLFDORIDLUERUQH
VSUHDG¶ DQGWKDWµZHVXVSHFWVWDIIVSUHDGYLUXVE\KDQGVRUIRPLWHV¶ 
No staff illness was reported so it is unlikely that they acted as primary 
vectors. It is impossible to exclude either droplet or aerosol spread in 
the scenario described but the unusually high levels of patient contact 
and a lack of strict infection control procedures do appear significant. 
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 An outbreak of H3N2 influenza occurred on a neonatal unit during an 
epidemic in Ontario, Canada in 1998 (Cunney et al, 2000). Of 54 
neonates present in the unit over 18 days, 19 (35%) were confirmed 
cases though only six were symptomatic. 16% of staff reported illness 
during the outbreak. Risk factors for infection in neonates were being a 
twin [odds ratio (OR) = 7] and being mechanically ventilated (OR = 
6.2). The unit was very busy over the period with >100% bed 
occupancy. The risk factors above seem to indicate that close contact 
is important. Perhaps parents were responsible for passing infection 
between twins, and nurses who have increased contact with ventilated 
children, also acted as secondary vectors. In the report the authors 
comment that they discovered that ³YHQWLODWRUWXELQJZDVEHLQJ
changed in a manner that produced aerRVROV´ 
 
 A tour group comprising 30 people travelled to China for a 4 day trip in 
June 2010. The index case was a female tourist who developed 
symptoms on the first day of the trip. The tour included time spent on 
a bus and two aeroplane flights. Confirmed secondary cases of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 included nine tour group members and one aeroplane 
passenger who was not part of the tour group (this passenger was 
seated within two rows of the index case). The investigators reported 
that talking to the index case for greater than 2 minutes (at a distance 
of less than 2m) was associated with an AR of 56%; nobody who did 
not talk to the index case became ill. Furthermore, talking for greater 
than 10 minutes increased the chances of becoming ill by five times 
compared to talking for between 2-9 minutes (Han et al, 2009). It 
seems that close proximity to the index case was necessary for 
transmission, droplet or contact transmission are certainly possible. 
7KHDXWKRUVVWDWHWKDWWKHUHZDV³Qo evidence of airborne 
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WUDQVPLVVLRQ´&HUWDLQO\WKHUHLVOLWWOHHYLGHQFHIRUORQJUDQJH
transmission but the possibility of short range aerosol transmission 
(SRAT) is overlooked, especially when one considers that talking and 
normal breathing can generate aerosols (Edwards et al, 2004). 
 
 A retrospective cohort study concerning a school group (n=24) that 
travelled to Mexico and returned home on a flight from Los Angeles to 
New Zealand in April 2009 is reported by Baker (Baker et al, 2010). A 
general practitioner in NZ identified cases of ILI amongst members of 
the group soon after their return and this led to an investigation to 
assess disease transmission during the air flight home. During the 
flight 12 cases reported symptoms; nine were virologically confirmed 
with A(H1N1)pdm09, three were suspected. A post-flight case was 
defined as illness appearing within 3.2 days of the airplane landing. At 
risk for in-flight infection were 102 passengers in rear section of plane; 
97 (95%) of these individuals were contacted and nasopharyngeal 
swabs were collected from 26. Four post-flight cases were identified; of 
these two were deemed probable, one possible and one inconclusive 
for in-flight infection. The overall risk of infection in the rear section of 
the plane was 1.9%. For 57 passengers who were seated within two 
rows of a symptomatic case the risk was 3.5%. The authors conclude 
WKDWWKH³PRGHRIWUDQVPLVVLRQFDQQRWEHHVWDEOLVKHGDOODUHSRVVLEOH
LQFOXGLQJ65$7´. Long range transmission was not evident. 
 
 An outbreak investigation in a Hong Kong hospital in 2008, that paid 
special attention to airflows is described by Wong (Wong et al, 2010). 
The setting was a 30 bedded medical ward that housed 59 patients and 
29 HCWs over the course of the outbreak. The ward was composed of 
three bays (A, B and C) and a side room (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3: Layout of the outbreak ward and the locations of affected 
patients.  
 
Footnote: Patient A (circled) was the index case. Dark-colored blocks 
represent high-efficiency particulate absorbing (HEPA) filters placed at the 
wall end of each ward bay. Dates of symptom onset are stated for all 
infected patients. Patient D had been staying at two bed locations (front 
row then back row). Reproduced with permission from (Wong et al, 2010). 
 
 
The index case had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
received non-invasive ventilation for 16 hours on the ward (Bay C) 
beginning on March 31st. Influenza H3N2 was subsequently diagnosed. 
Nine inpatients were confirmed as secondary cases and two HCWs 
developed symptoms but were not virologically confirmed. All cases 
received oseltamivir within 24hrs. The overall patient AR was 13.6%; 
ARs in Bays C, B and A were 20%, 22.2% and 0% respectively. The 
risk of infection was found to be highest on 31st March and 1st April.  
A variety of devices were in operation that affected airflows on the 
ward; i) air conditioning was provided by a system that had outlets at 
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ceiling level in each bay. Return air grills were located in the ward 
corridors; ii) air purifiers were also located in each bay; in bays A and 
B the fan setting was low but in Bay C the fan setting was on medium. 
This resulted in a net flow of air from Bay C into the corridor and 
towards Bay B (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4: The spatial distribution of normalized concentration of 
hypothetical virus-laden aerosols (modelled as gaseous tracer) in the 
outbreak ward. 
 
Footnote: The tracer was released at a height of 1.1m. All HEPA filters 
were assumed to function with 100% filtration of the modeled droplet 
nuclei. The three HEPA air purifiers are shown as black boxes, the four air 
conditioning inlets are shown by a square with an X, and the four returns 
are shown as a small rectangular filled box. Affected patients are 
represented by white ovals (the index patient is marked as a red oval). 
Reproduced with permission from (Wong et al, 2010). 
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The outbreak was temporally related to an aerosol generating procedure 
involving the index case and imbalanced airflow on the ward. The authors 
state that droplet and contact spread cannot entirely explain all instances 
of infection transmission. They cite as evidence the epidemic curve which 
supports a point source for the outbreak, the spatial distribution of 
secondary cases seen and the fact that close contact transmission was 
minimal as there was little patient interaction and little evidence that 
HCWs acted as vectors. This study presents a unique set of circumstances 
and convincing evidence for the presence of aerosol transmission. 
 
The very nature of an outbreak means that conditions are not formally 
controlled in any way making it very difficult to draw firm conclusions 
about specific risk factors for, and routes of transmission. This  
leaves us to interpret findings based upon observations only. Some studies 
do describe situations akin to a control and intervention group, whilst 
others describe specific environmental factors that existed which may 
have influenced the spread of infection. Repeated observations of 
outbreaks in closed settings show that as population densities increase, 
ARs also increase. This implies that short range transmission, by whatever 
route, is important. Long range transmission is a rare event; however, this 
does not mean that aerosol transmission can be discounted. The concept 
of SRAT is often overlooked with the consequence that transmissions that 
have been seen to occur through close contact are put down to either 
droplet or direct contact spread.  In the studies reviewed no routes of 
transmission can be completely excluded, circumstances related to the 
environment and individuals involved will dictate which route(s) 
predominate. For example, the reports by Moser, Mclean and Wong appear 
to support the existence of aerosol transmission because of circumstances 
that favoured this route. 
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2.7 Prospective intervention studies in the setting of natural 
infection 
 
Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) such as hand hygiene and face 
masks are recognised by WHO as being potentially useful to reduce the 
transmission of influenza between people (Bell 2006b). Such interventions 
may be able to tell us something about transmission routes because they 
act by disrupting one or more of them. For example if hand hygiene is 
shown to reduce illness rates then it implies that the contact route of 
transmission is significant and if wearing a SFM reduces illness rates then 
either the contact and/or droplet route(s) are important (a SFM will act as 
a barrier to both).  
 
Three systematic reviews (Rabie and Curtis 2006; Aledort et al, 2007; 
Jefferson et al, 2010) and one meta-analysis (Aiello et al, 2008) that 
included data on hand hygiene to reduce the spread of acute respiratory 
infections (ARIs) have been conducted. One review was specific to 
influenza (Aledort et al, 2007), but in general these papers relate to acute 
respiratory infections as a whole as there is little organism specific data. 
All reviews comment on the heterogeneity and often poor quality of 
studies done, but all conclude that hand hygiene can reduce episodes of 
respiratory illness. Two papers report pooled estimates of effect of 16 and 
21% (Rabie and Curtis 2006; Aiello et al, 2008). 
 
A systematic review of the evidence that face masks can prevent influenza 
transmission was undertaken by Cowling et al (Cowling et al, 2010b). It 
concluded that there is some evidence to support the use of either a SFM 
or respirator by an infected person to protect others but fewer data to 
endorse the wearing of a SFM to prevent the wearer from becoming 
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infected. However, it should be recognised that the evidence base is small 
and the quality of the studies reviewed was variable. 
 
Using the schlieren optical method to visualise airflows around human 
subjects, Tang et al show that a cough projects a turbulent jet into 
surrounding air and that this can be blocked by wearing a respirator or 
redirected by wearing a SFM (Tang et al, 2009). More recently, Milton et al 
have shown that SFMs worn by influenza infected subjects can reduce the 
number of virus containing particles emitted. Larger virus containing 
SDUWLFOHVPZHUHUHGXFHGPRUHWKDQVPDOOHUSDUWLFOHVP
overall SFMs produced a fivefold reduction in viral aerosol shedding (Milton 
et al, 2010).  
 
Prospective studies enrol participants (individuals, families, households) 
into randomised intervention trials and follow them over a period of time 
during which influenza activity is likely to be high. Studies have been 
performed in both community (homes, schools, university residences) and 
healthcare settings; in the latter the effectiveness of SFMs and respirators 
have been compared.  There are indications that some of the interventions 
deployed in community studies may have had some benefit in certain 
situations though only one study has shown positive results with regard to 
primary intention-to-treat objectives (Talaat et al, 2011). Selected studies 
are described in more detail below. The difficulties and limitations faced by 
these intervention studies are outlined in Table 2.1. 
 
 A study assessing the impact of a hand hygiene campaign on the 
incidence of laboratory confirmed influenza and absenteeism was 
conducted in Cairo, Egypt. The trial introduced an intensive hand 
hygiene programme to 30 schools over a 12 week period; 30 different 
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schools acted as controls. In the control arm there were 0.5 episodes 
per 100 student weeks of absence due to an influenza-like illness (ILI), 
in the intervention arm the rate was 0.3; risk reduction = 40% 
(p<0.0001). The incidence of laboratory confirmed influenza (both A 
and B) between the control and intervention group was reduced by 
50% (p<0.0001) (Talaat et al, 2011). 
 
 Aiello et al conducted a primary prevention study that recruited 1372 
young adult residents in university accommodation. Volunteers were 
assigned to SFM use, SFM plus hand hygiene or a control arm for 6 
weeks during an influenza season (06/07) in the US. Three hundred 
and sixty eight (32%) subjects reported symptoms of ILI and 94 
samples were obtained for virological analysis; ten were positive for 
influenza (3.7%). Neither intervention resulted in a significant 
reduction in cumulative ILI incidence over the entire study period but 
during weeks 4-6 there was a significant reduction of 35% [95% 
confidence interval (CI), 9%±53%) to 51% (95%CI, 13%±73%) in ILI 
in the SFM plus hand hygiene group and during weeks 4 and 5 there 
was a significant reduction in ILI of 28% (95%CI, 2-47%) to 35% 
(95%CI, 2-57%) in the SFM only group (Aiello et al, 2010b). It is 
worth noting that the average use of a SFM each day was only 3.5 
hours. While the authors suggest SFMs had the largest impact on 
WUDQVPLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWµQRUPDO¶KDQG
washing continued to take place in all study arms; it was use of a 
specific hand sanitizer that was being assessed in the hand hygiene 
intervention arm.  
 
 Cowling et al conducted a secondary prevention study. Index cases 
presented for medical care within 48 hours of symptom onset and 
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tested positive for influenza via a rapid antigen test. Members of the 
household of the index case (including the index case) were then 
randomised to interventions to reduce transmission. Interventions 
were i) control, ii) hand hygiene and iii) hand hygiene plus SFM. 259 
households (794 individuals) were subsequently visited and samples 
were collected. The primary outcome was laboratory confirmed 
influenza in household contacts. Adherence to interventions varied and 
contamination between groups occurred. Less than half of the index 
patients in the SFM plus hand hygiene group reported regular use of a 
SFM during follow-up and adherence among household contacts was 
lower. Good adherence to the hand hygiene intervention was no better 
than 62% in any group. The SAR in the study was low (8%) and no 
differences were seen across the intervention arms. In a subgroup of 
households who implemented the interventions within 36 hours of 
symptom onset, transmission was significantly reduced (adjusted OR, 
0.33 [95% CI, 0.13 to 0.87]) in the hand hygiene plus SFM group 
(Cowling et al, 2009a). 
 
 MacIntyre et al also performed a secondary prevention study. Two 
hundred and eighty six adults from 143 households containing a child 
suffering a respiratory illness were recruited (influenza was detected in 
21% of children). They were randomised to interventions that 
consisted of i) SFM, ii) respirator (FFP2/N95 mask, not fit tested) and 
iii) control. ILI was reported in 16%, 22% and 15% of adults in each 
group respectively; there were no statistically significant differences. 
*RRGFRPSOLDQFHZLWKPDVNXVHGHILQHGDVµZRUHPDVNPRVt or all of 
WKHWLPH¶RYHUD day period was reported by 21%. In a subgroup of 
adults who were adherent, use of either mask reduced their risk for ILI 
by between 60-80% (MacIntyre et al, 2009). 
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The majority of studies show some evidence of effect for the use of a face 
mask though it is difficult to say how this effect is mediated e.g. through 
reduced face touching or as a physical barrier to droplets. Furthermore, 
the beneficial effects of face masks are often seen in combination with 
hand hygiene interventions. Compliance with interventions has been 
problematic and another issue is the fact that the interventions in the 
secondary prevention studies are often only deployed after symptoms 
begin so missing periods of possible transmission when an index case is 
asymptomatic. 
 
Two randomised studies have reported data on the use of face masks to 
reduce influenza transmission by studying nosocomial transmission 
between patients (naturally infected) and healthcare workers who attend 
them. 
 7KHREMHFWLYHRI/RHE¶VVWXG\Zas to compare SFMs with respirators 
(FFP2/N95) to protect healthcare workers from influenza (Loeb et al, 
2009). Nurses working in Canadian emergency departments were 
randomised to a mask and asked to wear it whilst caring for patients 
with febrile respiratory illnesses during an influenza season. Four 
hundred and forty six nurses were recruited and the primary outcome 
was laboratory confirmed (PCR and/or serology) influenza. Influenza 
was diagnosed in 50 (23.6%) nurses in the SFM group and 48 (22.9%) 
nurses in the respirator group DEVROXWHULVNGLIIHUHQFHí
&,íWRp=0.86), indicating no significant different 
between outcomes in the two arms. The vast majority of influenza 
diagnoses were made by serology; ILI was reported by only 11 nurses 
(nine in the SFM group and two in the respirator group, a non-
significant difference) suggesting that the study was markedly under-
powered for ILI and PCR based endpoints. 
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 MacIntyre and colleagues also compared SFMs with respirators 
(FFP2/N95) to protect health-care workers from acute respiratory 
infections (MacIntyre et al, 2011). Nurses and doctors (n=1922) 
working in emergency departments and respiratory wards were 
recruited from 24 hospitals in Beijing, China. A non-randomised 
comparator group was asked to continue with usual practice (n=481) 
while other recruits (n=1441) were cluster-randomised to one of three 
intervention arms: SFMs, fit-tested respirators, and non fit-tested 
respirators. Masks were worn during all working hours for four 
consecutive weeks. For each infection outcome, respirators (fit tested 
and non-fit tested) were associated with an approximate halving of risk 
compared with SFMs. However, after adjustment for clustering, the 
only significant finding was that non-fit tested respirators were more 
protective against clinical respiratory infection compared with SFMs 
(OR 0·48 [95% CI 0·24±0·98]; p=0·045). Overall event rates were 
low, in the randomised arms clinical respiratory infections were 
reported by fewer than 7% of HCWs and ILI by <1%. Laboratory 
testing confirmed influenza in <1% of HCWs. These low event rates 
compromise the power of the study. Interpreting this study as 
suggesting respirators have somewhat greater effectiveness than SFMs 
might indicate a more significant role for aerosol transmission.  
 
The debate about whether respirators are needed routinely to protect 
HCWs from influenza continues. Until a trial is conducted that is large 
enough to capture a high event rate, a proportion of which are generated 
by aerosol mediated transmissions, we are unlikely to be able to conclude 
from randomised controlled trials (RCT) that respirators are superior for all 
situations. 
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Intervention studies designed to evaluate the effectiveness of specific 
items such as facemasks or respirators do not lend themselves to easy 
determination of the routes of transmission involved. While the studies 
GLVFXVVHGKDYHWKHSRWHQWLDOWRJLYHDQLQGLFDWLRQRIWKHµUHDOZRUOG¶
efficacy of interventions, they are unable to provide the emphatic evidence 
sought by governments and policy makers, especially with regards to 
modes of transmission. To date, the balance of evidence from randomised 
studies suggests that respirators seem no more effective than SFMs in 
preventing influenza transmission. Although this might suggest that the 
aerosol route of transmission is less significant than the droplet route, 
several other factors could have influenced study findings. Randomised 
studies of hand hygiene may be easier to interpret in relation to 
establishing the role of contact transmission, but not its relative 
importance compared with droplets and aerosols. A problem with using 
interventions to assess modes of transmission is that blocking one route 
still allows transmission to take place down other alternative 
(unblocked/open) routes. For example if contact transmission is blocked 
by hand hygiene, transmission could still occur via droplets and aerosols 
making the interpretation of any risk reduction complex (Briscoe 1984). 
Competing risk style models are required to make accurate inferences 
about the routes of transmission involved. 
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Table 2.1: Difficulties and limitations of community intervention studies. 
Although able to generate some data on the effectiveness of interventions 
most studies are unable to reveal which route(s) of transmission have 
been reduced; A respirator could reduce hand-to-face contact, droplet and 
aerosol exposure - which is most important? 
 
The number of participants required and therefore the costs involved are 
considerable given the low clinical attack rates of influenza seen in recent 
seasons and the potentially modest effect size. 
 
Use of clinical case definitions alone to identify patients with influenza is 
problematic (Call et al, 2005). Results from English GP-based sentinel 
virological surveillance in 2008/09 show that only 34% of samples taken 
from patients who present with an ILI are positive for influenza (McLean et 
al, 2009). In the US over recent years, the percentage of respiratory 
samples that test positive for influenza during an influenza season has 
been <20% (CDC 2011). 
 
Studies based on a mixture of ARIs are able to generate more power, but 
have to assume that the contributions of different modes of transmission 
are the same for all respiratory viruses. Given the available data on 
influenza, RSV and rhinovirus transmission this is probably a false 
assumption (Goldmann 2000). 
 
Most studies rely on PCR based identification of influenza from nose and 
throat specimens to assess outcomes. The ideal specimen is a 
nasopharyngeal sample (Sung et al, 2008; Spyridaki et al, 2009; 
Ngaosuwankul et al, 2010) but this is often considered overly invasive in a 
community setting. Furthermore, viral shedding varies by day of illness so 
studies ideally need to sample early in disease and at multiple time points 
in both index cases and contacts.  
 
It is important that interventions are initiated as early as possible when 
virus shedding is at its peak. This can be difficult to achieve when 
participants are recruited only after illness in an index case has begun. 
 
$VXEMHFW¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWKVWXG\LQWHUYHQWLRQVHJIDFHPDVNXVHDQG
hand hygiene, is often low and this has proved to be a major obstacle. 
Compliance may be much higher in a pandemic because of perceived risk, 
EXWWKLVLVGLIILFXOWWRVLPXODWHIRUµQRUPDO¶VHDVRQDOLQIOXHQ]D 
 
Confounding variables are difficult to eliminate in community infection 
studies. Although in theory randomised controlled trials eliminate 
confounding this is only the case if intention to treat analyses are used.  
 
An intrinsic limitation of studies in healthcare settings is that the relative 
risk of transmission within the study context (the hospital) and outside 
(i.e. the household and community) is unknown; if most exposure to 
influenza occurs outside the healthcare context, such studies will always 
be limited in their ability to demonstrate a significant difference in 
intervention effectiveness even if one occurred. 
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2.8 Human Challenge Studies 
 
Experimental human challenge studies present an attractive way to study 
influenza transmission. Some of the earliest respiratory virus human 
challenge experiments took place during the 1918/19 influenza pandemic, 
when attempts were made to demonstrate the transmission of infection 
from symptomatic patients with presumed influenza to healthy volunteers 
(Rosenau 1919). These experiments were unsuccessful, probably because 
the volunteers were immune. The first successful influenza challenge study 
took place in 1936 when volunteers were infected with atomised 
suspensions of infected mouse lung (Smorodintseff 1937).  
 
Notable findings from challenge studies in relation to transmission include 
the following; 
 Henle published findings from over 200 volunteer exposures and 
identified the route of inoculation as important; infection by inhalation 
led to fever much more frequently than did nasal instillation (89% vs. 
13%) (Henle et al, 1946).  
 There is evidence to suggest that the infectious dose required for 
aerosol inoculation (0.6-3 TCID50) is substantially lower than that 
required for intranasal inoculation (100-1000 TCID50) (Alford et al, 
1966; Couch et al, 1971; Douglas 1975; Knight 1980; Hayden et al, 
1996),Q$OIRUG¶VVWXG\DQ+1YLUXVDHURVROZDVSURGXFHGXVLQJDQ
atomiser which generated particles in the 1-3µm range. Twenty three 
volunteers (14 of whom had antibody titres to the challenge virus of 
LQKDOHG10 litres of the aerosol which was delivered via a 
facemask. The dose of virus delivered ranged between 1-126 TCID50; 
in the majority the dose was <5 TCID50. Four volunteers developed 
clinical illness; virus was isolated from these and one other volunteer, 
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whilst seroconversion was seen in seven including all those who 
exhibited illness. Noting limitations of the study design and making an 
assumption that only 60% of the aerosol load inhaled will reach the 
LRT, the study reports that half of the volunteers with very low pre-
existing antibody titres were infected with 0.3-6 TCID50. In another 
study 30 TCID50 of the same virus was given to volunteers via 
intranasal spray; 12 out of 30 (40%) became ill (Jao et al, 1965). 
 In a study which attempted to compare natural and experimental 
influenza (induced by nasal inoculation), it was found that natural 
infections produced more fever, more cough and had a more marked 
effect on pulmonary function tests (Little et al, 1979). Possible 
explanations for this lie in differences between the infecting viruses 
themselves and the route of inoculation.  
 Findings from studies that have assessed the use of the neuraminidase 
inhibitor (NAI) zanamivir seem to suggest that antiviral prophylaxis of 
the nose alone does not prevent natural influenza whereas orally 
inhaled zanamivir does (Calfee et al, 1999; Monto et al, 1999; Kaiser 
et al, 2000; Monto et al, 2002); this points to the pharynx and/or 
tracheobronchial tree as key sites for virus acquisition. In terms of 
routes of transmission, this data does not allow us to discriminate 
between droplets and aerosols as both can reach the pharynx, but it 
does suggest that the contact route may not play a dominant role. 
 
In analysing the findings from experimental challenge studies it should be 
recognised that that the inoculation methods employed are unlikely to 
accurately replicate transmission that occurs in natural settings. For 
example the size, concentration and viral load of aerosols and delivery 
methods that have been used to achieve infection are rather artificial. 
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2.9 Animal Studies 
 
Animal studies have played an important role in advancing our knowledge 
about influenza and its management. Indeed, it was through the use of a 
ferret model of infection that influenza was first isolated. Studies showed 
that throat washings obtained from humans, who had an influenza-like 
illness, could be used to infect ferrets and produce a very similar disease 
(Smith et al, 1933). Studies seeking to improve our understanding of 
influenza transmission have often employed mice or ferrets. However, the 
murine model has fallen out of favour because researchers have 
experienced difficulties in getting the virus to transmit consistently 
(Schulman and Kilbourne 1963; Lowen et al, 2006) and the guinea pig has 
been proposed as an alternative (Lowen et al, 2006). Using these animals, 
transmission and factors related to the host, the environment and the 
virus itself have been explored. 
 
The droplet and aerosol routes of transmission dominate in transmission 
experiments with animals. Unfortunately it is not possible to discriminate 
between them in most models (Andrewes and Glover 1941; Schulman 
1968; Lowen et al, 2006; Mubareka et al, 2009) though it has been 
argued that the experimental methods described favour the operation of 
aerosol over droplet transmission (Tellier 2009). We should caution 
against dismissing the contact route as minor; experimental 
methodologies may bias against it and the markedly different social and 
physical behaviours of humans compared to small mammals are probably 
critical.  
 
There seems little doubt that some environmental factors e.g. temperature 
and humidity can affect transmission (Lowen et al, 2007; Lowen et al, 
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2008; Lowen and Palese 2009). Experiments with guinea pigs show that 
aerosol/droplet transmission is reduced at high temperatures and RH 
whilst contact transmission is preserved. These findings led the authors to 
suggest that contact transmission predominates in tropical climates and 
may explain the lack of a well defined influenza season (Lowen et al, 
2008). However, the extent to which all these findings can be generalised 
to human transmission is uncertain and scientifically challengeable. 
 
Through use of animal models a better understanding of the viral 
determinants of transmission is developing, though the variety and 
interplay of traits is complex, some seeming to hinder transmission whilst 
others permit it through different routes. It is likely that viral properties 
(e.g. fitness for replication, receptor preferences) help determine 
infectiousness and modes of spread (Nicholls et al, 2008; Belser et al, 
2010). 
 
Despite the development of valid and reliable animal models it requires a 
leap of faith to extrapolate animal findings to humans when considering 
influenza transmission. Disease pathogenesis including immunopatholgy 
will differ and host factors that contribute to transmission can vary 
between animal models, for example, symptoms and social and physical 
behaviours. In humans the existence of super-spreaders appears likely 
and the possibility that different social behaviours and interactions can 
affect transmission seems logical. It is difficult to study such human 
phenomena in animals. Furthermore, animal models do not allow us to 
test NPIs to reduce transmission. So whilst animal models are generating 
useful and important findings their application to humans will always be 
debatable. 
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2.10 Modelling Influenza Transmission 
 
Modelling is an attempt to predict an outcome based on variables (either 
known or hypothetical) associated with the outcome. Using modelling, a 
number of authors have tried to estimate the importance of the various 
routes of influenza transmission with infection resulting from a particular 
route being the outcome. The development of a plausible model, however, 
is not straight forward because a large number of parameters need to be 
taken into account. Furthermore, whilst some of the parameters have 
been well characterised many others have not and this undermines the 
reliability of a model. 
 
A number of modelling scenarios have been constructed that combine 
defined physical dynamics with biologic processes to estimate outcomes. 
Whilst most support the concept that all transmission routes can be 
important given the right circumstances, there does appear to be some 
divergence between those who conclude that droplet transmission is 
significant (Teunis et al, 2011) and those who conclude it is less significant 
(Atkinson and Wein 2008; Nicas and Jones 2009; Spicknall et al, 2010). 
Despite droplet particles being high in number and having high infectivity 
potential, it is likely that their inability to reach target cells and data which 
reveals that the infectious dose in the URT is higher than the LRT (Tellier 
2006) are responsible for the modelling findings against droplets. Some 
models suggest a significant role for contact transmission (Nicas and Best 
2008; Nicas and Jones 2009; Spicknall et al, 2010) though model outputs 
are highly dependent on estimates of infectious dose. 
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There are however significant limitations to each of these models; 
 The empiric data that they rely on is weak. Many crucial variables arise 
from studies undertaken many years ago and both the reliability and 
validity of data is questionable. 
 The assumptions and data that some models have used is open to 
debate (Tellier 2009). 
 The models are restricted to certain scenarios, e.g. a coughing patient 
being visited in a bedroom. They cannot possibly take account of the 
huge variety of other factors, e.g. patients being mobile rather than 
bed-ridden, particle emission through talking, breathing and sneezing 
as opposed to coughing alone, heterogeneity in particle emission (e.g. 
super-spreaders) and room ventilation changes through door and 
window opening. 
 
Despite drawbacks, modelling has highlighted several important 
determinants of infection risk, for example viral shedding, infectivity of 
influenza at different sites, host density and viral transfer efficiencies 
(Jones 2011). By focusing future research on these areas and obtaining 
better data, models can be improved and they will become invaluable in 
helping us to appreciate the roles played by the different routes of 
transmission. 
 
 
2.11 Summary 
The evidence base for influenza transmission is largely derived from 
studies that have assessed; virus deposition and survival in the 
environment; the epidemiology of disease in hospitals, nursing homes and 
other closed or semi-closed settings; prospective pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) in the setting of natural infection; 
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animal models; and mathematical modelling of transmission. Whilst most 
studies contribute in some way to the evidence base, very few are 
conclusive; some (especially retrospective observations) are weakened by 
confounding factors and others (animal and laboratory studies) can be 
GLIILFXOWWRLQWHUSUHWLQWKHFRQWH[WRIµQRUPDO¶KXPDQLQWHUDFWLRQV
Furthermore, investigating routes of transmission was seldom the primary 
aim of the studies reviewed. 
 
Studying influenza transmission is difficult; seasonality, unpredictable 
attack rates, role of environmental parameters such as temperature and 
humidity, numbers of participants required and confounding variables all 
present considerable obstacles. A range of studies done to date have failed 
to provide definitive answers. Furthermore, they have revealed little about 
the routes of transmission and the relative contributions made by each. 
For a table summary of the evidence for each route of transmission see 
Appendix 2.7. 
 
Further research into routes of transmission is needed and has been called 
for by many authorities (Bell 2006a; ECDC 2007; IOM 2007; Aiello et al, 
2010a). A recent discussion paper following a series of studies funded by 
CDC, recognised ongoinJHYLGHQFHJDSVWREH³WKHUHODWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQVRI
LQIOXHQ]DYLUXVWUDQVPLVVLRQPRGDOLWLHVWRGLVHDVHVSUHDG´DQG³WKH
efficacy of different types of masks, hand hygiene, and combinations of 
personal protective measures for reducing transmission of influHQ]D´
(Vukotich et al, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
2.12 The Scope of this Thesis 
 
Research and study towards this thesis was undertaken on the background 
of the evidence base presented and an appreciation of the principal 
scientific and public health policy questions that exist with regard to 
influenza transmission. Two main lines of investigation were undertaken;  
 
1. The consideration, design and conduct of a clinical trial to collect data 
on nasal shedding and environmental deposition of influenza virus: 
The proposed routes of transmission all appear plausible. The evidence 
base suggests that influenza virus can remain viable on surfaces and 
hands for periods which are consistent with onwards transmission and 
there is good evidence that humans infected with influenza produce 
respiratory droplets and aerosols which contain influenza virus and are 
therefore of infectious potential. However, there is a relative lack of 
data from field settings involving naturally infected patients in support 
of these findings. The detection of virus in the environment (on fomites 
and in air) is the first step to demonstrate that transmission occurs via 
such routes, but data to confirm the presence and amount of infectious 
virus around patients and that infection can be transmitted specifically 
by fomites and /or air is sparse. The opportunity to collect such data 
arose during the 2009 influenza pandemic and the resulting study is 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
2. The consideration, design and conduct of a novel method to study 
influenza transmission in humans: 
 An influenza transmission strategy development group was convened 
and met to discuss, develop and agree on suitable designs for 
pragmatic research studies. The group considered the lack of 
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understanding about the modes of transmission, specifically in 
humans, critical to address in order to enable further research and 
policy development. Noting the advantages and disadvantages of a 
number of study methods, the group considered influenza challenge 
studies (involving the deliberate infection of volunteers) to present an 
alternative way of studying infection. The development of a human 
challenge model to study transmission is presented in Chapter 5. 
 
In addition, work was undertaken to validate air sampling methodologies 
used in the work above (Chapter 3). 
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Chapter 3: 
Experiments to Investigate 
Techniques for the 
Sampling and Detection of 
Airborne Influenza Virus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Background 
Indirect evidence exists to support the concept that influenza virus can be 
transmitted between humans via small aerosolised particles (droplet 
nuclei). The significance of the aerosol route of transmission is unknown 
and methodological challenges to virus sampling and detection in air limit 
our insights. A bioaerosol sampler has been developed which is able to 
size fractionate collected airborne particles and influenza has been 
detected in such particles. Prior to use of the sampler in UK studies, a two 
stage validation experiment was conducted. 
 
Methods 
Two laboratory based experiments were performed that involved 
aerosolisation of influenza with subsequent attempts at both virus 
collection and detection (by PCR and culture). In the first experiment 
sampling took place following release of virus at close range to the 
sampler over a short time period with and without viral transport medium. 
Attempts to simulate more natural conditions were made in the second 
experiment with longer sampling times following virus aerosolisation into a 
room. 
 
Results 
Influenza could be detected by both PCR and culture techniques in both 
experiments following the collection of air particles by the sampler. In the 
second experiment, detection was possible after 1-3 hours sampling time, 
when the samplers were placed at distances of 3 and 7ft from the virus 
source and whether or not viral transport medium was used. 
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Conclusions 
We have been able to validate use of the samplers for planned field 
studies despite some limitations and inconsistencies seen in the results. 
Importantly virus has been detected in particles that are small enough to 
be respired. If present in the environment around susceptible individuals 
such particles could mediate the aerosol transmission of influenza. 
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3.2 Introduction 
 
Any microorganism can become airborne when associated with particles 
that are dispersed in air (aerosols). The propensity to stay airborne 
depends on the aerodynamic sizes of particles; the larger the particle, the 
quicker it will fall to the ground. For a 3m fall, particles >100µm in 
diameter will settle in seconds, particles >10µm will settle in minutes 
whilst particles less than <3µm in diameter can remain suspended in air 
for several hours (Nicas et al, 2005). It should be appreciated that whilst 
small particles make up the vast majority of particles contained in a 
respiratory spray (particles emitted by individuals during expulsion events 
e.g. coughing and sneezing), larger particles (>10µm) make up the vast 
majority of the volume and therefore carry the majority of microorganism 
load. 
 
Particles laden with microorganisms can gain entry to the human 
respiratory tract by the actions of inhalation and respiration. Inhalation 
can bring particles into contact with the upper respiratory tract but only 
SDUWLFOHVPFDQUHDFKWKHWUDFKHREURQFKLDOWUHHDQGRQO\SDUWLFOHV
<5µm can be respired and reach the alveolar region (Soderholm 1989).  
 
For influenza to be transmitted via aerosols it must a) be released from an 
infected person in a bioaerosol, b) survive in the aerosol and c) reach 
target cells in sufficient concentration to initiate infection (i.e. be present 
as an infectious dose). The ability to survive has been confirmed in 
laboratories (see Chapter 2, page 42), but to support the transmissibility 
of influenza via aerosols we would expect to be able to detect infectious 
virus from aerosols released into the environment by humans. Despite the 
advancement of molecular techniques over recent decades (e.g. PCR), it 
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remains that the detection of live virus from natural bioaerosols has not 
been shown. The detection of influenza in aerosols presents a number of 
challenges; 
 Influenza is sensitive to dehydration and ultraviolet (UV) radiation. 
 Sufficient virus needs to be collected to enable culture. This is 
challenging because concentrations in air are often low and they are 
rapidly diluted in air as distance from the source increases. 
 Virus capture often requires the use of filters which complicate 
handling and recovery. 
 PCR allows great precision in identifying virus but it does not tell us 
whether the recovered virus is viable (and therefore infectious). 
 
Many types of aerosol samplers and analytical methods have been used 
over the years and the evolution of these instruments and methods is 
contributing to progress in this field. In general samplers rely on the 
aerodynamic size of particles and the properties they exhibit in relation to 
adhesion, Brownian motion, thermal gradients and inertia. Viruses can be 
collected on solid surfaces, filters or in liquid. The efficiency of a sampler is 
an important measurement and can constitute capture efficiency and/or 
the efficiency of viral recovery (the latter involving virological detection 
methods) (Verreault et al, 2008). 
 
Contemporary efforts to detect influenza virus in aerosols have been 
successfully achieved by a number of groups, both in the laboratory 
(Hogan et al, 2005; Blachere et al, 2007; Pyankov et al, 2007; Fabian et 
al, 2009a) and from around patients (Fabian et al, 2008; Blachere et al, 
2009). 
 Fabian et al have published work on the ability of four aerosol samplers 
to capture aerosolised virus (Fabian et al, 2009a). They used both 
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molecular (PCR) and infectivity assays to detect virus. The samplers 
were; 1) a liquid impinger that could accommodate liquid collection 
media, 2) a cassette with Teflon filter, 3) a cassette with a gelatine 
filter and 4) a compact cascade impactor. All samplers collected virus 
detectable by PCR but the liquid impinger recovered live virus more 
effectively than the other samplers. The authors put this down largely 
to the effect of VTM assisting virus survival. They have also 
demonstrated that optimisation of molecular biology methods to 
improve virus detection is important (Fabian et al, 2009b). 
 Scientists at the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Hygiene 
(NIOSH), US, designed and developed a cyclone-based bioaerosol 
sampler (Lindsley et al, 2006). Following aerosolisation of influenza 
virus they were able to successfully collect and detect virus (by PCR). 
Furthermore, collected particles were size fractionated allowing 
particles of a respirable size to be identified (Blachere et al, 2007). 
They went on to use the samplers in medical care facilities and 
demonstrated that collected air particles contained influenza (Blachere 
et al, 2009). 
 
To contribute to the evidence base concerning the potential for influenza 
to be transmitted via aerosols, studies involving the sampling of air around 
infected subjects were planned. To this end a number of air sampling units 
and accessory equipment were loaned by collaborators at NIOSH. To 
prepare for the use of the samplers in a field setting, two laboratory 
studies were undertaken and a number of variables were tested. 
 
We hypothesised that; 
a) Increasing lengths of sampling time will result in more virus being 
detected by PCR, but that sampling over a shorter period will result in 
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more infectious virus being detected by culture (as virus survival 
declines with time). 
b) Sampling further away from the source will result in less virus being 
detected (by both PCR and culture). 
c) Use of VTM may help preserve viable virus. 
 
Investigations were carried out in April (Experiment 1) and September 
2009 (Experiment 2) at facilities of The Health and Safety Laboratory 
(HSL), Buxton, UK.  
 
 
3.3 Experiment 1 
 
Objective: To capture aerosolised influenza virus released into a laboratory 
safety cabinet using a bioaerosol sampler and to detect virus by PCR and 
culture techniques. 
 
3.3.1 Equipment and Methods 
Aerosol samplers: 
A two-stage cyclone aerosol sampler was used to collect aerosol samples. 
The sampler draws in air and collects and size fractionates (via two 
collection stages and a filter) airborne particles. At a flow rate of 3.5 l/min, 
the first stage collects particles with a diameter >4 µm, the second stage 
collects particles with a diameter of 1±4 µm, and the filter collects 
particles with a diameter <1 µm (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). The upper particle 
size limit of detection is not definitively known but is likely to be around 
100 µm based on the fact that the collection efficiency of 80µm particles is 
approximately 20%. The sampler conforms to the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists/International Organization for 
Standardization criteria for respirable particle sampling. 
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Figure 3.1: NIOSH BC 251 two-stage cyclone aerosol sampler shown 
connected to a sampling pump. 
 
Footnote: Air is drawn into the sampler through the inlet on the sampler 
body above the 15mL tube, and exits through the black filter cassette on 
the top of the sampler. 
 
 
The experiment was run on two occasions: 
1. Using VTM - In an attempt to aid virus survival, the stage 1 tube 
(15mLZDVFKDUJHGZLWKǋOVTM (EMEM supplemented with 
0.125% BSA, 25mM HEPES, Penicillin/Streptomycin and non-essential 
amino acids) and the stage 2 tube (1.5mLZDVFKDUJHGZLWKǋO 
2. Without VTM. 
 
 
 
Stage 1 
collection tube 
Stage 2 
collection tube 
Sampling 
pump 
Air inlet 
Filter 
cassette 
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of the cyclone two-stage aerosol sampler. 
 
Footnote: Arrows show the path of the air as it flows through the sampler. 
Figure courtesy of William Lindsley.  
 
 
A midget impinger air sampler (SKC Ltd, US) was also assembled for 
parallel tests. Impingers are Pyrex glass bubble tubes designed to collect 
airborne material into a liquid medium. Ordinarily, midget impingers 
collect air particles by bubbling air through a large volume of liquid. In this 
study however, it was likely that the concentration of influenza virus 
recovered would be small and a large volume of liquid would dilute this 
further. In addition, vigorous bubbling of the fluid may render some of the 
recovered virus particles non-viable (Agranovski et al, 2004). A smaller 
YROXPHIOXLGǋOZDVWKHUHIRUHFKRVHQ7KHLPSLQJHUZDVconnected to 
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a vacuum pump at flow rate of 1L/min. A HEPA filter cartridge was placed 
between the impinger and sampling pump to prevent contamination of the 
sampling pump. 
 
The samplers were positioned within a 0.42m3 (120 x 50 x 70cm) Class II 
Microbiological Safety Cabinet immediately opposite a pulsed compressed 
air atomiser (Figure 3.3). The atomiser generates a poly-dispersed aerosol 
FRYHULQJDVL]HUDQJHWR!ǋPZLWKDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKH
particles being ǋPDQGbeing !ǋP7KLVFRPSDUes well with 
the particle size distribution of a cough (Nicas et al, 2005). The sampling 
distance from the atomiser to the samplers was approximately 85cm. 
 
Virus: 
A variant of influenza virus A/H1N1/PR/8/34 [adapted for growth on 
Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cells], obtained from the American 
Type Culture Collection (LGC Promochem Ltd, UK) was used for this 
experiment. MDCK cells were obtained from the European Collection of 
Cell Cultures and cultured as directed by the supplier.  High titre stocks of 
virus were grown on cultured MDCK cells as previously described (Gaush 
and Smith 1968). Virus was harvested when a cytopathic effect was visible 
on 80-100% of the cell monolayer. Cellular debris was removed from the 
crude virus preparation by centrifugation at 1000xg.  This clarified viral 
preparation was subsequently stored at -800C. Prior to use in aerosol 
sampling studies, influenza virus was concentrated by ultracentrifugation 
at 100,000xg for 2.5 hours at 40C.  The supernatant was aspirated and the 
viral pellet re-suspended in PBS containing 0.2% (w/v) Fraction V BSA 
overnight at 40C. Virus collected from approximately 36mL of crude 
preparation was re-suspended in 6mL PBS + 0.2% BSA. The concentration 
of virus suspension was between 1012 and 1013 PFU/mL. 
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Figure 3.3: Diagram depicting the experimental set up. 
Plant Air
(20 psi)
0.2 ʅŵ
filter
Nebuliser 
nozzleVirus 
suspension
Airflow 
control 
switch
Valve
Approx. 85 cm
NIOSH 
sampler
Air 
pump
Air 
inlet
 
 
Footnote: Aerosolised particles (represented by the grey area) are 
produced from a nebuliser and sampled by the NIOSH sampler. 
 
 
The atomiser was charged with 5mL of the virus test suspension. Vacuum 
pumps were switched on and a simulated cough was achieved with a 1 
second pulsed spray of the influenza test suspension. A 1 second pulse 
UHOHDVHVDSSUR[LPDWHO\ǋORIVXVSHQVLRQWKLVVKRXOGFRQWDLQ
approximately 2.5x1012 PFU. Air was sampled for a period of 5 minutes 
before the vacuum pump was switched off. The cabinet airflow was 
switched back on to remove residual bioaerosol particles and to permit 
safe handling of the samples. Liquid samples were removed from the 
samplers. The stage 2 WXEHZDVUHFRQVWLWXWHGWRǋO9707KHILOWHUV
were placed in a 6-ZHOOWLVVXHFXOWXUHGLVKDQGVRDNHGLQǋOYLUXV
transport medium for 4 hours. Liquid samples were then stored at ±80°C 
before processing. 
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Virus detection: 
The titre of influenza virus present in the samples was determined by 
plaque dilution assay (Gaush and Smith 1968; Gray 1999).  Plaques were 
counted on day 3 post-infection, and the titre in plaque-forming units per 
mL of influenza virus in the original sample calculated. The presence of 
YLUXVZDVDOVRGHWHUPLQHGE\3&551$ZDVH[WUDFWHGIURPǋO of each 
sample using a Mag-Max Viral RNA isolation kit (Ambion). Detection of a 
conserved region of the matrix gene of influenza A and the XenoRNA-01 
internal control was performed using the AIV-M Primer Probe mix (Applied 
%LRV\VWHPVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHPDQXIDFWXUHU¶VLQVWUXFWLRQVRQD%LR5$'L-
Cycler. A control RNA (10,000 copies/mL) was serially diluted and used to 
establish a quantification curve. This curve allowed the cycle threshold 
(Ct) values of all the other curves to be matched against it and the 
amount of viral RNA present to be quantified.  
 
3.3.2 Results 
The first run of the experiment employed a NIOSH and an SKC sampler, 
both using VTM. Influenza virus was detected by PCR and Plaque Assay 
(PA) from both samplers.  All particle sizes collected by the NIOSH 
sampler were positive by PA (i.e. detected live virus). Only the filter of the 
NIOSH sampler detected virus by PCR. In the second run, no VTM was 
used. Again, PCR and PA detected influenza virus from both samplers. All 
particle sizes collected by the NIOSH sampler demonstrated viable virus by 
PA whilst stage 2 and the filter demonstrated virus by PCR (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Results from Experiment 1 (runs 1 and 2). 
Run 1: Virus transport medium used in stage 1 and 2 collectors of the 
NIOSH samplers 
Sampler(particle size collected) 
Plaque Assay 
(PFU/mL) 
RT-PCR 
(Copies/mL) 
SKC Impinger (*) 4.7×104 9.4 x 104 
NIOSH Sampler stage 1 (>4µm) 1.72×102 0 
NIOSH Sampler stage 2 (1-4 µm) 2.4×103 0 
NIOSH Sampler filter (<1µm) 2.32×102 3.2 x 105 
Run 2: No Virus transport medium used in stage 1 and 2 collectors of 
the NIOSH samplers 
Sampler (particle size 
collected) 
Plaque Assay 
(PFU/mL) 
RT-PCR 
(Copies/mL) 
SKC Impinger (*) 2.9×104 5.16 x 107 
NIOSH Sampler stage 1 (>4µm) 4.4×103 0 
NIOSH Sampler stage 2 (1-4 µm) 3.4×104 6.86 x 105 
NIOSH Sampler filter (<1µm) 1.76×102 2.02 x 104 
 
Footnote: *The impinger will collect a wide range of particles but the 
upper and lower size ranges are not known. Stage 1 of the NIOSH sampler 
captures particles <1µm, stage 2 captures particles between 1 and 4µm 
and the filter captures particles >4µm. 
 
 
3.4 Experiment 2 
Objective: To capture aerosolised influenza virus released into a controlled 
air chamber (CAC) using a bioaerosol sampler and to detect virus by PCR 
and culture techniques.  
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3.4.1 Equipment and Methods 
Except where stated below, the materials and methods used were identical 
to those outlined in Experiment 1. The CAC is of a size comparable to a 
hospital side room or bedroom in a house (3m x 3m x 4m = 36m3). This 
approximates field conditions and allows the released aerosol to disperse 
in a more realistic fashion compared to the small volume within the 
microbiological safety cabinet used in Experiment 1. It also allowed 
samples to be taken from a variety of locations. The samplers were 
positioned at a height of 150cm from the floor (a similar height to that of a 
SDWLHQW¶VKHDGZKHQVLWWLQJLQEHG) and at distances of either 3 or 7ft from 
a pulsed compressed air atomiser. The temperature within the CAC was 
23oC and RH was 29%. The atomiser was charged with 5mL of virus test 
suspension. The CAC access door and portholes were closed and sealed, 
and the airflow was switched off. It is known that approximately 10% of 
air will be lost from the CAC system via the extractor fan. The sampling 
pumps were switched on and a simulated cough was achieved with a 1 
second pulsed spray of influenza virus test suspension. This was repeated 
once every hour over a 3 hour period (time points 0, 1 and 2 hours). Six 
NIOSH samplers were used and they varied with respect to; i) amount of 
VTM used in the first and second stage collection tubes, ii) distance from 
the aerosol source and iii) sampling time (see Table 3). A midget impinger 
6.&ZDVDJDLQXVHGDVDµFRQWURO¶DQGUDQIRUKRXUVDWIWIURPYLUXV
source.  
On completion of sampling, the chamber air was purged to remove any 
residual bioaerosol particles to permit safe handling of the samples.  Liquid 
samples were removed from the samplers. As significant evaporation of 
VTM had occurred the stage 2 tubes from samplers 1-5 were reconstituted 
WRǋOXVLQJ9706WDJHWXEHVDQGIURP Sampler 6 were washed 
with 750ǋORI9707KHILOWHUVZHUHSODFHGLQD-well tissue culture dish 
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DQGVRDNHGLQǋOYLUXVWUDQVSRUWPHGLXPIRUhours. Liquid samples 
were stored at ±80°C before processing. 
 
3.4.2 Results 
All the samplers collected and detected influenza virus by either PCR 
and/or PA. There does not appear to be any qualitative or quantitative 
relationship between the PCR and PA results. No formal statistical analysis 
were performed due to the small dataset. 
 
PCR 
 Of the 18 samples collected by the NIOSH samplers, virus could be 
detected in all but two. 
 Longer sampling time appeared to lead to the detection of more virus 
(sampler 3 > 2 > 1) with the exception of the filter from sampler 1. 
 Sampler 4 which was positioned at 7ft collected less virus than sampler 
3 positioned at 3ft. 
 Sampler 5 had an increased volume of VTM and collected less virus 
WKDQLWVFRXQWHUSDUWVDPSOHUZKLFKKDGDµVWDQGDUG¶YROXPHRI
VTM. 
 The sampler not using VTM (sampler 6) collected more virus than the 
sampler using VTM (sampler 3) in stage 1. 
 
Plaque Assay 
 Of the 18 samples collected, 12 contained live virus.  
 On 4 out of 6 occasions, samples from the filter were negative. 
 Sampling over a shorter time period appeared to lead to the recovery 
of more live virus (sampler 1 > 2 > 3). 
 Sampling at a greater distance from the source found more live virus 
(sampler 4 vs. 3).  
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 Sampler 6 with no VTM collected more live virus in each size fraction 
than sampler 3. Sampler 5 which had the highest volume of VTM failed 
to demonstrate any live virus. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Results from Experiment 2. 
Sampler Sampling 
Time 
(Hrs) 
Distance 
from 
source 
(ft) 
Stage Volume 
of VTM 
RT-PCR 
(copies
/mL) 
Plaque 
Assay 
(PFU/mL) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
1 750 19 9 
2 250 15 9 
Filter N/A 38300 0 
       
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
1 750 134 9 
2 250 411 3 
Filter N/A 19 0 
       
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
1 750 27170 3 
2 250 12170 3 
Filter N/A 653 0 
       
 
4 
 
3 
 
7 
1 750 69 6 
2 250 1121 6 
Filter N/A 0 12 
       
 
5 
 
3 
 
3 
1 1500 2441 0 
2 500 13 0 
Filter N/A 414 0 
       
 
6 
 
3 
 
3 
1 0 143200 12 
2 0 0 6 
Filter N/A 83 6 
       
 
SKC 
 
3 
 
3 
 
- 
 
750 
 
67460 
 
0 
 
Footnote: Stage 1 captures particles <1µm, stage 2 captures particles 
between 1 and 4µm and the filter captures particles >4µm. VTM = Viral 
transport medium 
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3.5 Discussion 
 
We were able to demonstrate that the NIOSH bioaerosol sampler can 
collect influenza virus in all three particle size ranges following virus 
release into air. Virus was detected by both PCR and culture techniques. 
The fact that virus was detected by culture on particles that are small 
enough to be respired at a distance of 7ft from the source is in itself 
important. If this finding were to be confirmed in a field setting around an 
infected patient it would add to the evidence that the aerosol route of 
transmission is at least possible. 
 
Experiment 1 was designed to assess whether the use of liquid medium 
could successfully be used as part of the sampling system, as it is 
theoretically attractive to use VTM to help preserve the virus (Agranovski 
et al, 2004; Fabian et al, 2009a). Both runs of the experiment were 
successful suggesting that VTM can be employed though its use may not 
be obligatory. It should be recognised that the sampling time was short. 
The NIOSH sampler was roughly comparable to the SKC sampler. 
 
Experiment 2 was an attempt to simulate natural conditions by releasing 
virus into a volume of air that might commonly exist around an infected 
patient. Releasing virus into a large volume of air makes detection more 
difficult due to dilution and drying effects. Furthermore, the ability to 
detect aerosolised virus by PCR in these circumstances is likely to be much 
more sensitive compared to the detection of live virus by PA; PA requires 
>1 viable infectious unit per inoculum to be present where as PCR can 
detect small amounts of viral RNA, irrespective of viability.  
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A lack of data due to a limited number of experiments and a wide variation 
in results obtained from quantitative tests hampers our ability to 
rigorously test our hypotheses. Formal statistical analysis cannot be 
performed but we may speculate that;  
 Culture of virus collected via the filter is difficult; particles collected 
here are the smallest and perhaps most vulnerable to dehydration, 
especially when in association with a porous material.  In addition, the 
filters tend to carry a static charge, which might affect the viruses. 
 Sampling over a short time period is beneficial for culture (compare 
results from samplers 1, 2 and 3). Increasing lengths of sampling time 
resulted in more virus being detected by PCR for stages 1 and 2. 
 The findings relating to sampling over different distances are less clear. 
Samplers closest to source collected more virus by PCR but not by 
culture. A continuous flow of air through the sampling apparatus may 
reduce virus survival within the sampler compared to room air and 
captured virus at 3ft may spend more time in the sampler than virus 
captured at 7ft. 
 The benefit of VTM is not clear; no other sampler collected more live 
virus than sampler 6, which did not use VTM. In contrast the sampler 
using increased volumes of VTM found no live virus; this could be a 
result of i) dilution of any virus that was collected below the level of 
detection for plaque assay ii) an effect on the efficiency of particle 
sampling by the sampler itself. 
 
There are other limitations to this work. Firstly it is not clear why some 
samples failed to yield a positive PCR result, whilst the same sample 
contained detectable virus in the PA. Due to time constraints the PCR 
method was not fully optimised; improved sensitivity could likely have 
been achieved had this been done. Secondly, the mechanisms and the 
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amount of virus that an infected individual releases will be much more 
complex than can be achieved in an experimental set up; an arbitrary 
value of one µFRXJK¶SHUKRXUZDVFKRVHQLQWKLVH[SHULPHQW)XUWKHUPRUH
we recognise that conditions such as air flow, temperature and humidity 
which were controlled in our experiment will vary both during and between 
different settings. In a hospital room for example, the presence of air 
conditioning, an open window or a door opening and closing will affect the 
concentration of bioaerosols in the air. This in turn will affect the ability to 
collect and detect them. Thirdly, no attempt has been made to analyse 
how the addition of a volume of VTM in each of the collection tubes affects 
the performance of the sampler. It could impact on the dynamics of airflow 
through the sampler with an effect on the sizes of particles trapped by 
each stage. Finally, an assessment of the filters sampling efficiency could 
not be made. Whilst the total amount of virus released could be estimated, 
the amount associated with specific particle sizes is unknown. 
Furthermore, we know that the vast majority of virus will be associated 
ZLWKWKHODUJHVWSDUWLFOHVEXWWKHVDPSOHU¶VDELOLW\WRFROOHFWWKHVHODUJH
particles is significantly impaired. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In the experiments described, the NIOSH aerosol sampler is able to collect 
particles containing influenza virus and this was detected using both PCR 
and culture techniques, the latter demonstrating the capture of live virus. 
Particles of sizes >4, 1-4 and <1µm were all shown to carry virus and 
virus could be detected over a variety of sampling times and distances 
from its source. The use of VTM within the collection tubes does not 
appear to enhance the detection of live virus. Despite limitations, these 
experiments do support the utility of the equipment and methods used to 
collect airborne influenza virus. 
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4.1 Abstract 
 
Background 
Influenza transmission is an area that is poorly understood and hotly 
debated. A better appreciation about the extent to which virus is deposited 
by infected individuals into the environment and whether deposited virus 
has the ability to infect new hosts, i.e. whether it remains viable, is 
important to our understanding of the routes and mechanisms of 
transmission. This study was conducted to collect data on subjects who 
were infected with influenza. The primary objectives were to correlate the 
DPRXQWRIYLUXVGHWHFWHGLQDSDWLHQW¶VQRVHZLWKWKDWUHFRYHUHGIURP
his/her immediate environment (on surfaces and in the air), and with 
symptom duration and severity.  
 
Methods 
Adults and children, both in hospital and from the community, who had 
symptoms of influenza infection were enrolled and followed up. 
Information about symptoms was collected and samples were taken 
including nose swabs, swabs from surfaces (e.g. door handles, remote 
controls) and air samples from around patients. Samples were tested for 
the presence of influenza virus, using PCR to detect virus genome and 
culture to detect viable (live) virus.  
 
Results 
42 subjects with confirmed infection were followed up. Mean duration of 
virus shedding was 6.2 days by PCR and 4.2 days by culture. Over 25% of 
cases remained potentially infectious for at least 5 days. From surface 
swabs collected in the vicinity of 40 subjects, 15 (38%) subject locations 
were contaminated with virus. Overall 35 of 662 (5.3%) surface swabs 
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taken were positive for influenza, two (0.3%) yielded viable virus. 
Subjects yielding positive surface samples had significantly higher nasal 
viral loads on illness Day 3 and more prominent respiratory symptom 
scores. Room air was sampled in the vicinity of 12 subjects and PCR 
positive samples were obtained from five (42%). Particles small enough to 
reach tKHGLVWDOOXQJPZHUHIRXQGWRFRQWDLQYLUXVWKRXJKZHZHUH
unable to detect the presence of live virus.  
 
Conclusions 
Despite some limitations caused by the small number of subjects 
recruited, important observations have been made. The duration of viral 
shedding is in line with other published studies. The data on viral 
deposition suggests that either swabbing and/or laboratory methods are 
insensitive or that virus deposited by infected patients does not 
contaminate the vast majority of surfaces in high titre. It is likely that both 
explanations contribute. Contact transmission of influenza via surfaces 
may be less important than current infection control policies and public 
guidance documents imply. Findings from the air sampling component of 
the study show for the first time that influenza can be detected in the air 
around identifiable influenza patients and add to the accumulating 
evidence in support of the potential for aerosol transmission of influenza. 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
As pandemic mitigation strategies have been developed over recent years 
it has become very clear that influenza transmission is one area that is 
poorly understood and hotly debated. Distinguishing the relative 
importance of the various modes of transmission is critical for the 
development of infection control precautions in healthcare settings and in 
the home.  
 
An important and to date relatively neglected area of research concerns 
the presence of virus in the environment, virus potentially available for 
transfer to new hosts. Through the release of respiratory sprays 
(generated by actions such as coughing, sneezing and talking), virus may 
be deposited on hands, surfaces and into the air. For these viruses to 
cause infection in new hosts, a number of prerequisites exist; 
1. Virus must survive in the environment. 
2. Virus must reach target cells in a new host. 
3. Enough virus must reach target cells such that an infectious dose is 
achieved and infection initiated. 
 
A number of laboratory studies have confirmed the ability of influenza to 
survive in the environment (see Chapter 2, pages 38 & 42) but 
surprisingly few studies have attempted to investigate the presence, 
quantity and viability of virus in the natural environment around infected 
patients. Laboratory studies are important but they cannot adequately 
replicate the spatial layout, content and conditions of field settings. 
Furthermore they cannot take account of human behaviour and 
interactions. There is therefore a need to obtain data concerning 
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deposition of virus in natural settings in order to improve our 
understanding of the routes and mechanisms of transmission. 
 
In all previous research on influenza virus excretion, viral shedding has 
been determined by measurement of the quantity of virus recoverable 
IURPWKHSDWLHQW¶VQDVRSKDU\Qx, i.e. virus has been recovered by a 
GHOLEHUDWHO\SHUIRUPHGLQYDVLYHWHFKQLTXH7KHVHVRFDOOHGµYLUDOVKHGGLQJ¶
studies measure virus shed from infected cells, they do not actually 
measure virus that is deposited into the touched or respired environment 
i.e. they do not define environmental contamination and the hazard posed 
to others. Whilst such data are useful, if they could be linked to near-
patient environmental sampling, estimates of the extent to which 
infectious virus is deposited onto surfaces anGLQWRWKHDLULQWKHVXEMHFW¶V
immediate vicinity could be made. 
 
The occurrence of the 2009/10 influenza pandemic afforded an opportunity 
to conduct fieldwork and a study was performed to collect data on 
conventional viral shedding and environmental contamination (surfaces 
and air) and to investigate the relationships between them. 
 
 
4.3 Methods 
 
A multi-centre, prospective, observational cohort study recruited subjects 
over two influenza seasons; September 2009 - January 2010 (Year 1) & 
December 2010 ± January 2011 (Year 2) in accordance with the principles 
of the Declaration of Helsinki and UK regulatory requirements. It was 
approved by Leicestershire, Northamptonshire & Rutland Research Ethics 
Committee 1 (09/H0406/94).  
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4.3.1 Research Objectives 
The primary objectives were to correlate the amount of nasal viral 
shedding from a subject with; i) the amount of virus recovered from the 
environment around the subject and ii) symptom duration and severity. 
Secondary objectives were to describe viral shedding according to patient 
sub-groups; adults versus children and those with mild illness (community 
subjects) versus those with more severe disease (hospitalised subjects). 
 
4.3.2 Participants 
Subjects who had symptoms suggestive of influenza were recruited from 
the following groups;  
i) Adults in hospital (AH) 
ii) Children in hospital; age >1 month up to 16 years (CH) 
iii) Adults in the community (AC) 
iv) Children in the community; age >1 month up to 16 years (CC) 
The designation AH and CH denote that the subject was enrolled during 
hospital admission. However, subjects discharged from hospital before the 
end of follow up were then seen in the community; so whilst initial 
environmental specimens will have been taken in hospital, later ones will 
EHIURPWKHVXEMHFW¶VKRPH1RVXEMHFWVLQLWLDOO\ enrolled in the community 
were subsequently admitted to hospital.  
 
4.3.3 Sampling Frames 
 Hospital: All cases of suspected influenza identified to researchers by 
clinical care teams who had agreed to be approached by a researcher. 
Hospitals involved in recruitment were; Queens Medical Centre and 
City Hospital, Nottingham; Leicester Royal Infirmary (AH, Year 1 only); 
Royal Hallamshire Hospital, Sheffield (AH, Year 1 only). 
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 Community: Individuals living in the Nottingham area who had; i) 
symptoms of influenza infection, ii) received an invitation to take part 
in the research and iii) had use of a telephone. Invitations to take part 
(Appendix 4.1) were given by the following methods;  
¾ Year 1; adverts in local newspapers, posters sited in community 
areas, 3000 posted leaflets, 15,000 letters given to parents via 
schools and 3000 invitations given out at antiviral collection points 
in areas covered by Nottingham City and Nottinghamshire County 
PCTs. 
¾ Year 2; members of staff at two Nottingham NHS walk-in centres, 
Queens Medical Centre A+E department and a local GP practice. 
 
4.3.4 Eligibility Criteria 
Inclusion criteria: A history of influenza-like illness (ILI) defined as; 
 Fever (or recent history of fever) + any one of cough, sore throat, 
runny nose, fatigue or headache OR 
 Any two of cough, sore throat, runny nose, fatigue or headache. These 
symptoms were those most commonly reported by the first cases of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 in the UK (McLean et al, 2010). 
 
Exclusion criteria: Illness present for >48 hours (community cases) or >96 
hours (hospital cases); PCR negative for influenza, participation in 
influenza research involving an investigational medicinal product within the 
last 3 months (See Appendix 4.2). 
 
Eligible subjects were enrolled after informed consent had been obtained. 
A subject was defined as a case if; i) they met our criteria for ILI, and ii) 
tested PCR positive on a nasal swab for influenza. See Appendices 4.3 for 
participant information sheets and 4.4 for informed consent forms. 
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4.3.5 Study Procedures  
Adult subjects were followed for up to 15 days from the start of symptoms 
and children <13 years of age were followed for up to 12 days. Where 
possible, subjects were followed up on a daily basis. Follow up was 
generally shorter in Year 2 but the surface sampling performed was more 
intensive, i.e. every day as opposed to alternate days (Table 4.1). This 
was based on an assumption that environmental contamination is likely to 
be higher earlier in the course of illness. Data concerning body 
temperature, medications and room conditions (temperature and 
humidity) were collected. In addition a symptom diary was completed by 
each subject; symptoms were given a severity score on a scale of 0-3 
(Appendix 4.5).  
 
The following samples were collected; 
 Nasal swabs - Whilst a nasopharyngeal aspirate (NPA) is considered 
the best specimen for detecting influenza viruses (Sung et al, 2008; 
Spyridaki et al, 2009; Ngaosuwankul et al, 2010), this procedure 
causes more discomfort and is more difficult to perform, particularly in 
children. Indeed studies attempting to collect daily NPA samples from 
VXEMHFWVKDYHUHSRUWHGSUREOHPVZLWKVXEMHFWV¶WROHUDQFHDQG
compliance with the procedure (To et al, 2010). A nasal swab however, 
has been shown to be an acceptable alternative that is not statistically 
less sensitive than a NPA (Heikkinen et al, 2001; Sung et al, 2008; 
Spyridaki et al, 2009).  
 
A rapid antigen test (Quidel Quickvue A+B) using a nasal swab was 
performed on the day of enrolment to aid the identification of subjects. 
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Table 4.1: Study procedures conducted in Year1 and Year 2. 
Materials and 
methods 
 
Year 1 Year 2 
Timing Sept 2009 ± Jan 2010 Dec 2010 ± Jan 2011 
 
Recruitment 
 
 Community 
 
 
 
 Hospital 
 
 
 
 
Antiviral collection 
points, local media, 
letters via schools 
 
Nottingham, Leicester, 
Sheffield 
 
 
 
 
NHS walk in centres, 
A+E department, 
university campus GP 
 
Nottingham 
PCR testing to 
confirm diagnosis 
performed? 
No Yes 
Mean Follow up 
period 
8.7 days 4.8 days 
 
Swabs 
 
Surface sampling 
 Hospital 
 
 
 Community 
 
 
 
Frequency 
 
 
Cotton tipped 
 
 
Table, window sill, bed 
button 
 
Kettle, tap, door handle, 
bed table, TV remote, 
dining table 
 
Alternate days 
 
Dacron tipped 
 
 
Table, cup, bed button, 
door handle 
 
Kettle, tap, door handle, 
light switch, fridge, TV 
remote, computer 
 
Most days 
 
Air sampling 
 
 
VTM volume 
 
 
Performed at both 3-7 
and >7ft from subject 
and for 1 and 3 hours 
 
750µl VTM was added to 
samples after collection 
 
Performed at >7 ft from 
subject for 3 hours 
 
 
1.5mL VTM was added 
to samples after 
collection 
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 Surface swabs - Swabs were taken in DVXEMHFW¶VKRVSLWDOURRP and/or 
their own home. Swabs were moistened with VTM and then rubbed 
across an area of approximately 100cm2 in three different directions 
whilst applying even pressure. In addition to using swabs, sponges 
were trialled in Year 1 to sample bedside tables. The sponges (TS/15-
B:PBS; Technical Service Consultants Ltd) were 50cm2 in size, sterile 
and dosed with 10mL of a neutralising buffer. They were wiped over an 
approximate 400cm2 area and then sealed in a sterile medical grade 
plastic bag. No specific cleaning instructions were given to households 
and hospital cleaning continued as normal during follow up. If other 
household members became ill during the period of follow up, sampling 
of the original participant continued and the age and symptoms of any 
potential secondary cases were recorded. 
 
In Year 1 cotton tipped swabs (FB57835; Fisherbrand) were used and in 
Year 2 Dacron tipped swabs (FB57833; Fisherbrand) were used [this 
change was made in line with advice to use synthetic fibre swabs for 
influenza diagnostics (CDC 2009d)]. Swabs and sponges were placed into 
VTM DQGNHSWRQµZHW¶LFHIRUQRORQJHUWKDQ hours before being 
delivered to a laboratory or frozen at -700C. 
 
 Air particles were collected using a National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) two-stage cyclone bioaerosol sampler 
which has been validated for use with influenza (see Chapter 3). The 
flow rate through each sampler was set at 3.5L/min with a flow 
calibrator (Model 4143, TSI) before use. Samplers were mounted on 
tripods at a height of 150cm, were placed at distances of either 3-7 or 
>7ft from the subject and ran for 1, 2 or 3 hours. Not all subjects were 
stationary during the sampling period (though they were asked to 
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remain in the same room if they could), so that the distance from the 
subject to the sampler may have varied over time. Sampling was 
usually performed on just one follow up day. After sampling, VTM was 
added to both stage 1 and 2 tubes and the filter paper was immersed 
in a 15mL tube also containing VTM. The volumes of VTM were 
increased in Year 2 to allow sufficient volume for testing. Samples were 
stored at ±70°C. 
 
4.3.6 Laboratory Methods 
7KHIROORZLQJVDPSOHSURFHVVLQJµUXOHV¶ZHUHLQVWLWXWHGWROLPLWWKHDQDO\VLV
of likely negative samples; 
 Nasal swabs from Day 4 onwards were not tested if days 1-3 were all 
PCR negative. 
 Culture was only performed on PCR positive samples. 
 Environmental swabs were not processed if nasal swabs taken on the 
three previous days from a case were PCR negative (Year 1) or if nasal 
swabs were negative on the same day (Year 2). 
 
Laboratory work was carried out at following institutions; 
 The HPA and University of Cambridge virology laboratories at 
$GGHQEURRNH¶V+RVSLWDO&DPEULGJH Samples were defrosted and split 
into six aliquots, three for PCR and three for culture, then refrozen at -
70°C until required.  
 Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham ± Diagnostic PCRs were performed 
on nasal samples taken on the day of enrolment in Year 2 in order to 
limit the follow up of influenza negative subjects.  
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PCR:  A novel influenza A H1N1 pentaplex assay was devised to detect 
virus genome in the samples. The assay was designed to detect 
A(H1N1)pdm09, seasonal H1 and H3 influenza A, influenza B and the 
internal control MS2. Viral load data were generated using the PCR assay 
and plasmids containing the gene target to create a standard curve, such 
that the concentration of genome present in each sample could be 
calculated (see Appendix 4.6A for further detail). 
 
Culture: Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 did not readily form plaques on MDCK 
cells so an immunofluorescence (IF) assay was used to detect the 
influenza A/B nucleoprotein in order to demonstrate the presence of live 
replicating virus in the swab samples. Assays were performed on samples 
that were PCR positive. Generally, if a swab was IF positive on a given day 
(e.g. study Day 5) then an assumption was made that previous days (e.g. 
1-4) would also have been positive and no testing on these days was done 
(see Appendix 4.6B for further detail). 
 
4.3.7 Statistical methods 
 Sample size 
The recruitment target was 100 subjects in total, comprising 
approximately 25 subjects in each of the four groups. Sub-group sizes of 
25 [which allow pooling of data by adults or children (50 per group) or the 
whole population] gives high statistical power (>80%) to detect 
correlations of >0.55 in groups of size n = 25, 0.4 in groups of size n = 
50, and 0.3 in groups of size n = 100. 
 
 Outcome Measures 
1. Viral shedding (nose swab) and environmental deposition (surfaces 
and air) as measured by PCR and culture techniques. 
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¾ A positive nose swab was defined as a sample in which a Ct value 
of <35 (2342 copies/mLIRUWULSOLFDWHRIDVDPSOHLVREWDLQHG
Implausible results and any single triplicates separated by >48 
hours from other positive samples were not counted. 
¾ A positive fomite swab / air sample was defined as a sample in 
which a &WYDOXHRIIRUWriplicate of a sample is obtained. 
Post-hoc it was considered that a Ct value of <40 (122 copies/mL) 
IRUWULSOLFDWHRIDVDPSOHLILWZDVREWDLQHGIURPDVXEMHFWZLWK
a positive nose swab taken on the same day, would also be defined 
as positive. Lowering the threshold of detection to limit falsely 
negative results was considered reasonable based on a belief that 
false positive samples were unlikely because; i) 73% (11 out of 15) 
of subjects had >1 positive sample; and ii) in Year 1 when many 
more fomite samples from later in the course of a subject¶s illness 
were processed, the false positive rate was low (0.6%). 
¾ Viral loads represent the mean value of the triplicate assay. A value 
of half of the lower limit of detection (i.e. 1171 copies/mL for nose 
swabs and 61 copies/mL for fomite swabs and air samples) was 
imputed for undetectable values. 
¾ The duration of viral shedding is defined as the time between 
symptom onset and the last day that a positive specimen was 
taken. Because subjects were seldom recruited on the day 
symptoms began an assumption has been made that they were 
shedding virus from the first day of symptoms to the last positive 
specimen. 
 
2. Daily symptom scores categorised into; 
¾ URT score - stuffy nose, runny nose, sneezing, sore throat, sinus 
tenderness, earache. 
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¾ LRT score - cough, shortness of breath. 
¾ Systemic score - fatigue, myalgia, headache. 
¾ Total symptom score is the sum of URT, LRT and systemic 
symptom scores plus a score for diarrhoea and a score for 
vomiting. 
Scores for each symptom range between 0 and 3. Each symptom score 
within a category is summed to give an overall category score, for 
example; cough ± 2, shortness of breath ± 1 = LRT score of 3. A 
similar index has previously been used to assess respiratory tract 
illness of viral aetiology (Jackson et al, 1962). 
 
 Analyses 
A detailed descriptive analysis of the data is presented. The Student t-test 
was used to compare mean values. The Pearson's correlation test was 
used to test correlations between continuous variables and ORs and 95% 
CI were calculated to represent associations between variables for binary 
categorical outcome measures. The chi-squared test was used to test the 
significance of ORs. Differences in viral loads were measured using 
geometric means (GMs) and compared using geometric mean ratios and 
WKHSDLUHGWWHVW3YDOXHVRIZHUHFRQVLGHUHGVLJQLILFDQW$OO
statistical analyses were conducted in Stata version 11. 
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4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Demographics 
102 subjects were followed up between September 2009 and January 
2011. Influenza A was detected in 48 (47%) subjects; all were 
A(H1N1)pdm09. Influenza B was detected in seven (7%). Four influenza A 
cases and two influenza B cases were excluded as study laboratory (as 
opposed to clinical care) tests were negative. In addition two influenza A 
cases were excluded on the basis of being recruited >5 days after 
symptom onset (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 1: Participant flow diagram. 
102 Subjects Followed Up
48 Influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09
(6 excluded from 
further analysis)
15 Children 27 Adults 
47 Other* 7 Influenza B
(2 excluded from 
further analysis)
4 Children 1 Adult 
4 
Hospital
11 
Community
1
Hospital
0
Hospital
14 
Hospital
13
Community
4 
Community
0 
Community
 
Footnote: *Others consisted of ILI with no confirmed viral aetiology or 
confirmed infections with rhinovirus and RSV. Four influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 cases and two influenza B cases were excluded as study 
laboratory (as opposed to clinical care) tests were negative. In addition 
two influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases were excluded on the basis of being 
recruited >5 days after symptom onset. 
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The following results all pertain to the A(H1N1)pdm09 cases unless stated. 
Of 42 analysed cases, 24 (57%) were female, 27 (64%) were adults and 
24 (57%) were community cases. Subjects were recruited after a mean of 
2.1 days of illness (Year 1 = 1.8, Year 2 = 2.3) (median = 2, range = 0-4) 
and were followed for a mean of 6.6 days (Year 1 = 8.7 Year 2 = 4.8) 
(median = 7, range = 1-12). Seventeen subjects (40%) reported co-
morbidities; in ten cases (59%) these included respiratory conditions. The 
numbers enrolled and a demographic description of A(H1N1)pdm09 cases 
is shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2: Numbers enrolled and overall demographic description of 
subjects with A(H1N1)pdm09. 
 Adult 
community 
 
Adult 
hospital 
Child 
community 
Child 
hospital 
Total 
(%) 
 
Enrolled 
 
 
13 
 
14 
 
11 
 
4 
 
42 
 
Male sex (%) 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
8 
 
0 
 
18 (43%) 
 
Median age (yrs) 
Range 
 
 
29 
21-58 
 
28 
19-57 
 
4 
2-12 
 
2.5 
0-15 
 
22 
0 - 58 
Ethnic group 
- White 
- Black 
- Asian 
- Other 
 
10 
1 
2 
0 
 
8 
1 
5 
0 
 
8 
0 
1 
2 
 
4 
0 
0 
0 
 
30 (71%) 
2 (5%) 
8 (19%) 
2 (5%) 
Mean time from 
symptom start to 
enrolment (days) 
 
2.2 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
1.5 
 
 
2.8 
 
 
2.1 
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Tables 4.3A&B list the 42 cases of A(H1N1)pdm09 recruited into the study 
and shows some of the key outcome measures for each. Two recruited 
cases needed high dependency care, none died during follow up. 
 
Table 4.3A: A(H1N1)pdm09 positive cases in Year 1. 
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AC01 21 F Asian - 6 (3/1) 32.7 (3/1) 6 (10) 5 (6) - 
AC04 28 F Black Asthma 13 (2/1) 8.2 (2/1) 3 (9) 3 (3) - 
AH01 19 F White CF 13 (3/1) 5.2 (8/6) 9 (10) -ve (9) 3 
AH03 27 F Asian - 28 (3/1) 60.7 (3/1) 9 (12) 4 (9) 2 
AH04 30 F Asian - 17 (3/1) 1595.9 (8/6) 10 (10) 8 (10) 2 
AH05 24 F Asian - 12 (4/1) 1.9 (5/2) 5 (7) -ve (5) - 
AH07 34 M Asian - 20 (8/6) 15.4 (4/2) 5 (10) 4 (5) NA 
AH08 33 M Black Asthma 25 (3/1) 0.3 (3/1)* 3 (7) -ve (3) 2 
CC01 12 M Mixed Asthma 18 (3/1) 3.6 (3/1) 5 (12) -ve (5) 2 
CC02 11 M Asian - 18 (3/1) 116.1 (3/1) 8 (11) -ve (8) - 
CC03 6 M Asian - 5 (4/2) 25.1 (3/1) 6 (12) 4 (7) 4 
CC04 2 M White - 10 (2/1) 1.9 (3/2) 4 (4) -ve (4) - 
CC05 9 M White Asthma 23 (2/1) 1302.5 (2/1) 7 (11) 3 (9) 2 
CC06 4 M White Eczema 8 (2/2) 15.1 (1/1) 9 (12) 5 (6) - 
CC07 3 F White - 8 (2/1) 0.4 (3/2) 3 (10) 3 (3) 2 
CC14 6 M White - 12 (2/1) 346.6 (2/1) 7 (12) 6 (7) - 
CC15 2 F White - 10 (6/4) 2452.1 (3/1) 8 (13) -ve (8) - 
CH01 15 F White - 10 (3/1) 286.5 (3/1) 8 (10) 6 (8) 3 
CH03 0 F White CF 4 (4/1) 1847.5 (5/2) 7 (10) 5 (7) 4 
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Table 4.3B: A(H1N1)pdm09 positive cases in Year 2. 
 
Footnote: AC = Adult Community, AH = Adult Hospital, CC = Child 
Community, CH = Child Hospital, DoI = Day of Illness (= day of follow up 
+ time to enrolment; Day 1 is the day symptoms were first noticed), DoFU 
= Day of Follow Up, CF = Cystic Fibrosis, DM = Diabetes Mellitus, CCF = 
Congestive Cardiac Failure, ND = Not Done, NA = Not Available, * Only 
data on one viral load available, 7LPHIURPV\PSWRPRQVHWWRODVWGD\
swab positive. Á)LUVWGD\RIV\PSWRPV 'ay 1, therefore treatment at 
Day 3 is within 48 hours 
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AC20 43 M White - 10 (3/2) 340.2 (4/3) 6 (6) 4 (6) - 
AC21 58 F White DM 21 (3/2) 27.2 (3/2) 5 (7) 5 (5) - 
AC22 23 M Asian - 18 (3/1) 70.2 (3/1) 6 (8) 3 (3) - 
AC26 45 F White - 32 (5/3) 95.1 (3/1) 5 (8) 3 (5) - 
AC28 22 F White - 26 (4/2) 773.5 (4/2) 4 (7) 4 (4) - 
AC29 21 F Black Asthma 18 (5/1) 1.8 (6/2) 10 (10) 10 (10) - 
AC30 25 M White - 11 (3/1) 316.6 (4/2) 7 (7) 4 (7) - 
AC32 57 M White - 18 (3/1) 8.0 (3/1) 4 (4) -ve (4) - 
AC33 33 F White - 15 (5/1) 1.9 (5/1) 6 (6) -ve (6) - 
AC36 30 M White - 15 (3/1) 6.8 (3/1) 7 (9) ND - 
AC37 22 F White Asthma 22 (6/3) 55.4 (6/3) 6 (10) 6 (6) - 
AH20 52 M White - 18 (4/1) 258.4 (4/1) 15 (15) 5 (13) 4 
AH24 31 F White Asthma 18 (3/1) 173.5 (3/1) 4 (8) 4 (4) 3 
AH26 57 F White CCF, DM 4 (4/1) 2381.8 (4/1) 6 (7) 4 (7) 4 
AH27 42 M White IHD 20 (4/1) 417.1 (4/1) 6 (6) -ve (6) 3 
AH28 22 M White - 10 (4/1) 33.4 (4/1) 5 (5) -ve (5) 4 
AH29 19 F White Asthma 28 (3/1) 1120.5 (3/1) 4 (4) 3 (4) 1 
AH32 31 F White - 22 (5/3) 5.5 (4/2) 5 (10) -ve (5) 4 
AH42 37 F Asian - 14 (4/1) 60.5 (4/1)* 4 (5) -ve (4) 3 
CC25 3 M White - 16 (4/1) 1.2 (4/1) 5 (7) -ve (5) - 
CC26 3 F White - 6 (2/1) 15.0 (2/1)* 2 (2) -ve (2) - 
CH21 5 F White Eczema 15 (5/1) 0.3 (5/1) 10 (10) ND - 
CH30 0 F White  12 (6/4) 1.2 (8/6) 7 (9) ND 4 
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4.4.2 Rapid antigen tests 
Sixteen out of 40 (40%) subjects were rapid antigen test positive; 8 out of 
27 (30%) adults and 8 out of 15 (53%) children. There were no false 
positives tests. 
 
4.4.3 Symptoms 
The most frequently reported symptoms were cough, sore throat and 
runny nose (Table 4.4). Fever was reported on the day illness began in 21 
out of FDVHVDQGZDVPHDVXUHGDVKLJK0C) during follow 
up in 14 out of 42 (33%) of cases. During follow up symptom scores were 
highest on Day 3 of illness and declined thereafter (Figure 4.2). 
 
Table 4.4: Symptoms reported over the course of study follow up. 
Symptom 
A(H1N1)pdm09 Subjects 
(n=42) 
Fever (on day of onset) 50% 
Cough 93% 
Sore throat 88% 
Runny nose 86% 
Stuffy nose 81% 
Fatigue 76% 
Sneezing 74% 
Headache 71% 
Myalgia 55% 
Shortness of breath 52% 
Sinus Tenderness 52% 
Vomiting 31% 
Earache 26% 
Diarrhoea 14% 
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Figure 4.2: Mean symptom scores of A(H1N1)pdm09 cases over time.  
 
Footnote: Data only shown ZKHUHREVHUYDWLRQVDUHDYDLODEOH. 
 
 
 
Children had lower symptom scores than adults (Figure 4.3). When 
matched for study setting, total symptom and systemic scores on Days 3 
and 4 were significantly lower in children compared to adults (except for 
total symptom scores in hospital cases on Day 3). There were no 
consistent differences in relation to symptom scores between community 
and hospital subjects on illness Days 3 or 4 (Tables 4.5 & 4.6). 
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of mean total symptom scores over time.  
 
)RRWQRWH'DWDRQO\VKRZQZKHUHREVHUYDWLRQVDUHDYDLODEOH. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Symptom score data. 
 
All 
Adults 
All 
Children 
All 
Community 
All 
Hospital 
AH CH AC CC 
n 27 15 18 24 14 4 13 11 
Mean TS 
Day 3 
17.8 8.1 12.1 18.0 20 10 16.1 7.7 
Mean TS 
Day 4 
14.7 7.1 11.3 12.9 14.4 5.7 15.1 7.5 
Mean LRT 
Day 3 
4.1 2.6 2.79 4.8 5.0 4.0 3.3 2.2 
Mean LRT 
Day 4 
3.6 2.1 2.8 3.4 3.7 1.7 3.4 2.2 
Mean URT 
Day 3 
6.8 3.2 4.9 6.5 7.4 3.0 6.4 3.2 
Mean URT 
Day 4 
5.4 3.3 4.8 4.5 5.1 2.0 5.8 3.8 
Mean SS 
Day 3 
6.6 1.7 4.2 5.8 6.8 2.0 6.4 1.7 
Mean SS 
Day 4 
5.3 1.4 3.7 4.2 4.9 1.0 5.7 1.6 
 
Footnote: TS = Total Symptoms, URT = Upper Respiratory Tract, LRT = 
Lower Respiratory Tract, SS = Systemic Symptoms, AC = Adult 
Community, AH = Adult Hospital, CC = Child Community, CH = Child 
Hospital 
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Table 4.6: Symptom score analyses. 
 
Adults vs. 
Children 
Community 
vs. 
Hospital 
CH vs. AH CC vs. AC CC vs. CH AC vs. AH 
TS Day 3 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-9.74 
(-14.8, -4.7) 
0.0005 
 
-5.89 
(-11.9, 0.1) 
0.055 
 
-10 
(-20.6, 0.6) 
0.06 
 
-8.4 
(-14.9, -2.0) 
0.01 
 
-2.33 
(-12.4, 7.8) 
0.61 
 
-3.9 
(-10.7, 2.9) 
0.24 
TS Day 4 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-7.63 
(-12, -3.4) 
0.0008 
 
-1.58 
(-6.3, 3.2) 
0.50 
 
-8.7 
(-16.4, -1.1) 
0.03 
 
-7.6 
(-13.8, -1.4) 
0.01 
 
1.83 
(-3.6, 7.3) 
0.47 
 
0.67 
(-5.4, 6.8) 
0.82 
LRT Day 3 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-1.51 
(-2.7, -0.3) 
0.018 
 
-2.01 
(3.2, -0.9) 
0.0012 
 
-1.0 
(-3.4, 1.4) 
0.37 
 
-1.08 
(-2.4, 0.3 
0.11 
 
-1.78 
(-3.6, 0.4) 
0.055 
 
-1.7 
(-3.3, -0.2) 
0.03 
LRT Day 4 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-1.5 
(-2.7, -0.4) 
0.0072 
 
-0.5 
(-1.6, 0.6) 
0.35 
 
-2.05 
(-4.3, 0.2) 
0.07 
 
-1.18 
(-2.6, 0.2) 
0.08 
 
0.56 
(-0.6, 1.7) 
0.32 
 
-0.31 
(-1.8, 1.2) 
0.67 
URT Day 3 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-3.65 
(-6.5, -0.8) 
0.0143 
 
-1.61 
(-4.8, 1.6) 
0.3136 
 
-4.38 
(-11.9, 3.1) 
0.22 
 
-3.18 
(-6.7, 0.3) 
0.07 
 
0.22 
(-3.7, 4.1) 
0.90 
 
-0.98 
(-5.4, 3.5) 
0.65 
URT Day 4 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-2.04 
(-4.3, 0.2) 
0.0751 
 
0.31 
(-1.9, 2.6) 
0.78 
 
-3.07 
(-6.6, 0.5) 
0.09 
 
-2.02 
(-5.5, 1.5) 
0.24 
 
1.78 
(-1.2, 4.7) 
0.21 
 
0.73 
(-2.4, 3.8) 
0.63 
SS Day 3 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-4.83 
(-6.3, -3.4) 
<0.0001 
 
-1.64 
(-4., 0.7) 
0.1667 
 
-4.75 
(-7.5, -2.1) 
0.004 
 
-4.73 
(-6.8, -2.7) 
0.0001 
 
-0.33 
(-4.4, 3.6) 
0.86 
 
-0.35 
(-2.1, 1.4) 
0.67 
SS Day 4 
MD 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
-3.83 
(-5.6, -2.1) 
0.0001 
 
-0.5 
(-2.6, 1.6) 
0.62 
 
-3.92 
(-7.2, -0.7) 
0.02 
 
-4.14 
(-6.6, -1.7) 
0.002 
 
0.56 
(-2.4, 3.5) 
0.69 
 
0.77 
(-1.5, 3.0) 
0.48 
 
Footnote: TS = Total Symptoms, SS = Systemic Symptoms, URT = Upper 
Respiratory Tract, LRT = Lower Respiratory Tract, MD = Mean Difference, 
AC = Adult Community, AH = Adult Hospital, CC = Child Community, CH = 
Child Hospital 
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4.4.4 Viral load 
Nasal swab viral loads were examined over time and in relation to 
symptom scores. Viral loads, measured by PCR, varied widely across our 
A(H1N1)pdm09 positive subjects, ranging from 2033 ± 24,521,397 
copies/mL.  As shown in Figure 4.4, viral loads declined over time. 
 
Figure 4.4: Viral Loads over time. 
 
Footnote: Viral loads plotted over time are shown for ten subjects from 
ZKRPWKHPRVWFRPSOHWHGDWDZHUHREWDLQHGFRQVHFXWLYHYDOXHV7KH
geometric mean viral load for each day is represented by GM and its linear 
trend line is also shown., AC = Adult Community, AH = Adult Hospital, CC 
= Child Community, CH = Child Hospital 
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Poor correlations were observed between total symptom scores and viral 
loads on illness Days 3 (r = -0.0628; p>0.05) and 4 (r = -0.0700; p 
>0.05) (Figure 4.5). 
 
Figures 4.5A (top) + 4.5B (bottom): Scatter plots showing the relationship 
between viral load and total symptom score on illness Day 3 and 4. 
 
 
 
 
Footnote: Linear trend lines are shown in red. 
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No significant differences were seen in the geometric mean viral loads 
between adults vs. children and community vs. hospital cases on illness 
Days 3, 4 and 5 (Table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.7: Geometric mean viral loads compared between groups. 
Illness day 
GM VL adults 
(95% CI) 
GM VL children 
(95% CI) 
 Adult/Children  
GM ratio (95% CI) 
P value 
Day 3 
121972 
(26689, 557430)  
132520 
(16143,1087878) 
0.92  
(0.1, 10.4) 
0.945 
Day 4 
98666 
(26015, 374210) 
20303 
(5386, 76532) 
4.86 
(0.8, 29.1) 
0.081 
Day 5 
 31311 
(12005, 81663) 
26187 
(4417, 155248) 
1.20 
(0.2, 8.1) 
0.850 
Illness day 
GM VL 
community 
(95% CI) 
GM VL hospital 
(95% CI) 
 
Hospital/Community  
GM ratio (95% CI) 
 
P value 
Day 3 
139051 
(44444, 435047) 
102360 
(4271, 2452955) 
0.74 
(0.0, 14.7) 
0.835 
Day 4 
36510 
(10204, 130630) 
104849 
(19876, 553104) 
2.87 
(0.4, 21.3) 
0.292 
Day 5 
16669 
(5591, 49698) 
56467 
(12781, 249478) 
3.39 
(0.6, 19.7) 
0.168 
 
Footnote: GM = Geometric Mean, VL = Viral Load 
 
 
Amongst sub-groups there was a trend and one significant observation 
suggesting AH have higher GM viral loads than CH. There was also a 
significant difference in GMs on illness Day 4 suggesting that CC have 
higher viral loads than CH (Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8: Geometric mean viral loads compared between groups. 
 
 
AH vs. CH 
 
AC vs. CC CH vs. CC AH vs. AC 
Reference 
category 
CH CC CC AC 
Day 3 
GMs 
GM ratio 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
120446/57917 
2.1 
(0.0, 9031.1) 
0.842 
 
123051/159280 
0.8 
(0.1, 8.5) 
0.823 
 
 
57917/159280 
0.4 
(0.0, 516.8) 
0.760 
 
 
120446/123051 
1.0 
(0.0, 35.2) 
0.990 
Day 4 
GMs 
GM ratio 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
180149/3110 
57.9 
(9.7, 345.8) 
<0.001 
 
45110/29549 
1.5 
(0.1, 21.0) 
0.738 
 
3110/29549 
0.1 
(0.0, 0.5) 
0.009 
 
 
180149/45110 
4.0 
(0.3, 61.8) 
0.305 
 
Day 5 
GMs 
GM ratio  
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
60106/47556 
1.26  
(0.0, 116.6) 
0.913 
 
12772/20628 
0.6 
(0.1, 5.2) 
0.638 
 
47556/20628 
2.3 
(0.0, 269.1) 
0.709 
 
 
60106/12772 
4.7 
(0.8, 26.6) 
0.076 
 
 
Footnote: AC = Adult Community, AH = Adult Hospital, CC = Child 
Community, CH = Child Hospital, GM = Geometric Mean 
 
 
4.4.5 Viral shedding 
The data on shedding presents a number of difficulties for interpretation. 
As a result a number of estimates for shedding have been derived; they 
are referred to as A, B and C; 
A. Estimate based only on positive results. 
B. Estimate that includes only samples that have a positive followed by a 
negative result or that were positive for at least 5 days from illness 
onset. Some positive subjects were only followed for a short period of 
WLPHZLWKWKHUHVXOWWKDWµ$¶PD\XQGHUHVWLPDWHWKHWUXHGXUDWLRQRI
shedding. This estimate attempts to describe an upper bound for 
shedding. 
C. Estimates based on all results - Negative results may arise through 
false negatives or because the duration of viral shedding was too short 
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WREHREVHUYHG7KHUHIRUHµ$¶PD\RYHUHVWLPDWHWKHGXUDWLRQRI
shedding. To obtain a lower bound for the duration, the calculation is 
UHSHDWHGZLWKWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW³QHJDWLYH´VXEMHFWVGLGQRWVKHG
live virus (duration of shedding = 0).  
 
The duration of viral shedding is defined as the time between symptom 
onset and the last day that a positive specimen was taken. Because 
subjects were seldom recruited on the day symptoms began an 
assumption has been made that they were shedding virus from the first 
day of symptoms to the last positive specimen. 
 
 Shedding by PCR 
Duration; 
A. 6.2 days, range 2-15 days (n = 42) (Figure 4.6) 
B. 6.5 days, range 3-15 days (n = 38) 
C. N/A (by definition all cases were PCR positive on at least one day) 
 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of the duration of viral shedding by PCR positivity 
(using estimate A). 
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Based on estimate A, adults shed virus for 6.11 days (95%CI: 5.08, 7.14) 
compared to children who shed for 6.40 days (95%CI: 5.17, 7.63); mean 
difference = 0.29 (95% CI: -1.33, 1.90), p = 0.72. There were no 
differences in the mean duration of shedding between hospitalised adults 
and children, community adults and children, hospitalised adults and 
children and community adults and children (Table 4.9). 
 
Table 4.9: Duration of PCR shedding (estimate A) compared between 
groups. 
 
All 
adults 
All 
children 
AH CH AC CC 
n 27 15 14 4 13 11 
Mean 
duration of 
shedding 
6.1 6.4 6.4 8.0 5.8 5.8 
 
 
 
 
Adults 
vs. 
Children 
CH vs. AH  AC vs. CC CC vs. CH AC vs. AH  
Mean 
difference 
(95% CI) 
0.29 
(1.3, 1.9) 
1.6 
(2.0, 5.2) 
0.05 
(-1.6, 1.7) 
-2.2 
(-4.8, 0.4) 
-0.6 
(-2.7, 1.4) 
P value 0.72 0.37 0.95 0.094 0.52 
 
Footnote: AC = Adult Community, AH = Adult Hospital, CC = Child 
Community, CH = Child Hospital 
 
 
Symptom score and duration of shedding; 
Mean total symptom scores on Days 3 and 4 of illness were significantly 
higher in those who shed for <6 days compared to tKRVHZKRVKHGIRU
days; no difference was observed on Day 5. Although not significant these 
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trends largely held when adults and children were analysed separately 
(Table 4.10). 
 
 
Table 4.10: Data showing associations between symptom scores and 
duration of shedding (by PCR). 
Illness 
day 
 
Mean Total Symptom Score 
(All Subjects) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(95% CI) 
P value 
Shedding <6 
days 
(95% CI) 
6KHGGLQJ
days 
(95% CI) 
Day 3 
18.00 
(13.46, 22.54) 
11.00 
(7.30, 14.70) 
7.00 
(1.49, 12.51) 
0.0148 
Day 4 
14.52 
(10.92, 18.14) 
9.90 
(6.89, 12.91) 
4.63 
(0.14, 9.12) 
0.0436 
Day 5 
10.92 
(5.65, 16.20) 
9.86 
(7.01, 12.70) 
1.07 
(-4.17, 6.30 ) 
0.6811 
Illness 
day 
 
Mean Total Symptom Score 
(Adults) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(95% CI) 
P value 
Shedding <6 
days 
(95% CI) 
6KHGGLQJ
days 
(95% CI) 
Day 3 
20.30 
(15.81, 24.79) 
14.75 
(9.21, 20.29) 
5.55 
(0.92, 12.02) 
0.0876 
Day 4 
16.15 
(12.03, 20.27) 
13.00 
(8.26, 17.74) 
3.15 
(2.73, 9.04) 
0.2784 
Day 5 
12.89 
(5.69, 20.08) 
12.73 
(8.21, 17.24) 
0.16 
(7.40, 7.71) 
0.9647 
Illness 
day 
 
Mean Total Symptom Score 
(Children) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(95% CI) 
P value 
Shedding <6 
days 
(95% CI) 
6KHGGLQJ
days 
(95% CI) 
Day 3 
10.34 
(6.58, 27.24) 
7.25 
(2.90, 11.60) 
3.08 
(5.49, 11.66 ) 
0.4370 
Day 4 
9.25 
(0.79, 17.71) 
6.11 
(4.17, 8.05) 
3.13 
(1.51, 7.78 ) 
0.1650 
Day 5 
6.50 
(2.73, 15.73) 
6.7 
(3.88, 9.52) 
-0.2 
(5.98, 5.58) 
0.9411 
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 Shedding by culture 
The duration of viable viral shedding is defined as the time between 
symptom onset and the last day that a positive culture was obtained. 
Cultures were performed in reverse order from the last day of nasal swab 
PCR positivity; if PCR was positive on study days 3-5, culture would be 
done first on the sample from Day 5, then Day 4 and then Day 3. If a 
culture was positive on any given day, then we assumed that earlier days 
would also have been positive. 
 
Twenty four out of 39 cases (62%) were culture positive (culture was not 
performed in three cases due to insufficient sample). 
 
Duration; 
A. Positive results only; mean 4.6 days, range 3-10 days (n = 24) (Figure 
4.7) 
B. Samples that have a positive followed by a negative result or that were 
positive for at least 5 days from illness onset; mean 4.9 days, range 3-
10 days (n = 19) 
C. All results; mean 2.8 days, range 0-10 days (n = 39) 
 
Ten out of 39 (26%) subjects shed live virus for at least 5 days from the 
onset of illness. Based on definition B, the mean duration of shedding was 
4.8 and 5.0 days in children and adults respectively; mean difference: -0.2 
(95% CI: -2.04, 1.70); p = 0.85. 
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of the duration of viral shedding by culture 
positivity (using estimate A). 
 
 
Symptom score and duration of shedding; 
No statistically significant associations were observed between the mean 
total symptom scores on Days 3, 4 and 5 of illness in those who shed for 
GD\VFRPSDUHGWRWKRVHZKRVKHGIRUGD\V7DEOH 
 
Table 4.11: Data showing associations between symptom scores and 
duration of shedding (by culture). 
Illness 
day 
 
Mean Total Symptom Score 
(All Subjects) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(95% CI) 
P 
value 
Shedding <5 
days 
(95% CI) 
6KHGGLQJ
days 
(95% CI) 
Day 3 
15.3 
(11.73, 18.9) 
10.5 
(3.09, 17.91) 
4.8  
(-2.7, 12.3) 
0.20 
Day 4 
12.9 
(10.14-15.71) 
9.8 
(4.37-15.18) 
3.1  
(-2.4, 8.7) 
0.25 
Day 5 
10.5 
(7.22-13.83) 
9.8 
(4.64-14.92) 
0.7  
(-5.2, 6.7) 
0.74 
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4.4.6 Antivirals 
Twenty out of 42 (48%) received an antiviral (all oseltamivir); hospital 
cases 16 out of 18 (89%), community cases 4 out of 24 (17%), adults 13 
out of 27 (48%), children 7 out of 15 (46%). Twelve out of 41 (29%) took 
oseltamivir within 48 hours (data on when treatment was begun for one 
subject is not available). In Year 1, 4 out of 11 (36%) community cases 
received oseltamivir compared to 0 out of 13 (0%) in Year 2. There 
appeared to be no difference in the rate of symptom decline between 
those who took antivirals within 48 hours and those who did not take 
antivirals at all (Figure 4.8). 
 
Figure 4.8: Symptoms scores over time for those who took antivirals 
within 48 hours and those who did not take antivirals. 
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Durations of viral shedding by group of antiviral exposure is shown in 
Table 4.12. No significant differences were observed for the mean 
differences between the groups who took antivirals and the group who did 
not (Table 4.13). 
 
Table 4.12: Duration of shedding by antiviral exposure (using estimate B). 
 
Took 
antivirals 
Took antivirals 
within 48 hours 
Did not take 
antivirals 
Shedding by PCR 
 
6.53 
(n=18) 
 
6.18 
(n=11) 
 
6.47 
(n=19) 
Shedding by 
culture 
4.6 
(n=10) 
4.8 
(n=5) 
5.33 
(n=9) 
 
 
Table 4.13: Mean Differences in shedding between antiviral exposure 
groups. 
 AV vs. NoAV AV48 vs. NoAV  
Mean Difference in 
shedding by PCR 
(95% CI) 
-0.05 
(-1.65, 1.54) 
0.29 
(-1.38, 1.97) 
P value 0.95 0.72 
Mean Difference in 
shedding by culture 
(95% CI) 
 
0.73 
(-0.97, 2.44) 
 
0.53 
(-1.97, 3.03) 
P value 0.38 0.65 
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4.4.7 Symptom and viral shedding data summary 
 
 During follow up the highest symptom scores were recorded on illness 
Day 3. 
 Adults reported more symptoms than children/parents of children. 
 There was a trend to higher viral loads in hospitalised compared to 
community cases. 
 No clear relationship between symptom scores and viral load was 
evident. 
 The typical duration of PCR detectable viral shedding was 6-7 days. 
 In those who were culture positive the mean duration of viable viral 
shedding was 4-5 days. 
 No clear distinction in the duration of viral shedding between adults and 
children or community and hospital cases was shown. 
 
 
4.4.8 Environmental Deposition 
 
¾ Surfaces 
662 samples were collected and tested; 651 swabs and 11 sponges.  
A(H1N1)pdm09 was detected by PCR from 36 samples (5.4%). Positive 
samples were obtained from 15 out of 40 subject locations (38%); >1 
positive sample was obtained from 11 subjects. Seventeen samples 
(selected on the basis of strongly positive PCR results) were examined for 
viable virus and two surfaces from different subjects were positive (Table 
4.14). 
 Year 1: 413 swabs collected, 356 samples processed (86%), five 
positive (1.4%). 18 surface samples were collected with sponges, 11 
were processed, one was positive (9.1%). 
 Year 2: 485 swabs collected, 306 samples processed (63%), 30 
positive (10.7%). 
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Differences between Year 1 and 2; 
 Cotton tipped swabs were used in Year 1 and Dacron tipped swabs 
were used in Year 2. 
 The surfaces swabbed were slightly different ± more commonly 
touched and more non-porous surfaces were selected in Year 2 (see 
Table 1). 
 Sample processing - In Year 1 most collected samples were analysed 
whereas in Year 2 samples were usually only tested when nose swabs 
were triplicate PCR positive on the same day. If Year 1 samples had 
been subject to the same rules, then 201 (49%) would have been 
processed and the positivity rate would have been 4 out of 201 
(2.0%). 
 Swabbing in Year 2 tended to be performed early in the course of 
illness. In Year 1 swabbing was evenly spaced over the duration of 
follow up (which averaged 8.7 days) compared to Year 2 where 
swabbing tended to be performed on most days of follow up (average 
4.8 days). 
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Table 4.14: Details of surfaces swabs that were positive for 
A(H1N1)pdm09. 
Subject 
ID 
Surface Material Setting Day of 
illness 
VL surface 
(copies/mL 
x 104) 
VL nose 
(copies/mL 
x 104) 
AC21 
Remote Plastic 
Home 
3 0.07 27.2 
Tap Metal 4 0.03 1.9 
AC22 
Tap Metal 
Home 3 
1.2 
70.2 
Games Console Plastic 1.2 
AC26 Tap Metal Home 3 0.02 95.1 
AC28 
Fridge Plastic 
Home 4 
1.0 
773.5 
Tap Metal 0.04 
AC30 
Remote Plastic 
Home 
3 
0.3 
99.9 
Door handle Metal 0.1 
Laptop Plastic 
4 
1.0 
316.6 
Fridge Plastic 0.4 
Remote Plastic 1.1 
Light switch Plastic 0.14 
Light switch Plastic 
7 
0.02 
2.1 
Tap Metal 0.1 
AC36 Laptop Plastic Home 3 0.02 6.8 
AC37 Laptop Plastic Home 6 0.07 55.4 
AH04* 
Kettle Plastic 
Home 
4 0.5 72.2 
Tap Metal 10 0.94 0.7 
AH08 
Table Veneer 
Hospital 3 
0.14 
0.3 
Table# Veneer 0.02 
AH20 
Table Veneer 
Hospital 
4 
0.07 
258.4 
Cup Plastic 0.1 
Cup Plastic 5 0.2 39.8 
Bed Rail Metal 9 0.02 2.6 
AH24 
Table Veneer Hospital 3 0.006 173.5 
Remote Plastic 
Home 4 
0.01 
0.2 
Fridge Plastic 0.01 
AH29 
Bed control Plastic 
Hospital 3 
0.42 
1120.5 
Table Veneer 0.27 
CC25* 
Chair Plastic 
Home 5 
0.03 
0.6 
Remote Plastic 0.01 
CC26* 
Light switch Plastic 
Home 2 
0.6 
15.0 Tap Metal 0.5 
Cup Ceramic 0.7 
CH01 Bed control Plastic Hospital 3 0.17 286.5 
 
Footnote: * Other household members present who were exhibiting 
respiratory symptoms, # Sponge swab, Culture positive 
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On illness Day 3 a significantly higher GM viral load was seen in those who 
had surface positive swabs compared to those who did not. There were 
also some statistically significant findings and trends to suggest that those 
who had positive surface swabs taken from their environment were more 
likely to have higher URT and LRT symptom scores respectively (Table 
4.15). 
 
Table 4.15: Viral loads and symptom scores compared between those with 
positive and those with negative surface swabs. 
Illness 
day 
GM nasal VL 
surface positive 
(95% CI) 
GM nasal VL 
surface 
negative 
(95% CI) 
GM ratio P value 
Day 3 
 
464225.5 
(79759.9, 
2701927.0) 
 
 
18072.4 
(1573.2, 
207613.6) 
 
25.7 
(1.75, 376.0) 
0.021 
Day 4 
 
77514.8 
(7301.8, 
822885.5) 
 
118788.1 
(19080.1, 
739547.4) 
0.7 
(0.0, 10.5) 
0.753 
Illness 
day 
Mean URT score 
surface positive 
Mean URT 
score surface 
negative 
Mean 
difference 
P value 
Day 3 8.5 3.9 -4.6 0.002 
Day 4 6.6 3.6 -3.0 0.009 
Illness 
day 
Mean LRT score 
surface positive 
Mean LRT 
score surface 
negative 
Mean 
difference 
P value 
Day 3 4.2 3.2 -1.0 0.14 
Day 4 3.8 2.7 -1.1 0.051 
 
Footnote: GM = Geometric Mean, VL = Viral Load, URT = Upper 
Respiratory Tract, LRT = Lower Respiratory Tract 
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A positive, but non-significant, correlation (r = 0.1574, p >0.05) was 
observed between viral loads recovered from surfaces and nasal viral 
loads (Figure 4.9). 
 
Figure 4.9: Scatter plot showing relationship between nasal and surface 
viral loads.  
 
Footnote: Linear trend line shown in red. 
 
 
¾ Air 
Air samples were collected from the immediate environment of 12 subjects 
(Year 1 = 5, Year 2 = 7); six were in hospital, nine were adults and eight 
were rapid test positive (Table 4.16). Twenty seven air collections were 
undertaken generating 81 size fractionated samples (one sample could not 
be processed because of insufficient sample volume). Positive samples 
were obtained from five subjects (42%) (Table 4.17); 9 out of 27 (33%) 
collections and 23 out of 80 (29%) samples were positive for PCR. Viral 
loads ranged between 238 and 24,231 copies/mL. No samples were 
culture positive. 
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Table 4.16: Description of air samples collected. 
Subject 
ID 
Any air 
sample 
PCR 
+ve 
Location Approx 
Distance 
(ft) 
Sampling 
Time 
(hrs) 
Day of 
Illness 
Nose VL 
on day of 
sample 
(copies/
mL x 104) 
 
$+ Yes Side 
room 
3-	 1 & 3 4 17.3 
$+ Yes Side 
room 
3-	 1 & 2 3 825 
AH20 No 
ITU main 
area 
3 - 7 3 5 39.8 
AH20 No 
ITU main 
area 
3 - 7 3 6 44.8 
AH20 No 
ITU main 
area 
3 - 7 3 7 ND 
AH20 No 
ITU main 
area 
3 - 7 3 8 3.3 
$+ No Side 
room 
 3 4 417 
$+ No Side 
room 
 3 4 5.5 
AC20 No Lounge * 3 4 340 
AC26 No Lounge * 3 5 2.0 
$& No Lounge * 3 4 774 
$& Yes Bedroom  3 4 0.4 
&& No Bedroom 3-	* 1 & 3 3 57.9 
&& Yes Lounge 3-	* 1 & 3 3 2452 
&+ Yes Shared 
room 
3-	 3 5 1848 
 
Footnote: Positive samples obtained,  = Rapid antigen test positive, # = 
other infected people present at the time of sampling, * = subject 
ambulatory at time of sampling, ND = Not Done 
 
 
In Year 1 collections took place at different distances (3-7 aQGIWIURP
the subject and for different periods of time (1, 2 or 3 hours). In Year 2 
only one collection was made per sampling episode; sampling took place 
over 3 hours and the sampler was positioned in a convenient location in 
the same room as the subject (usually this meant that the sampler was 
IWIURPWKHVXEMHFW 
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The following collections were made; 
A 12 samples collected at 3-7ft over 1 hour; five positive = 42% 
B 23 samples collected at 3-7ft over 3 hours; eight positive = 35% 
C 12 samples cROOHFWHGDWIWRYHUKRXUthree positive = 25% 
D VDPSOHVFROOHFWHGDWIWRYHUKRXUVseven positive = 23% 
E VDPSOHVFROOHFWHGDWIWRYHUKRXUV]HURSRVLWLYH  
 
Statistical analyses were performed to investigate any associations 
between the sampling parameters and a positive PCR result; 
 A vs. B: Point estimates suggest that samples collected at a distance of 
3-7ft were 34% more likely to be positive when the sampling duration 
was 1 hour, compared to an extended sampling duration of 3 hours. 
This result is not statistically significant. Unadjusted OR: 1.34 (95%CI: 
0.25- 6.93); p= 0.6891. 
 &YV'6DPSOHVFROOHFWHGDWDGLVWDQFHIWZHUHDSSUR[LPDWHO\
more likely to be positive when the sampling duration was 1 hour as 
compared to an extended sampling duration of 3 hours. This result is 
not statistically significant. Unadjusted OR: 1.10 (95% CI: 0.15- 6.27); 
p= 0.9088. 
 A vs. C: Samples collected over a 1 hour period were approximately 
twice as likely to be positive when they were collected at a distance of  
3-7ft as compared to >7ft. This result is not statistically significant. 
Unadjusted OR: 2.14 (95% CI: 0.28- 18.31); p= 0.3865. 
 B vs. D: Samples collected over a 3 hour period were approximately 
75% more likely to be positive when they were collected at a distance 
of   3-7ft as compared to >7ft. This result is not statistically significant. 
Unadjusted OR: 1.75 (95% CI: 0.44- 6.96); p= 0.3591. 
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Virus was detected in all particle sizes collected; particles <1um gave 7 
out of 26 positives (27%); 1-4um gave 9 out of 27 positives (33%) and 
>4um gave 7 out of 27 positives (26%).  
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Table 4.17: Positive air sample results
 AH03 AH04 CC15 CH03 AC36 
Subject setting 
(+ infected 
others) 
Hospital bed in side 
room 
Hospital bed in side room Playing in living room  
(6 year old infected child also 
present) 
Cot on neonatal unit 
(2 infected neonates 
also present) 
Bedroom 
Room 
Temperature 
(0C) 
 
 
21.6 
 
23.3 
 
18.0 
 
24.0 
 
17.0 
Room Humidity 
(relative %) 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
60 
 
40 
 
44 
Duration of 
sampling 
(hours) 
 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
Approximate 
distance from 
subject (ft) 
 
 
3-7 
 
 
 
3-7 
 
 
 
3-7 
 
 
 
 
 
3-7 
 
 
 
3-7 
 
 
 
3-7 
 
 
 
 
 
Particle size 
detected in 
(µm) 
PCR copies/mL 
<1 
1068 
 
 
 
<1 
238 
1-4 
258 
>4 
511 
 
 
 
 
 
1-4 
603 
  <1 
13199 
1-4 
5179 
>4 
8210 
<1 
5156 
1-4 
7107 
>4 
4028 
N/A 
 
1-4 
24231 
>4 
5603 
<1 
2149 
1-4 
5166 
>4 
4889 
<1 
2577 
1-4 
3527 
>4 
3639 
<1 
1287 
1-4 
3889 
>4 
2245 
 
 
1-4 
5388 
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There were no differences in the GM viral loads on illness Day 4 or in LRT 
and URT scores on illness Days 3 and 4 between those with positive and 
negative air samples (Table 4.18). 
 
Table 4.18: Viral loads and symptom scores compared between those with 
positive and those with negative air samples. 
Illness 
day 
GM nasal VL  
air positive  
(95% CI) 
GM nasal VL  
air negative 
(95% CI) 
GM ratio* 
(95% CI) 
P value 
 
Day 4 
 
120.9 
(1.1, 12902.5) 
42.1 
(7.9, 225.1) 
2.9 
(0.1, 140.8) 
0.565 
Illness day 
Mean URT 
score air 
positive 
Mean URT 
score air 
negative 
Mean 
difference 
P value 
Day 3 6.3 7.0 0.75 0.84 
Day 4 4.6 7.1 2.5 0.34 
Illness day 
Mean LRT 
score air 
positive 
Mean LRT 
score air 
negative 
Mean 
difference 
P value 
Day 3 3.8 3.0 -0.8 0.60 
Day 4 2.8 4.1 1.3 0.28 
 
Footnote: * Reference category = air negative samples, GM = Geometric 
Mean, VL = Viral Load, URT = Upper Respiratory Tract, LRT = Lower 
Respiratory Tract 
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4.4.9 Environmental sampling data summary 
 5% of swabbed surfaces were contaminated with influenza; viable virus 
was detected on two occasions. 
 Positive surface samples were significantly associated with higher nasal 
viral loads on Day 3 and more upper respiratory tract symptoms. 
 PCR positive air samples were obtained from 5 subjects. These samples 
were equally well represented across all particle size ranges collected, 
which includes respirable particles. We were unable to demonstrate the 
presence of viable virus in air samples. 
 
4.4.10 Influenza ward 
Surface swabs and air samples were collected over a 2 day period from a 
hospital ward in Sheffield that cohorted patients with influenza. Swabs 
were taken from amongst others things; door handle, desk, tap, medicine 
trolley, computer and telephone.  On each day, four air samplers were 
positioned around the ward and collected specimens over a 3 hour period. 
On Day 1, ten patients with influenza A and five with influenza B were 
present. On average patients had been unwell for 12 days and all were 
either taking or had completed a course of oseltamivir. 22 swabs and 12 
air samples were collected, all were negative by PCR. On Day 2, seven 
patients with influenza A and five with influenza B remained. A further 14 
swabs and 12 air specimens were taken; all were again negative by PCR.  
 
4.4.11 Influenza B 
Data was collected from five subjects (four children and one adult) with 
influenza B, though follow up of these cases was short (mean = 2.4 days). 
Two of the cases (both children) were culture positive from nose swabs. 
Only one case (a hospitalised adult) received oseltamivir. 32 surface 
swabs were taken and tested, none were positive for influenza B by PCR. 
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4.5 Discussion 
 
This is the first study to examine the relationship between influenza viral 
shedding from the nose with viral deposition in the near patient 
environment. In addition, it is the first time that the air around specific 
individuals with influenza has been sampled and examined for the 
presence of airborne virus. 
 
4.5.1 Symptoms 
6XEMHFWV¶V\PSWRPVZHUHGLYHUVHZLWKWKHFRPPRQHVWEHLQJFRXJKDQG
sore throat. Symptoms peaked early in the course of illness in the majority 
of cases which is consistent with other reports (Carrat et al, 2008; Writing 
Committee of the WHO Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Pandemic 
Influenza 2010). Scores for all categories of symptoms were lower in 
children compared to adults on illness Days 3 and 4. This may be 
explained by reporting bias i.e. differences in reporting behaviour between 
adults and children, and the fact that parents usually reported symptoms 
of behalf of younger children. 
 
4.5.2 Viral shedding 
The mean duration of shedding detected by PCR was between 6-7 days 
and by culture was between 3-5 days. A variety of estimates were 
calculated in an attempt to overcome some of the limitations in sampling 
and testing and they should be interpreted carefully. No significant 
differences were observed between adults and children despite the widely 
held view that children shed virus for longer than adults (Frank et al, 
1981; Sato et al, 2005). Reasons for this could include lack of statistical 
power to detect a difference and heterogeneity in the quality of sample 
obtained (this may be particularly relevant when dealing with children 
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when operator skill and compliance of the subject are important). There 
was also no significant difference between hospitalised and community 
cases though there was a trend to longer shedding in hospitalised cases 
which accords with previous data (Leekha et al, 2007; Lee et al, 2009) 
and has infection control implications for healthcare institutions. Our 
findings on the duration of viral shedding are broadly in agreement with 
published findings concerning seasonal influenza (Boivin et al, 2000; Lau 
et al, 2010; Ng et al, 2010) and A(H1N1)pdm09 (Cao et al, 2009; van 
Doorn 2009; Ling et al, 2010; Suess et al, 2010; To et al, 2010; Waiboci 
et al, 2011) (Table 4.19). When comparing studies it should be borne in 
mind that differences in study populations (children vs. adults, hospital vs. 
community cases), sampling methods and the proportions of cases 
receiving antivirals (particularly whether they received them within 48 
hours) may exist. 
 
Despite general agreement about the mean duration of shedding, data do 
suggest that some individuals shed virus for longer periods. Our findings 
suggest that over 25% of cases remain potentially infectious for at least 5 
days. Findings from Spain showed that 16 out of 64 (25%) of hospitalised 
cases are PCR positive 7 days after diagnosis (Giannella et al, 2011),  a 
study of 70 cases in Singapore revealed that shedding (by PCR) occurred 
for more than 7 days in 37% of patients (Ling et al, 2010) and in a 
Canadian study of community patients 74% (PCR) and 19% (culture) were 
positive on Day 8 of illness (De Serres et al, 2010). Whilst PCR is almost 
certainly a more sensitive test than culture because it detects both viable 
and non-viable virus (Ruest et al, 2003), its interpretation is problematic 
because it is not possible to determine the presence of viable 
(transmissible) virus, it can only illustrate the potential for it to be present. 
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This issue often causes difficulty in a clinical setting in deciding whether 
hospital cases are infectious. 
 
Table 4.19: Published studies describing shedding patterns from cases of 
A(H1N1)pdm09. 
 
 
It is generally well established that viral titres in URT samples taken from 
adults decline steadily from symptom onset and are proportional to 
symptom severity (Hayden et al, 1998; Treanor et al, 2000; Lau et al, 
2010; Ng et al, 2010). Our results show a decline in viral titre over time 
but correlations between symptoms and viral load were poor. Factors to 
account for this may include; small sample size, lack of data for analysis 
early in the course of illness (Days 1 and 2), variation in the quality of 
sample collected, method of sampling, differences in the collation of 
 
UK 
(current study) 
China 
(Cao et al, 
2009) 
Hong 
Kong 
(To et al, 2010) 
Singapore 
(Ling et al, 
2010) 
Germany 
(Suess et 
al, 2010) 
 
Kenya 
(Waiboci et al, 
2011) 
 
Setting 
Hospital and 
Community 
Hospital Hospital Hospital Community Community 
Number of 
cases 
42 421 22 70 15 106 
Adults and 
Children 
Yes Yes Yes Adults Yes Yes 
% who 
received 
oseltamivir 
within 
48hours 
32% 72.4% 95% 51% 
 
40% 
 
1.8% 
Duration of 
viral 
shedding 
(PCR) 
6.5 (mean) 6 (median) 4 (median) 6 (mean) 6.6 (mean) 8 (median) 
Duration of 
viral 
shedding 
(Culture) 
 
3-5 (mean) 
Range 0-8 
 
- 
- 
- 
Range 1-5 
4 (mean) 
- 
- 
- 
3 (mean) 
Range 0-13 
Risk 
factors for 
prolonged 
shedding 
- 
Age <14, 
male sex, 
delayed 
oseltamivir 
Younger 
age 
- - - 
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symptom data and viral sub-type studied. Some authors have shown that 
hospitalised cases shed more virus than community cases (Lee et al, 
2009). However, we did not find any consistent trends to suggest that 
there are differences between the viral loads of hospitalised adults or 
children and those of community cases in our cohort. Indeed, a 
relationship between viral load and severe disease is not always 
demonstrated (Giannella et al, 2011; Lee et al, 2011). There are data to 
show that hospitalised adults shed more virus than hospitalised children. 
This is contrary to evidence that shows children tend to have higher viral 
loads (Hall et al, 1979; Lee et al, 2011); again our small sample size limits 
interpretation. 
 
Surprisingly, symptom scores were significantly higher on Days 3 and 4 in 
those with shorter durations (<6 days) of PCR shedding compared to 
ORQJHUGD\V. A similar effect was not seen when shedding was 
detected by culture. We attempted to investigate this further by doing 
sub-group analyses but the effect was lost as statistical power diminished. 
Confidence in this finding is limited by small sample size as 
heterogeneities in sampling, virus detection, symptom reporting and inter-
individual shedding are not dealt with satisfactorily. 
 
4.5.3 Case History 
One subject who shed live virus up until Day 8 of illness will be considered 
further. She was a 34 year old of south Asian origin who had no co-
morbidities. She spent one night in hospital on the first day of her illness 
and began taking oseltamivir on Day 2. Prominent symptoms early in her 
illness were fever, cough, sore throat and fatigue. The virus was 
sequenced across the HA gene during the period of time that it was shed 
and no changes were detected. In addition, no common oseltamivir 
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resistance mutations were detected. All other household family members 
subsequently developed symptoms of cough and fever; a 5 year old 
daughter became unwell on Day 4 RIWKHPRWKHU¶VLOOQHVVIROORZHGE\D 2 
year old son on Day 5 and her 30 year old husband on Day 6. Thus a high 
SAR in this family was associated with high levels and prolonged shedding 
of virus in the index case (despite treatment with oseltamivir). The index 
case could be considered a super-spreader of infection. 
 
4.5.4 Surfaces 
A role for surfaces in the transmission of influenza A appears widely 
accepted but limited data are available to directly support the potential of 
contact transmission of influenza. Influenza can survive and remain viable 
on surfaces long enough to permit transmission, however, the ability to 
survive does not necessarily equate to the ability to infect; sufficient virus 
(enough to constitute an infectious dose) must be transmitted to initiate 
infection.  
 
Virus contamination of surfaces was found in over a third (38%) of subject 
locations. However, despite finding that viral shedding continued for over 
6 days in most subjects, virus was infrequently isolated from surface 
swabs (5.4%). On two occasions live virus was recovered. On the whole, 
amounts of virus recovered from surfaces during the study were small 
(53% had a Ct value >35) and the proportion of PCR positive samples 
where 3 out of 3, 2 out of 3 and 1 out of 3 aliquots of the same sample 
were positive was 31%, 11% and 58%respectively. No specific cleaning 
instructions were given during the follow up of our subjects, so for 
example daily cleaning of hospital rooms would have continued, which 
may have contributed to the low positive swab rate. 
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GM nasal viral loads were significantly higher in those with positive surface 
swabs compared to those with negative surface swabs on illness Day 3 
(but not Day 4). In addition, there was a positive (but non-significant) 
correlation between nasal and surface viral loads. Furthermore, symptom 
scores were generally higher (significantly so for URT scores) in those with 
positive surface swabs. These findings suggest that individuals who emit 
the most virus into the environment are likely to be responsible for the 
majority of transmissions that occur via the contact route. The amount of 
virus released by individuals is governed by a number of factors but viral 
load and symptoms are chief among them. This data therefore supports 
the concept that super-spreaders of influenza infection might exist. 
 
Sponges were trialled in Year 1 as they provide a potential advantage over 
swabs in that larger surface areas can be sampled. A disadvantage is that 
any virus collected is diluted in a relatively large volume of preserving 
medium soaked into the sponge making subsequent detection more 
difficult. Of the 18 sponge samples processed one was positive, giving a 
positivity rate of 9.1% compared to 1.4% for cotton swabs. Further 
investigation of the use of sponges is warranted. 
 
Both swabbing and laboratory processing were more selective in Year 2 as 
we attempted to target samples that had a greater chance of positivity; 
the swab positive rates (1.4 vs. 10.7%) reflect this. For example, 4 out of 
9 chosen surfaces in Year 1 (bedside table, dining table, patient table and 
windowsill) were not items that could be picked up or grasped by the hand 
and in many instances they were made of wood, a material that does not 
support virus survival (Greatorex et al, 2011). New items in Year 2 
included cup, light switch and computer and a synthetic fibre tipped swab 
was used instead of cotton. 
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Several studies have assessed and documented the presence of influenza 
virus on surfaces around infected individuals (Boone and Gerba 2005; 
Bright et al, 2010; Pappas et al, 2010; Killingley et al, 2012). Our findings 
contrast with those of Boone and Gerba who detected influenza virus on 
over 50% of all swabs taken from a number of surfaces in the home and in 
child care centres. Reasons for this difference may include the presence of 
children in the location studied (100% v 33% in the current study) and the 
likelihood that more than one individual contributed to virus deposition in 
%RRQH¶VVWXG\LQFRQWUDVWWRWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\ZKHUH
only one individual was ill when the majority of swabs were taken. More 
recent data comes from a randomised trial to investigate hand hygiene 
and surface contamination that took place in Thailand during 2009/10. 
One hundred and ninety one households containing an influenza positive 
child were recruited and 2358 swabs were collected on either Day 1, 3 or 
7; 38 (1.6%) were positive by PCR (a Ct threshold of <40 was used). No 
swabs were culture positive. Twenty four (12.6%) households had at least 
one surface positive by PCR; 17 in a control arm, seven in an intervention 
arm that consisted of hand hygiene programme (prevalence risk difference 
= 10.3%; P=0.048). Households in which the index case was <8 years old 
had a significantly higher prevalence of contamination. Interestingly, 
reduced surface contamination in the hand hygiene group did not lead to a 
reduction in the secondary attack rate (Simmerman et al, 2010; 
Suntarattiwong et al, 2011).  
 
As exemplified by our own work, differences between studies may be 
influenced by; 
 Patients involved; we might expect more virus to be deposited if 
multiple cases contribute or if children are over represented compared 
to adults.  
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 The timing of swabbing in relation to the time of deposition and to the 
duration of illness in a case. 
 Swabbing and detection methods. 
 Virus survival; there is evidence to suggest that some viral strains may 
be more robust than others (Tiwari et al, 2006; Greatorex et al, 2011). 
 Surfaces swabbed can differ in how frequently they are touched and 
their ability to support virus survival. 
 
Overall the data suggests that either swabbing and/or laboratory methods 
for virus detection are insensitive or that virus deposited by infected 
patients does not contaminate the vast majority of surfaces in high titre. It 
is likely that both explanations have a role to play. To understand the 
relationship between surface contamination and contact transmission 
consider the situation in a household where an ill child contaminates the 
environment. There are likely to be specific high risk contamination events 
where a high titre of virus, in association with a volume of respiratory 
mucous that aids survival, is deposited e.g. sneezing directly onto a 
remote control or touching a door handle with a heavily contaminated 
hand. Being able to identify and sample surfaces involved in such events 
in a timely manner may be critical. Choosing a small number of surfaces to 
swab once a day may simply not be sufficiently targeted to collect samples 
associated with high transmission risk. In laboratory settings, the 
efficiency of retrieving live virus from a cotton swab, used to collect virus 
immediately after its inoculation onto non-porous surfaces, was 83-97% in 
one study (Bean et al, 1982) and approximately 50% in another 
(Greatorex et al, 2011); they are likely to be lower in field settings. With 
regard to laboratory related processes, pre-analytical (e.g. storage and 
transport of samples) and analytical variables (e.g. specificity and 
sensitivity of diagnostic tests), have major impacts on the performance of 
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laboratory testing. It is known for example that influenza virus is lost and 
survival reduced during freeze thaw cycles (Greiff et al, 1954). 
 
Methodological improvements to surface sampling might therefore include; 
 A more intensive and targeted swabbing protocol could be employed; 
e.g. shadowing an infected case around the home or using CCTV to 
pick out specific events. 
 Sampling early in the course of a subject¶s illness when viral shedding 
is highest. 
 Determination of the best swab to use in terms of size, material and 
design (e.g. flocked v standard). 
 Consideration of other methods/materials for sampling e.g. foam, 
sponges (Otter et al, 2009; Lewandowski et al, 2010). 
 Elimination or reduction of freeze thaw cycles. 
 Selection of the optimal sample transport medium and eluent. 
 
4.5.5 Air 
If influenza can transmit via aerosols then we would expect to be able to 
detect virus in such aerosols. Studies performed over 40 years ago 
showed that artificially aerosolised influenza could be recovered (by using 
infection in animals as a detection method) for up to 24 hours after 
release (Wells and Brown 1936; Loosli et al, 1943) and that aerosolised 
virus is able to infect humans (Alford et al, 1966). More recently influenza 
virus has been detected (by PCR) in air samples taken from medical 
facilities (Blachere et al, 2009; Lindsley et al, 2010a) and from the directly 
exhaled breath of infected patients (Fabian et al, 2008). For the first time, 
this study now demonstrates that samples of air collected from around 
infected subjects contain influenza virus. This is important because it is 
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the only method to date that has assessed the amount of virus (released 
by an individual) that is available for transmission in normal room air. 
 
All particle sizes collected contained virus detectable by PCR, including the 
<1µm and 1-4µm fraction sizes which are aerosols of a respirable size, i.e. 
they can reach the distal airways of the respiratory tract (Hinds 1999).  
Sampling nearer to the subject led to the detection of more virus as one 
might expect (as the concentration of virus in air will normally be higher 
nearer the source), though analyses did not reveal any statistical 
significance because numbers were small. Nasal viral loads, symptoms and 
duration of sampling time were not associated with positive air samples. 
 
In Year 1, 4 out of 5 (80%) subjects sampled were positive compared to 1 
out of 7 (14%) in Year 2. A number of factors may explain this; 
 Sampling was generally done later in the course of illness in Year 2 
(mean = 4.1 days) compared to Year 1 (3.6 days). 
 3 out of 5 (40%) subjects in Year 1 were reliably sampled at 3-7ft (i.e. 
were not ambulatory), compared to only 1 out of 7 (14%) in Year 2. 
 Sampling of AH20 took place in a large open area (intensive care unit) 
compared to other subjects who were sampled whilst in single rooms. 
 Increased volumes of VTM were used in Year 2 (1500 µl) compared to 
Year 1 (750 µl) as problems with small sample volumes were 
experienced in Year 1. This will dilute virus and may make detection 
more difficult. 
 Two subjects in Year 1 from whom positive samples were obtained 
were sampled in the presence of other known influenza A cases who 
may have contributed to the airborne viral load. 
 
144 
 
Attempts can be made to understand whether the PCR copy number found 
in the air samples could represent an infectious dose. The ratio of the 
TCID50 to the number of virions (and therefore to the number of genome 
copies) for influenza A has been estimated by various authors at 1:100, 1: 
400, 1:650 (Lamb and Krug 2001; van Elden et al, 2001; Wei et al, 2007). 
If we take 1 TCID50 to equal 400 genome copies/mL, then an infectious 
aerosol dose [calculated to be 0.6 to 3 TCID50 (Alford et al, 1966)] would 
be 240 ± 1200 copies/mL. Such amounts were commonly collected by the 
samplers operating at 3.5L/min. By way of comparison, an adult human 
typically inhales 6L/min. If the virus collected/respired is infectious, then 
the majority of positive samples collected during this study could contain 
infectious doses of influenza. 
 
Unfortunately we have been unable to conclusively demonstrate the 
presence of live A(H1N1)pdm09 in any samples. Initial culture results 
indicated the presence of live virus in three samples from one subject 
(AH03) and PCR detected only pandemic H1N1 in the original samples. 
However, following amplification of the virus to permit further analysis, it 
appears that the sample became contaminated with a laboratory influenza 
strain. Detecting live virus in air samples is challenging and techniques are 
in development. Difficulties include virus fragility (especially its 
susceptibility to desiccation) and the fact that sufficient virus needs to be 
collected to enable culture because the amount and concentration of virus 
being sampled in air is much lower than that from nasal swabs. The use of 
VTM during sample collection (as opposed to its addition afterwards) to 
help preserve virus has been cited as a necessity (Fabian et al, 2009a). 
However, preparatory work did not reveal this to be an absolute 
requirement with the samplers used (see Chapter 3). 
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4.5.6 Study Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to this study. Firstly, the number of 
cases recruited was well below target. Reasons for this include; a) The 
study began just prior to the beginning of the second wave of the 
pandemic in England, but the overall number of people infected during the 
second wave was well below what had been predicted (Bowcott 2009) and 
seroconversions during the first wave were far higher than expected 
(Miller et al, 2010).  A mild illness, including a high asymptomatic infection 
rate (Miller et al, 2010) contributed to the recruitment difficulties; b) 
Enrolling subjects early in the course of their illness was challenging; a 
significant proportion of subjects approached were ineligible because 
symptoms had been present for too long. An attempt to overcome this 
problem involved the recruitment of community as well as hospitalised 
cases (when presentation is often delayed); c) Identifying subjects as 
having influenza as opposed to other acute respiratory infections (ARIs) 
was problematic. It has been shown that the standard definition of ILI 
cannot be relied upon to distinguish A(H1N1)pdm09 from other ARIs 
(Chan et al, 2010a; Nguyen-Van-Tam et al, 2010) and the low numbers of 
people with illness in the local population made the positive predictive 
value of even our modified definition of ILI low (55%). A near-patient 
rapid antigen test was used to help identify influenza cases but the 
sensitivity of the test (using a nasal swab) was low (40%). These findings 
concur with a number of other reports about the low sensitivity of these 
tests to detect pandemic H1N1 (CDC 2009b; Ginocchio et al, 2009; Vasoo 
et al, 2009). In Year 1 the capacity to generate PCR results on samples 
quickly enough to limit follow up of non-influenza cases did not exist; in 
Year 2 this capacity was built in and resulted in time and cost savings. The 
modest recruitment of cases limits the study in several ways including the 
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generalisabilty of our findings and an inability to adequately address the 
primary aim. 
 
Secondly, the difficulty of recruiting subjects early in the course of their 
illness meant that data on the initial days of illness were not collected. The 
first few days of illness usually see peak symptoms and viral shedding 
(and by inference environmental deposition). Unfortunately most analyses 
could only be attempted on illness Days 3 and 4. It is the lack of this data 
that hampers the ability to address the main aims of the study most. 
 
Thirdly, the comparison of symptom data between adults and children is 
imperfect. The data collection method was the same and whilst this allows 
some comparison, it is clear that its interpretation must be guarded, as 
responses to the symptom diary card in children and adults may well be 
different; for example comprehension of questions, perceptions of 
symptoms and assessment of severity. A specific problem arises when 
symptoms are estimated by parents on the behalf of younger children. For 
these reasons symptom questionnaires have been designed specifically for 
adults (Barrett et al, 2005) and children (Jacobs et al, 2000). A method to 
compare them however, does not exist. 
 
Fourthly, the majority of subjects from whom air samples were obtained 
(including all those with positive samples) were positive on rapid antigen 
testing. This may have biased the group somewhat as a positive rapid 
antigen test has been associated with higher viral loads in nasal samples 
(CDC 2009b). However, as our intention was to prove whether viable virus 
deposition on surfaces or in the air could be detected, selection of these 
individuals was important.  
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Finally, no measurements or estimates of room air flow patterns or 
ventilation were made when collecting samples. Such parameters are 
likely to have an influence on the ability to detect virus in the air.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Detecting virus, particularly live virus in the environment is challenging; 
getting to the subject in time, executing optimal sampling whilst 
preserving virus viability and performing sensitive detection tests in the 
laboratory are all key factors and present logistical challenges. Despite 
limitations important observations have been made and new evidence to 
inform the debate on the role of both contact and aerosol routes of 
transmission is presented. Data suggests that contact transmission via 
surfaces may be less important than hitherto emphasised, especially given 
the low titres of virus recovered and the scarce finding of live virus which 
together do not support the widespread presence of infectious doses of 
virus. The detection of virus by PCR in air collected at close range to 
subjects, well within the contact distance of an attending healthcare 
worker, suggests that the theory of short range bioaerosol transmission 
advanced by Tellier (Tellier 2009) cannot be dismissed. Although based on 
limited data these finding are of sufficient importance to justify further 
efforts to reproduce them, including further attempts to detect live virus, 
as they have important potential implications for infection control 
strategies. 
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5.1 Abstract 
 
Background 
Distinguishing the relative importance of the three potential modes of 
influenza transmission is critical for the development of infection control 
advice for healthcare settings, schools, workplaces, and homes. To answer 
questions about routes of influenza transmission and the effectiveness of 
interventions to reduce it, both animal models and community studies are 
being employed but the limitations of these approaches hamper the 
generation of clear evidence which can be translated into policy. 
Experimental challenge of humans with influenza offers an alternative 
approach with many potential benefits. The primary aim of this proof of 
concept study was to establish that experimentally induced influenza 
infection is transmissible between humans.  
 
Methods 
Healthy subjects (Donors) deemed sero-susceptible to influenza 
A/H3N2/Wisconsin/67/2005 were intranasally inoculated and when 
symptoms began, further sero-susceptible subjects (Recipients) were 
exposed to Donors during an µ([SRVXUH(YHQW¶Subjects were split into 
three exposure groups, each consisting of two Donors and five Recipients. 
Subjects were in close contact, e.g. playing games and eating meals 
together, for a total of 28 hours during a 2 day period. Serum samples 
were collected from all subjects before and after exposure to virus and 
were tested for antibody evidence of infection.  In addition, respiratory 
samples for PCR and viral culture were collected from all subjects after 
exposure. 
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Results 
Among 24 healthy adult subjectVQLQHZHUHUDQGRPLVHGWRWKHµ'RQRU¶
JURXSDQGWRWKHµ5HFLSLHQW¶ group. Following inoculation 5 out of 9 
Donors (55%) developed illness and 7 out of 9 (78%) were proven to be 
infected (7 PCR, 4 culture and 7 serology); one Donor was found to have 
been non sero-susceptible at the time of inoculation. After exposure, 5 out 
of 15 Recipients developed symptoms and 3 out of 15 were proven to be 
infected (2 PCR, 0 culture and 1 serology). Three others were found to be 
non sero-susceptible prior to exposure. The overall attack rate in 
Recipients was 20% but was 25% after adjustment for pre-exposure 
immunity. There were no adverse events. 
 
Conclusions 
The model successfully demonstrated that transmission of influenza 
infection can be achieved from experimentally infected subjects. We had 
sought to generate a secondary attack rate of at least 25% in order that 
future studies could be run efficiently and this was achieved after 
adjustment for pre-existing immunity. Improvements to the study design 
could increase transmission rates further. Experimental human exposure 
studies remain an attractive method to answer challenging questions 
relating to influenza transmission. 
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5.2 Introduction 
 
A better understanding of influenza transmission is needed to improve 
infection control and other disease mitigation strategies. A number of 
approaches to generate new insights into transmission are possible. 
Outbreak investigations can retrospectively provide information about 
transmission dynamics (e.g. reproductive number) but the uncontrolled 
nature of outbreaks themselves and the retrospective nature of data 
collection can make it difficult to reliably draw conclusions about the 
determinants of transmission, especially with regard to which routes of 
transmission were acting. Prospective intervention studies have the 
potential to address questions about routes of transmission but studies 
done to date have not provided conclusive findings (see Chapter 2, pages 
52-59). 
 
When investigating routes of transmission, there are advantages and 
disadvantages to conducting studies amongst naturally infected patients in 
the community. The prime advantage is that µQDWXUDO¶LQIHFWLRQ 
transmission is studied. The main drawbacks concern timing, sample size, 
origin of infection and compliance. 
 Timing: Infectiousness is likely related to viral shedding and symptoms 
and can therefore be expected to occur relatively early in the course of 
illness. It is therefore crucial that index cases and their contacts are 
identified early to enable interventions to be deployed before 
transmission occurs. Studies that rely on the presentation of infected 
individuals to medical services for recruitment will inevitably face 
delays. Further delay is caused by the need to recruit and educate 
household members and issue any intervention equipment. Studies 
have been conducted following the recruitment of subjects in advance 
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of an influenza season e.g. Flu Watch (Hayward 2011). Such a method 
could minimise delays to intervention but would require a substantial 
sample size (see below). 
 Sample size: Attack rates of confirmed influenza and ILI observed 
during intervention studies conducted to date have been low which has 
meant that studies have been underpowered to detect differences in 
attack rates between study arms. Predicting influenza attack rates 
amongst susceptible persons is difficult and in the years prior to the 
2009 pandemic (when many of the intervention studies were taking 
place) attack rates had generally been low both in the UK and US (HPA 
2009; CDC 2011). In addition the assumed modest effect size of the 
interventions also places a requirement for a larger sample size. Thus 
there are significant logistic and financial barriers to recruiting the 
necessary numbers of volunteers to adequately power intervention 
studies. 
 Origin of infection: We would like to be certain that any infections that 
occur in subjects are the result of contact with defined index cases, i.e. 
those around whom interventions are taking place. When a subject in a 
household study leaves the home or when a healthcare worker 
recruited to face mask study leaves their place of work they can 
become infected outside of the defined study setting. This may 
severely compromise the ability of the study to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of an intervention even if one existed. 
 Compliance: To be effective intervention strategies must be adhered 
to. However, when interventions require specific behaviour 
modification outside of a normal routine we may expect less than 
100% compliance. To better understand compliance with interventions 
such as hand hygiene and the wearing of face masks a number of 
factors must be considered; i) time spent performing an intervention, 
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ii) can steps be taken to reduce the impact of acceptable non-
compliance e.g. removing a face mask at meal times and whilst 
sleeping, iii) adverse events related to an intervention, e.g. skin 
problems caused by hand hygiene, breathing problems related to face 
masks and iv) availability of equipment, e.g. hand hygiene gel, face 
masks. People are likely to be more compliant with an intervention 
when the perceived benefit outweighs any problems. In the case of 
influenza this might mean that people are more compliant during a 
pandemic or an outbreak that shows high morbidity and mortality. 
Incorporating these behaviour modifying factors into studies is difficult. 
Compliance rates with interventions in some studies conducted have 
been low; 21% reported good compliance with a face mask in one 
study (MacIntyre et al, 2009) whilst in another 26% reported regular 
use of a face mask and 55% reported good hand hygiene practice 
(which was only 9% more than the control group) (Cowling et al, 
2009a). 
 
These limitations of community intervention studies led to the 
consideration of alternative study methods and influenza challenge studies 
emerged as a prospect. 
 
Experimental human challenge studies present an attractive way to study 
infectious diseases (assuming it is ethically acceptable to do so). Many 
aspects of the course of microbial disease (pathophysiology, transmission, 
treatments) can be observed in a manner seldom afforded by natural 
infection. There is a long history of challenge studies dating back to 1796 
when Edward Jenner inoculated subjects with cowpox to protect them 
from smallpox (Riedel 2005). More recent studies include assessments of 
immunological correlates of protection against pneumococcal colonisation 
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(McCool et al, 2002), the evaluation of anti-malarial drugs and vaccines 
following malarial challenge (Epstein et al, 2007) and the evaluation of 
cholera vaccines (Tacket et al, 1999; Garcia et al, 2005). Challenge 
studies have been used to study viral respiratory infections since the 
¶V7KHMRC Common Cold Unit based in the UK conducted research 
involving approximately 18,000 volunteers between 1946 and 1989. 
Studies into the pathophysiology of infection, the spread of virus from 
person to person and the development and testing of vaccines and 
antiviral agents were performed (Tyrrell 1992).  
 
Studies of respiratory virus transmission have revealed intriguing findings. 
Hall and Douglas concluded that transmission of respiratory syncitial virus 
(RSV) is predominantly mediated via close contact (through which both 
droplets and aerosols can act) and fomites. They found that volunteers 
ZKRHLWKHUFDUHGIRULQIHFWHGFKLOGUHQµFXGGOHUV¶RUWRXFKHG
contaminated surfaces around infected children µWRXFKHUV¶DFTXLUHG
infection whereas volunteers  who sat at a distance of >6 ft from an 
LQIHFWHGFKLOGDQGKDGQRFRQWDFWµVLWWHUV¶GLGQRW(Hall and Douglas 
1981). Rhinovirus transmission has been studied extensively using 
challenge experiments and models to predictably achieve experimental 
human to human transmissions have been devised (Gwaltney et al, 1978; 
Meschievitz et al, 1984).  Routes of infection are analysed by manipulating 
conditions, e.g. deliberately contaminating hands or fomites, use of 
restraining devices to prevent face touching (eliminating the indirect 
contact route) and use of distance allowing only aerosols to act (Gwaltney 
et al, 1978; Dick et al, 1987). Such methods have shown that 
transmission can occur through indirect contact (via hands and fomites) 
and large droplets and/or bioaerosols. However, a review of rhinovirus 
transmission found it difficult to  draw firm conclusions about routes of 
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transmission because studies have not been able to isolate all the different 
transmission routes and study designs were often somewhat contrived, 
e.g. directing behaviours and creating events that may not reflect natural 
conditions and occurrences (Hendley and Gwaltney 1988). Couch et al 
conducted a series of challenge experiments involving coxsackievirus, 
adenovirus and rhinovirus and concluded that both contact and airborne 
transmissions likely occur (Couch et al, 1966). 
 
The first successful influenza challenge study took place in 1936 when 
volunteers were infected with atomised suspensions of infected mouse 
lung (Smorodintseff 1937).  Noteworthy findings from influenza challenge 
studies that are relevant to transmission include; 
 The aerosol route of infection led to the development of fever more 
frequently than did nasal inoculation (Henle et al, 1946). 
 Natural infections cause more fever and LRT symptoms than do 
infections induced by nasal inoculation (Little et al, 1979). 
 The infectious dose required for aerosol inoculation is thought to be 
significantly less than that required for nasal inoculation (Alford et al, 
1966; Couch et al, 1966; Hayden et al, 1996). 
 
In present-day influenza challenge studies, susceptible healthy adults are 
selected by serum antibody levels and infected intranasally with a well-
characterized pool of wild-type influenza virus (the aerosol route of 
inoculation is not used as there is a concern that infections induced in this 
way may be more severe). Under these conditions, the majority of 
subjects will be infected and develop a mild illness accompanied by 
recovery of virus from the nasopharynx. This model has been used to 
evaluate antiviral agents and influenza vaccines (Carrat et al, 2008).  
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The safety of subjects recruited into influenza challenge studies is 
paramount and over the years influenza challenge has been shown to be 
safe. An extensive review of the literature has revealed only one subject 
who developed a serious adverse event that temporally followed 
experimental challenge with influenza (Ison et al, 2005).  In July 2000, 
during a study of experimentally induced influenza (influenza 
B/Yamagata/88) to assess the prophylactic efficacy of the oral NAI 
peramivir, one subject developed myocardial dysfunction and presumed 
myocarditis that temporally followed influenza challenge.  The subject was 
a 21-year-old man with no previous history of cardiac abnormalities.  He 
did have a history of retinoblastoma that had been successfully treated 
with systemic chemotherapy, including an anthracycline agent, at 2 years 
of age.  The pre-study evaluation revealed normal physical examination 
findings and laboratory studies, with the exceptions of an 
electrocardiogram (ECG) that revealed T wave flattening in the aVF and T 
wave inversion in lead III and an elevated creatine kinase (CK) level of 
505 IU/mL.  A second test performed prior to viral inoculation revealed a 
CK level of 202 IU/mL.  The subject was inoculated and received the study 
drug. He shed low titres of influenza B and manifested only mild nasal 
symptoms, sore throat and loss of appetite.  On Day 4 of the study, an 
ECG revealed new T wave inversions in leads II, aVF, and V4-6.  Findings 
of an ECG performed 15 days after infection showed that the new 
abnormalities described on Day 4 had resolved.  At the completion of the 
study, the subject took a 2 week vacation to Indonesia, during which time 
he experienced upper respiratory infection symptoms for several days.  
Because of the aforementioned ECG changes, the subject was asked to 
return for further evaluation. Fifty one days after influenza infection, he 
underwent echocardiography, which revealed left ventricular enlargement 
with severely reduced systolic function globally and minimal mitral and 
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tricuspid regurgitation.  Physical examination revealed 6cm jugular venous 
distension and a faint mitral regurgitation murmur.  An extensive 
laboratory work-up failed to reveal a secondary cause of myocardial 
dysfunction.  He was treated with lisinopril and allowed to gradually 
increase his exercise levels.  Successive echocardiograms at 1 and 5 
months later showed progressive improvement in left ventricle function; 
the final study showed that the ejection fraction level had returned to low 
normal. The subject never developed any cardiac symptoms. 
 
To further evaluate cardiac findings during influenza, 30 healthy adults 
without NQRZQFDUGLRYDVFXODUGLVHDVHZKRSUHVHQWHGWRFOLQLFKRXUV
after onset of influenza symptoms and had a positive influenza antigen 
study underwent serial ECGs, cardiac enzyme measurements, and 
echocardiography.  Abnormal ECG findings were noted in 53%, 33%, 
27%, and 23% of patients on Days 1, 4, 11, and 28, respectively, but 
none of the findings were considered to be clinically significant.  No patient 
had significant changes in ejection fraction or abnormal wall motions seen 
on echocardiography (Ison et al, 2005). Furthermore, a recent review 
(Carrat et al, 2008) identified 56 studies involving 1,280 healthy adults 
that were challenged with influenza.  This meta-analysis cited no other 
serious adverse events associated with the influenza challenge studies that 
were reviewed. 
 
To date the challenge model has not been used to study the transmission 
of influenza amongst volunteers though it does present an attractive 
method of doing so (Killingley et al, 2011a). Advantages include the 
abilities to select serologically susceptible subjects who can be infected at 
specific times and control subject behaviour and environmental conditions. 
Studies could assess the efficacy of interventions such as face masks and 
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hand hygiene, and answer questions about virus survival in the 
environment, the effects of temperature and humidity, and the efficacy of 
engineering controls²e.g. ventilation and UV light. The generation of such 
information is fundamental to better understanding of routes of 
transmission and their relative importance. Furthermore, study of both 
pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic influenza infection and on the 
relationship between transmission and presence or level of symptoms 
should be possible. 
 
Three approaches are possible to study transmission using a human 
challenge model: The first approach exposes volunteers to naturally 
infected patients. Although ideal because of natural infection, the use of 
patients infected naturally with influenza would be logistically complex 
(with a need to have immunologically naive volunteers ready and waiting), 
ZRXOGUDLVHHWKLFDOLVVXHVLQUHODWLRQWRSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VDIHW\DQGFRXOG
propagate a nosocomial outbreak. Such a study has been done to 
investigate transmission of RSV (Hall and Douglas 1981) but the safety 
concerns about adults infected with influenza are different to those with 
RSV. 
 
The second approach sees participants undergo artificial challenge (not 
human to human) with particles or inocula of known size. Such studies 
have contributed to the evidence base on rhinovirus transmission (Hendley 
et al, 1973) and influenza transmission by demonstrating the potency of 
aerosol inoculation compared with instillation of nasal drops (Alford et al, 
1966; Couch et al, 1966; Hayden et al, 1996). However, establishing the 
viral dose and composition (e.g. particle size) of inocula to mirror those 
that occur naturally is very difficult. Furthermore, virus shedding is a 
dynamic process dependent on the host and the environment; replication 
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of this process would also be difficult. Moreover, artificial transmission 
removes the important role that human-to-human interactions (physical 
and social) have in transmission. 
 
In the third approach, volunteers are exposed to other, deliberately 
infected, volunteers. Two groups of volunteers are needed; 1) Donors are 
inoculated intranasally with virus and develop illness, 2) Recipients are 
exposed to symptomatic Donors. Experiments performed to study the 
transmission of a number of respiratory viruses have been done in the 
past (Couch et al, 1966; Gwaltney and Hendley 1982; Dick et al, 1987) 
but such a model has not been used to study influenza.  
 
The third approach was considered a viable option and a proof of concept 
study was conducted to assess whether transmission of influenza infection 
can take place in a human challenge model.  
 
 
5.3 Methods 
 
The study took place between May and July 2009, and was conducted in 
accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki and UK 
regulatory requirements. It was approved by Plymouth Independent Ethics 
Committee (Retro 1236).  
 
5.3.1 Objectives 
The primary objective was to determine if an influenza 
A/H3N2/Wisconsin/67/2005 (A/WI) infection, induced by means of viral 
challenge, was transmissible between humans. Secondary objectives were 
to confirm the safety of transmitted infection, to determine the suitability 
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of the model for future trials and to obtain samples from the environment 
(surfaces and air) to look for the presence of influenza virus. 
 
5.3.2 Recruitment 
Recruitment occurred from a group of individuals who had expressed 
interest in participating in challenge studies conducted by Retroscreen 
Virology Limited (RVL). RVL uses a range of methods to recruit volunteers 
including posters, flyers, student and other local newspapers, magazines, 
radio, Facebook and its own website (www.FluCamp.com). RVL is also 
approached by volunteers who have heard of the studies through word of 
mouth. Individuals were contacted and asked if they would consider taking 
part in this study. Those that expressed interest were invited to attend for 
screening. 
 
5.3.3 Screening 
Volunteers needed to be healthy with no uncontrolled acute or chronic 
medical condition and be between the ages of 18-45. Two screening 
stages were used. The first was used to establish antibody susceptibility to 
the challenge virus and took place between study Days -200 and -14. The 
following were performed;   
 Written, witnessed informed consent was obtained. 
 A brief medical history was obtained to ensure criteria for enrolment 
were met. 
 Approximately 10 mL of blood was obtained for influenza serum 
antibody (HAI) screening. 
 
The second screening stage took place between study Days -45 and -5 
and assessed volunteers against further study specific inclusion and 
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exclusion criteria (Table 5.1A+B). The following were performed (See 
Appendix 5.1 for a full schedule of assessments); 
 A medical history was taken. 
 A detailed explanation of the study was given to subjects remaining 
eligible (Appendix 5.2) and written informed consent (Appendix 5.3) to 
trial participation was obtained. 
 Vital signs and baseline physical examination. 
 An electrocardiogram (ECG). 
 Nasal wash and throat swabs for compliance testing. 
 Screening for class A drugs, alcohol and nicotine. 
 Approximately 35 mL of blood was obtained for clinical haematology, 
coagulation and biochemistry safety assessments. 
 HIV, Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C screening. 
 Dipstick urine test. 
 A urine pregnancy test. 
 
Blood samples from subjects were also collected immediately prior to 
quarantine entry on Day -2 for repeat antibody testing (though results 
were not available until after the study). An HA,WLWUHRIDQGRUDQ01
titre of <80 were taken to indicate susceptibility to infection. 
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Table 5.1A:  Inclusion criteria. 
Inclusion Criteria 
 
1. Age 18 to 45 years, inclusive. 
2. Comprehension of the study requirements; availability for the 
required study period, ability to attend scheduled study visits, and 
willingness to participate in the inpatient challenge. 
3. Willingness to provide written consent for participation after reading 
the Participant Information Sheet and Informed Consent Form and 
after having adequate opportunity to discuss the study with an 
Investigator or qualified deputy. 
4. H3N2 HAI titre levels recorded as < 1:10 
5. Good general health status as determined by a screening evaluation 
no greater than 160 days prior to the quarantine challenge phase. 
6. Subjects shall be registered with a general practitioner who will 
FRQILUPDVXEMHFWV¶SDVWPHGLFDOKLVWRU\DQGWKHLUVXLWDELOLW\WR
participate based on this. Consent will be obtained to receive this 
information. 
7. For female subjects, provision of a history of reliable contraceptive 
practices [hysterectomy or bilateral tubal ligation, oral or implanted 
contraceptive use, intrauterine device, barrier method plus 
spermicide, history of a single male partner with vasectomy and 
documentary evidence confirming sterility (negative sperm counts at 
the recommended post-operative intervals) or a history of abstinence 
deemed credible by the Investigator]. The provision of this history 
does NOT replace the requirement to perform, and obtain negative 
results in, pregnancy tests. 
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Table 5.1B: Exclusion criteria. 
Exclusion Criteria 
 
1. Presence of any significant acute or chronic, uncontrolled medical or 
psychiatric illness, that in the view of the Investigator is associated with 
increased risk of complications of respiratory viral illness [subjects with 
uncomplicated chronic diagnoses stable and treated for  3 months (e.g. 
mild hypertension well-controlled with medication may be enrolled) 
provided the condition and its therapy are not known to be associated with 
an immunocompromised state or increased risk of complications of 
respiratory viral illness]. 
2. Health care workers (including doctors, nurses, medical students and allied 
healthcare professionals) anticipated to have patient contact within 2 weeks 
of viral challenge. Healthcare workers who volunteer should not work with 
patients until 14 days after challenge or until their symptoms are fully 
resolved (whichever is the longer). Health care workers who work in units 
housing severely immunocompromised patients (e.g. bone marrow 
transplant units) were excluded from the study. 
3. Venous access deemed inadequate for the phlebotomy demands of the 
study. 
4. Positive serologic tests for HIV, Hepatitis B surface antigen, or Hepatitis C 
antibody. 
5. Evidence of drug abuse or a positive urine Class A drug or alcohol screen. 
6. Female subjects, who are known to be pregnant or who have a positive 
urine -HCG test prior to challenge. 
7. Acute (within 7 days of challenge/exposure) or chronic use of any 
medication or other product (prescription or over-the-counter), for 
symptoms of rhinitis or nasal congestion or for any nasopharyngeal 
complaint, or use of any intranasal medication for any indication (this 
includes any corticosteroid or beta agonist containing nasal spray). 
8. Any history during adulthood of asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease or any other condition requiring bronchodilator therapy. A history of 
childhood asthma until and including the age of 12 is acceptable. 
9. Smokers unwilling/unable to desist for the quarantine phase duration of the 
study and any smoker with a >10 pack year history of smoking. A nicotine 
test was done at study specific screening and must be negative prior to 
admission to the quarantine unit. 
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10. Subjects who have type I or type II Diabetes Mellitus. 
11. Body Mass Index >30. 
12. An Abnormal ECG deemed clinically relevant by the Investigator. 
13. Any anatomic or neurologic abnormality impairing the gag reflex or 
conducive to aspiration, or history suggestive of such a problem or any 
abnormality significantly altering the anatomy of the nose or nasopharynx. 
14. Receipt of systemic glucocorticoids (in a dose 5 mg prednisone daily or 
equivalent) within 1 month, or any other cytotoxic or immunosuppressive 
drug within 6 months prior to challenge. 
15. Receipt of any investigational drug within 6 months prior to challenge, or 
prior participation in a clinical trial of any Influenza vaccine, or any 
investigational vaccine or experimental Influenza viral challenge delivered 
directly to the respiratory tract within 1 year prior to challenge. 
16. History of adverse reaction to neuraminidase inhibitors e.g. oseltamivir 
17. Presence of any febrile illness or symptoms of upper viral respiratory 
infection:  
a. On the day of challenge/exposure or between admission for Influenza 
challenge/exposure and administration of the challenge inocula (Donors) 
or exposure event (Recipients). Such subjects may be re-evaluated for 
enrolment in later studies after resolution of the illness; 
b. Within 2 weeks prior to challenge or if challenge is set to occur during 
November, December, January, February, or March if there are any 
symptoms suggestive of viral respiratory infection occurring between 
screening and challenge. 
18. History of epistaxis (nose bleeds) more than 1 episode a month. 
19. Presence of household member or close contact (for an additional 2 weeks 
after discharge from the isolation facility) who is: (a) less than 3 years of 
age; (b) any person with any known immunodeficiency; (c) any person 
receiving immunosuppressant medications; (d) any person undergoing or 
soon to undergo cancer chemotherapy within 28 days of  
challenge; (e) any person who has diagnosed emphysema or COPD, is 
elderly residing in a nursing home, or with severe lung disease or medical 
condition including but not exclusive to the conditions listed in Appendix 7; 
or (f) any person who has received a transplant (bone marrow or solid 
organ). 
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20. Any laboratory test which is abnormal and which is deemed by the 
Investigator to be clinically significant. (This includes blood chemistry, 
haematology, cardiac iso-enzymes, or urinalysis). 
21. .QRZQ,J$GHILFLHQF\LPPRWLOHFLOLDV\QGURPHRU.DUWDJHQHU¶VV\QGURPH 
22. History of seasonal hay fever or a seasonal allergic rhinitis (SAR), including 
the use of symptomatic prescription only medication and non prescription 
medication. 
23. As a result of the medical interview, physical exam, or screening 
investigations, the Investigator considers the subject unfit for the study. 
24. Those employed or immediate relatives of those employed at Retroscreen 
Virology Ltd or the study site.  
25. Staff and students working directly in or for any of the Units in which the 
principal or a co-Investigator works. 
26. Immediate relatives of any of the principal or co-Investigators. 
27. Receipt of a northern hemisphere seasonal influenza vaccine in the 
2006/07/08 winter seasons.  
28. Receipt of any systemic cytotoxic chemotherapy agent at any time. 
 
Viral Challenge Exclusion criteria 
1. History of hypersensitivity to chicken eggs. 
 
 
5.3.4 Study design and conduct  
Sixty volunteers underwent stage two screening; 24 were eligible and 
were randomly DOORFDWHGWRRQHRIWZRJURXSVµ'RQRUV¶RUµ5HFLSLHQWV¶
prior to the start of the study (see Figure 5.1 for study timeline). 
 
Ten Donors entered the quarantine unit on Day -2 and all remained well 
during 2 days of observation (Days -2 and -1). They were inoculated 
intranasally with A/WI virus on the morning of Day 0. Fourteen Recipients 
entered the quarantine unit on Day 0 and were segregated from Donors. 
In order to balance the groups in accordance with the protocol, one Donor 
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was randomly selected to become a Recipient (R12) on the morning of 
Day 0. Four Recipients reported a mild upper respiratory tract symptom 
during their period of observation (Day 0 to Day 1). One of these (R08) 
also reported diarrhoea on arrival at the quarantine site. He was 
monitored outside of quarantine until the morning of Day 2 by which time 
symptoms had resolved and he was allowed to enter the quarantine unit. 
Subjects were housed in pairs. 
 
Figure 5.1: Study timeline. 
Donors Day of Study Recipients
Initial screening -180 to -14 Initial screening
Study specific screening -45 to -5 Study specific screening 
Entry to quarantine unit -2
-1
Viral challenge 0 Entry to quarantine unit
1
Exposure Event (n=6) 2 Exposure Event (n=15)
Exposure Event (n=6) 3 Exposure Event (n=15)
Oseltamivir 4
5
Discharge from quarantine 6
7
8 Oseltamivir
9
10 Discharge from quarantine
Follow up 28 +/- 3 Follow up
 
On Day 2, 36 hours after inoculation, six Donors (selected on the basis of 
the highest symptom scores) and 15 Recipients were placed into shared 
accommodation and took part in three separate Exposure Events (EEs) 
each comprising of two Donors and five Recipients. The EE lasted for a 
total period of 30 hours and took place over study Days 2 (10.00 - 24.00) 
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and 3 (09.00 ± 01.00). Subjects played games, watched television and ate 
meals together (Figure 5.2a, b & c) (Appendix 5.4). Donors and Recipients 
were separated overnight into shared rooms. The EE rooms measured 
42.3m3 (4.6m x 4.0m x 2.3m) in size. Room temperature ranged between 
220C and 260C and the humidity ranged between 38% and 53%. Windows 
were kept closed but recycling of air (not exchange) by an air conditioner 
allowed for subject comfort. 
 
Follow up in the quarantine unit continued until Day 6 for Donors and Day 
10 for Recipients. Recipients who developed symptoms were separated 
from roommates who did not have symptoms to prevent Recipient-
Recipient transmission.  
 
Clinical assessments and sample collections: (Appendix 5.1) 
Subjects recorded symptoms of illness twice a day (08.00 and 20.00) 
during quarantine (Appendix 4.5). A record was kept of any concomitant 
medications (e.g. paracetamol) and adverse events. Vital signs were 
monitored four times a day and daily physical examination (Appendix 5.5), 
ECG and spirometry were performed. Venous blood was collected at 
specified intervals for serology and to examine a panel of safety 
parameters. Respiratory tract samples were obtained by nasal wash and 
throat swab and kept on wet ice for transport to the laboratory. 
Influenza-like illness (ILI) was defined as an illness lasting 24 hours or 
more with either; i) fever >37.9 ºC + at least one respiratory symptom or 
ii) two or more symptoms, at least one of which must be respiratory. 
 
To minimise the possibility of post-experiment transmission, all subjects 
were given a 5 day course of oseltamivir (donors from Day 4 and 
recipients from Day 8) and had a negative rapid antigen test prior to 
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discharge. Analgesics and anti-pyretics were available at the discretion of 
the study physician. 
 
End of study follow up for all subjects took place on Day 28 +/- 3. The 
following procedures were performed (Appendix 5.1); 
 A blood sample for influenza serology was collected. 
 ECG. 
 A nasal wash and throat swab. 
 Blood samples were collected for safety tests ± haematology, 
coagulation and biochemistry tests (including cardiac iso-enzymes). 
 Vital signs and physical examination. 
 Adverse events were reviewed. 
 New medical problems/diagnoses and any changes in concomitant 
medications were recorded. 
 A dipstick urine test, including a pregnancy test for female subjects 
 
Figure 5.2a: Subjects playing bingo during the exposure event. 
Donor
Donor
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
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Figure 5.2b: Subjects playing cards during the exposure event. 
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Donor
Donor
Moderator
 
 
Figure 5.2c: Subjects playing Twister during the exposure event. 
Recipient
Recipients
Recipient
Recipient
Donor
Donor
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5.3.5 Challenge Virus 
The challenge virus Influenza A/WI was used in this study. The viral stock 
was manufactured and processed under good manufacturing practices 
(GMP) and the final product underwent quality testing performed by the 
manufacturer (identity, appearance, sterility, infectivity, and 
contaminants) according to pre-determined specifications.   
 
For inoculation, Donors were positioned supine with the chin up whilst a 
solution of 0.5 mL containing approximately 5.5 log10TCID50/mL of virus 
was instilled into each nostril (0.25 mL per nostril twice). Subjects were 
instructed to remain in position for 10 minutes after inoculation and were 
then monitored by medical staff for a further 20 minutes in a seated 
position. 
 
The challenge virus has been tested previously in both ferrets and 
humans: 
 12 ferrets were infected in a dose ranging study; no safety concerns 
were raised as a result of ferret inoculations (personal communication 
± RVL). 
 17 human subjects were quarantined and infected in a dose escalation 
study designed to assess the safety of inoculum and to establish the 
correct dosage of influenza virus to be used in future challenge 
experiments. No SAEs, unexpected symptoms or other complications 
occurred. Furthermore, no significant abnormalities were found on 
blood safety tests, ECG recordings or spirometry measurements. The 
data derived on symptoms that arose as a result of the two most 
optimal intranasal inoculation doses (n=8) showed that; 75% 
developed five or more symptoms, symptoms scores were highest 
approximately 60-90 hours post inoculation and viral shedding was 
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highest approximately 40-80 hours post inoculation (personal 
communication ± RVL). 
 
Comparisons between symptoms recorded following experimental 
challenge with H3N2 virus and natural infection (Monto et al, 2000; Kaji et 
al, 2003) are presented in Table 5.2 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of symptoms recorded during studies of natural 
and experimental infection. 
Symptom 
Monto 
n=2740 
(majority 
H3N2) 
Kaji 
n=98 
(all H3N2) 
Retroscreen 
n=17 
(all H3N2-
varying 
inoculated 
doses) 
Retroscreen 
n=8 
(all H3N2- 
optimal dosing 
range) 
 
Fever 68% 94% 18% 38% 
Malaise 94% 81% 29% 50% 
Nasal 
congestion 
91% - 59% 100% 
Cough 93% 18% 12% 25% 
Sore 
throat 
84% 38% 24% 25% 
Sneezing - - 41% 75% 
 
 
In consideration of the data presented in table 5.2, it is worth noting a few 
points; 
 Subject selection; in the study done by Monto et al, subjects were 
recruited on the basis of fever or feverishness + two other ILI 
symptoms. Kaji et al recruited subjects who attended hospital. These 
studies many be selecting subjects at the upper end of the scale for 
symptom severity. 
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 Numbers; The RVL dataset is small compared to the others. 
 Timing of symptom scores; Subjects were included by Kaji et al if they 
presented within 3 days of symptom onset, the paper by Monto et al 
does not state timelines. RVL data is presented as the maximum 
proportion observed between Days 2-4. 
 
5.3.6 Environmental sampling 
Swabs were taken from surfaces and commonly touched objects in subject 
bedrooms and EE rooms on study Days 2 and 3. Cotton swabs (FB57835; 
Fisherbrand) were moistened with VTM (VTM) and then rubbed across an 
area of 2x2cm2 in six different directions applying even pressure. 
 
Air samples were collected using a NIOSH two-stage cyclone bioaerosol 
sampler which has been described and validated for use with influenza 
(see Chapter 3). Three samplers were used during the EE on study Days 2 
and 3; i) carried by a Donor, ii) carried by a Recipient and iii) free 
standing in the room at a height of 120cm. The samplers ran for 3 hours 
at a flow rate of 3.5 litres/min. Prior to sampling ǋODQGǋORI970
were added to stage 1 and 2 tubes respectively. After sampling, the 
YROXPHRI970LQERWKWXEHVZDVUHFRQVWLWXWHGWRǋODQGWKHILOWHU
paper was immersed in a 15mL WXEHFRQWDLQLQJǋORI970 Samples 
were placed on dry ice, transported to the laboratory and stored at -700C. 
 
5.3.7 Laboratory methods 
Influenza serology at screening, quarantine entry (Donors = Day -2, 
Recipients = Day 0) and Day 28 was performed by HAI assay at RVL, 
London, UK). Serology was also performed on quarantine entry and Day 
28 by HAI and MN assays at CDC laboratories, Atlanta, US. Culture of 
nasal wash and throat swab specimens was performed by RVL. Influenza 
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antigen rapid tests were performed on fresh nasal wash specimens using a 
Quidel QuickVue® Influenza A+B test. PCR analysis was performed at Lab 
21 Healthcare laboratories, Cambridge, UK (influenza A) and HPA 
ODERUDWRULHV$GGHQEURRNH¶V+RVSLWDO&DPEULGJH8.LQIOXHQ]D$DQG
respiratory virus panel). Safety blood tests were performed by The 
Doctors Laboratory, London, UK. For further detail of laboratory methods 
see Appendix 5.6. 
 
5.3.8 Outcome measures 
A laboratory confirmed case was defined as evidence of acute infection 
based on four fold or greater rise in either HAI or MN titres between the 
Day -2 or Day 0 serum specimen and the Day 28 serum specimen, or a 
positive test by either viral culture or PCR. Any influenza case(s) amongst 
Recipients would be taken as evidence of infection and accepted as proof 
of concept that the virus is transmissible under experimental conditions. 
The PCR results presented are a combination of both HPA and Lab 21 
results (see Appendix 5.7 for further detail). Serology results presented 
are those of CDC; RVL results were comparable (see Appendix 5.8). 
 
5.3.9 Statistical methods 
Sample size was based on the premise of attaining a SAR RI
defined in advance as the level of SAR that would be consistent with the 
viability of future transmission studies. Assuming a 25% attack rate and 
that the infection of each Recipient is independent of that of any other 
Recipient (i.e. no correlation of infection risk by EE group), using six 
Donors and 15 Recipients (in three groups of 2:5) gives a 76% chance of 
observing three or more cases. If no cases were detected, the upper 95% 
confidence bound on the attack rate would be 22%. 
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Descriptive statistics and reports are provided for subject demography, 
adverse events and responses to viral challenge and exposure. Summary 
statistics have been generated for signs and symptoms of influenza illness 
and viral assessments by PCR, culture and serology.  
 
 
5.4 Results 
 
Twenty four subjects (median age 27) satisfied the entry criteria and 
subsequently entered the quarantine unit. 
 
5.4.1 Donor inoculation 
Nine Donors (five male and four female) were intranasally inoculated on 
Day 0. The virus inoculum used to infect the donor subjects was back-
titrated on MDCK cells at the time that the first subject was inoculated and 
against the time that the last volunteer was inoculated. Titres were found 
to be within acceptable ranges; 
 The titre of the virus immediately post preparation was calculated to 
be 5.75 log10TCID50/mL. 
 The titre of virus at the time that the first subject was inoculated was 
calculated to be 6.00 log10TCID50/mL. 
 The titre of virus at the time that the last subject was inoculated was 
calculated to be 5.27 log10TCID50/mL. 
 The GM of the virus titres at the time of the first and last subject 
inoculations was calculated to be 5.64 log10TCID50/mL. 
 
5.4.2 Donor challenge 
Seven out of 9 Donors were found to be infected (78%); four had 
symptoms consistent with an ILI [one (D05) had a recorded fever] and 
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three were asymptomatic. One of the two non infected Donors reported 
symptoms (Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3) 
 
Table 5.3: Donor symptom scores. 
Donor Symptom Scores 
 Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 
D1# 0 1 6 9.5 11 4.5 1.5 
D2# 0 0 6.5 12.5 7.5 1.5 0 
D3# 0 1 4 3.5 1 2 0 
D4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D5# 0 0 0 9.5* 9* 4 0 
D6 0 0 0 2 1.5 0 0 
D7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
)RRWQRWH)HYHU0C, #Donor with ILI 
Scores shown are the average sum of the total symptom score for each 
day. Total symptom score is the sum of all individual symptom scores 
recorded at a particular time. A score of 0.5 has been recorded as 0 to 
show only more significant symptoms. Shading represents participation in 
the Exposure Event. D6 and D8 were not infected. 
 
 
5.4.3 Exposure Event 
On Day 2, three Donors who showed symptoms consistent with ILI (D01, 
D02, and D03) and one who had respiratory symptoms but did not fulfil 
the definition of ILI (D06) were selected for the EE. In addition, two 
further asymptomatic Donors were randomly selected to take part (D04, 
D08). On Day 3, one of the three reserves (D05) became symptomatic 
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with an ILI. Out of the Donors who remained asymptomatic one (D08) was 
randomly withdrawn in favour of D05 (Table 5.3).  
 
Figure 5.3: Graph showing Donor total symptom scores over time. 
 
Footnote:  The shaded areas represent the Exposure Event periods. Total 
symptom score is the sum of all individual symptom scores recorded at a 
particular time. 
 
 
Four Donors were culture positive from nasal wash, seven were PCR 
positive on nasal wash (three were also positive on throat swab) and 
seven seroconverted (Table 5.4). One Donor (D04) was retrospectively 
found to have high serum antibody titres (HAI=160; MN=1280) on Day -2 
and was therefore not sero-susceptible. 
 
Viral shedding from the seven infected Donors was detected up to an 
average of 5.3 days following inoculation (this is a minimum value as four 
Donors shed virus up until the last day of testing). The average incubation 
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period for the four infected and symptomatic Donors was approximately 
1.8 days. Viral shedding therefore occurred for an average of 3.5 days 
(5.3 ± 1.8) after symptoms began in these four subjects. 
 
Table 5.4: Results of Donor influenza challenge. 
Subject Results  
Infection Status 
Donor ILI 
(day) 
 
PCR 
 
 
Culture 
(TCID50/mL) 
Serology 
(Day -2 ї 28) 
D01* 2-6 NW4-6 
NW3 
(3.5) 
HAI 5 ї 40 
MN 28 ї 640 
ILI 
Infected 
D02* 2-5 
TS3 & 
NW4-6 
 
NW4 
(3.0) 
HAI 5 ї 20 
MN 14 ї 80 
ILI 
Infected 
D03* 2, 3, 5 NW3-4 - 
HAI 40 ї 80 
MN 160 ї >1280 
ILI 
infected 
D04* - - - 
HAI 160 ї 160 
MN >1280 ї >1280 
Immune 
pre-exposure 
D05* 3-5 
TS3 & 
NW4-6 
NW3 & 4 
(4.75 & 3.75 
HAI 5 ї 80 
MN 10 ї 640 
ILI 
Infected 
D06* - - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 40 ї 80 
Symptomatic 
Not infected 
D07 - NW3-5 
NW4 
(2.0) 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 10 ї 40 
Asymptomatic 
infected 
D08* - NW 5-6 - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 80 
Asymptomatic 
infected 
D09 - 
TS3 & 
NW4 
- 
HAI 10 ї 80 
MN 80 ї >1280 
Symptomatic 
infected 
 
Footnote: *Donor used in the exposure event. ILI = days when subject 
recorded symptoms consistent with ILI. Positive virological results are 
shown in red. Yellow shows pre-existing antibody immunity. Numbers 
refer to day(s) when positive e.g. NW4-6 = Nasal wash positive Day 4, 5 
and 6. Serology results are presented as geometric mean titres. A positive 
result is a fourfold rise in titre. TS = Throat swab,  
HAI = Haemagglutination Inhibition, MN = Microneutralisation 
 
 
No clinically significant ECGs, spirometry or vital signs and no unexpected 
or clinically significant blood tests amongst Donors were recorded. One 
adverse event occurred; D05 suffered a nose bleed that resolved 
spontaneously on DD\WKLVZDVGHHPHGµSUREDEO\¶UHODWHGWRLQIOXHQ]D
challenge. All Donors were rapid antigen test negative on discharge (Day 
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6) from the quarantine unit, completed a course of oseltamivir and 
remained well through the Day 28 follow-up visit. 
 
5.4.4 Recipient exposure 
Following the EE, ten Recipients reported symptoms, of whom four (R04, 
R07, R08 and R15) had illness consistent with ILI (Figure 5.4 and Table 
5.5).  
 
Figure 5.4: Graph showing selected Recipient symptom scores over time. 
 
Footnote: Graph shows Recipients who demonstrated symptoms on at 
least two consecutive days 
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Table 5.5: Recipient symptom scores. 
Recipient Symptom Scores 
 Day  
0 
Day  
1 
Day  
2 
Day  
3 
Day  
4 
Day 
5 
Day  
6 
Day  
7 
Day  
8 
R1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R2 0 0 0 1.5 1 1 1 0 0 
R3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
R4 0 0 0 1.5 1 1.5 1.5 0 1.5 
R5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 
R6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R7 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
R8 0 0 0 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 
R9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R15 0 0 1.5 3 3.5 3 6 4 2 
 
Footnote: Scores shown are the average sum of the total symptom score 
for each day. Total symptom score is the sum of all individual symptom 
scores recorded at a particular time. A score of 0.5 has been recorded as 0 
to show only more significant symptoms. Shading shows Recipients who 
KDGV\PSWRPVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK,/,IRUKRXUV 
 
 
Three (20%) Recipients (R08, R12 and R15) had laboratory confirmed 
influenza; R12 was confirmed serologically and R08 and R15 were PCR 
positive on a nasal wash from Day 4 and Day 6 respectively (Table 5.6). 
7KUHHUHFLSLHQWVKDG01WLWUHV0 on Day -2 and were considered non 
sero-susceptible.  
181 
 
Table 5.6: Results of Recipient influenza challenge. 
Subject Results  
Influenza 
Infection 
Status 
Recipient ILI 
(day) 
 
PCR 
 
Culture 
 
Serology 
(Day -2 ї 28) 
R1 - - - 
HAI 10 ї 10 
MN 80 ї 80 
Immune 
pre-exposure 
R2 - - - 
HAI 10 ї 7 
MN 57 ї 57 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R3 - - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 40 ї 40 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R4# 5-6 - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 40 ї 40 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R5 - - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 10 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R6 - - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 14 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R7 4-5 - - 
HAI 5 ї 10 
MN 80 ї 160 
Immune 
pre-exposure 
R8 3 NW4 - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 10 
ILI 
Infected 
R9 - - - 
HAI 10 ї 5 
MN 40 ї 40 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R10 - - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 40 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R11 - - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 40 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R12 - - - 
HAI 5 ї 20 
MN 40 ї 160 
Asymptomatic 
infected 
R13 - - - 
HAI 40 ї 40 
MN 160 ї 160 
Immune 
pre-exposure 
R14 - - - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 20 
Asymptomatic 
not infected 
R15# 3-8 NW6 - 
HAI 5 ї 5 
MN 20 ї 10 
ILI 
Infected 
 
Footnote: # Rhinovirus detected, ILI = Days when subject recorded 
symptoms consistent with ILI. Positive virological results are shown in red. 
Yellow shows pre-existing antibody immunity. Serology results are 
presented as geometric mean titres. A positive result is a fourfold rise in 
titre. HAI = Haemagglutination, MN = Microneutralisation, NW = Nasal 
wash 
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No clinically significant ECGs, spirometry or vital signs and no unexpected 
or clinically significant blood tests amongst Recipients were recorded. All 
were rapid antigen test negative on discharge from the quarantine unit, 
completed a course of oseltamivir and remained well through the Day 28 
follow-up visit. 
 
5.4.5 Attack Rates 
Attack rates in each of the three EE groups (A, B, C) were 0%, 20% and 
40% respectively. Excluding non sero-susceptible Recipients gives attack 
rates of 0, 25% and 50% per group and an overall attack rate of 25% 
(95% CI 6-57%) (Table 5.7a-c). 
 
Table 5.7a: Outcome of Exposure Event for Group 1. 
Group 1 
Subjects 
Symptoms post 
virus exposure 
ILI Fever Influenza 
status 
D03 Yes Yes No Infected 
D04 No No No Immune 
R01 No No No Immune 
R02 Yes No No Not Infected 
R03 Yes No No Not Infected 
R04# Yes Yes No Not Infected 
R05 Yes No No Not Infected 
Attack rate = 0% 
 
Footnote: # Infected with rhinovirus 
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Table 5.7b: Outcome of Exposure Event for Group 2. 
Group 2 
Subjects 
Symptoms post 
virus exposure 
ILI Fever Influenza 
status 
D01 Yes Yes No Infected 
  D08* No No No Infected 
  ' Yes Yes Yes Infected 
R06 No No No Not Infected 
R07 Yes Yes No Immune 
R08 Yes Yes No Infected 
R09 No No No Not Infected 
R10 Yes No No Not Infected 
Attack rate = 20%  
(adjusted for immune Recipients = 25%) 
Footnote: * Took part on Day 2 RQO\7RRNSDUWRQ'ay 3 only 
 
 
Table 5.7c: Outcome of Exposure Event for Group 3. 
Group 3 
Subjects 
Symptoms post 
virus exposure 
ILI Fever Influenza 
status 
D02 Yes Yes No Infected 
D06 Yes No No Not Infected 
R11 Yes No No Not Infected 
R12 No No No Infected 
R13 Yes No No Immune 
R14 No No No Not Infected 
  R15# Yes Yes No Infected 
Attack rate = 40%  
(adjusted for immune Recipients = 50%) 
 
Footnote: #Infected with influenza and Rhinovirus 
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5.4.6 Co-infections 
A panel of respiratory virus PCRs performed on Recipient nasal washes 
from days 4-7 detected rhinovirus from R15 (Day 4) and R04 (Day 6). All 
Donor nasal washes on Day 3 were negative for non-influenza viruses. 
 
5.4.7 Environmental sampling 
Air sampling took place within EE group B on study Days 2 and 3 and 
generated 18 samples. Samplers were carried by D01 and R10 and one 
sampler was free standing. Only one sample was PCR positive; this was in 
1-4 µm size range. This sample was collected on Day 3 by a device carried 
by a Donor (D01). Culture assays conducted on this and all other samples 
were negative. 
 
Surface swabbing was performed in two subject bedrooms (D01 and 
D02/03) and the EE rooms of groups A and B on study Days 2 and 3. All 
rooms where sampling took place contained Donors who were proven to 
be infected with influenza. Forty eight samples were collected from the 
following surfaces; Bedside table (wood), computer game control (plastic), 
teaspoon handle (metal), door handle (metal), drinking glass, plastic 
water bottle, plastic dice, ceramic mug, computer keyboard, computer 
touchpad, paper cup, coffee table (wood), plastic table cloth. Nine out of 
48 (19%) samples were PCR positive; 
 Donor bedroom (D01) Day 2 ± Ceramic mug and computer touchpad. 
 Donor bedroom (D01) Day 3 ± Computer touch pad. 
 Donor bedroom (D02/03) Day 3 ± Bedside table, teaspoon, door 
handle, ceramic mug, plastic bottle. 
 Exposure room Day 3 ± computer touchpad. 
All samples were culture negative. 
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5.5 Discussion 
 
This study has demonstrated for the first time, the successful and safe 
deployment of a human challenge model to demonstrate transmission of 
influenza infection from experimentally infected subjects to other 
susceptible subjects. The overall attack rate was 20%, but taking into 
account non sero-susceptible (immune) Recipients, the adjusted attack 
rate was 25%. In addition the presence of influenza (by PCR) on surfaces 
and in the air around subjects has been demonstrated. The human 
challenge model could offer opportunities to study the transmission of 
influenza and is an alternative to the study of naturally infected subjects. 
 
In this study most sero-susceptible Donors (88%) developed infection 
which is in keeping with other challenge studies (Carrat et al, 2008). It is 
not clear why higher rates of infection are not achieved but probably 
relates to some degree of underlying heterosubtypic or T-cell mediated 
immunity. Five (63%) of the infected susceptible Donors developed 
symptoms which is similar to an overall rate (65%) observed in other 
H3N2 challenge studies, though less fever was observed (13% v 41%) 
(Carrat et al, 2008).  
 
Although the majority of Recipients experienced symptoms post EE, most 
were not clinically significant and may relate to the effect of quarantine 
itself (e.g. nasal congestion due to confinement indoors). Three out of four 
Recipients who had an ILI, had virological evidence of infection (two 
influenza and one rhinovirus). Although we could confirm influenza 
infections in three Recipients, we recognise the lack of coherence across 
diagnostic modalities, particularly that antibody responses to the 
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transmitted infection were not strong. This likely reflects low viral loads 
and the mild nature of illness seen. 
 
Antibody detection was undertaken by both HAI and MN assays. Virus 
neutralization assays are largely regarded as being a more sensitive 
method (Gross and Davis 1979) but there are, in general, no immune 
correlates of protection for neutralising antibody. Virus neutralization 
assays likely detects a broader range of antibody than does the HAI 
including antibody directed against the stem region of the HA molecule 
(Sui et al, 2009; Corti et al, 2010). Whilst a MN titre of 80 indicates some 
level of pre-existing antibody, it is not known whether this represents a 
protective level that would prevent infection. For Recipients R01 and R07 
we have assumed that it did. However, two Donors (D09 and D03) had 
EDVHOLQH01WLWUHVRIDQGZHUHLQIHFWHG,WLVSRVVLEOHWKDWWKHWRWDO
inoculation dose of approximately 5.64 log10TCID50 per Donor represents a 
substantially larJHULQRFXOXPUHODWLYHWRWKHµGRVHV¶WRZKLFKWKH5HFLSLHQWV
were exposed and that this  larger amount of virus was able to overcome 
existing levels of MN antibody. 
 
Based on the times that symptoms began, it appears that R08 caught and 
incubated infection from D01 within 12 hours. This illness transmission 
timeline is depicted in Figure 5.5a. The incubation period in the Recipient 
is more expedient than might have been expected but is plausible (Lessler 
et al, 2009). The finding of rhinovirus on a sample from R15 makes it 
difficult to interpret a similar timeline for transmission from D02 to R15 as 
rhinovirus may well have been causing the early symptoms seen in R15 
(Figure 5.5b). 
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Figure 5.5a: Timelines of symptoms in Donor D01 and Recipient R08. 
 
Footnote: The arrow indicates the 12 hours it took for illness to appear in 
57KHVKDGHGDUHDVUHSUHVHQWWKH([SRVXUH(YHQWSHULRGV5¶V
symptom on Day 0 was earache. They also reported diarrhoea and the  
subject was isolated outside of the quarantine unit until these symptoms 
had resolved. am = 08.00, pm =20.00. 
 
 
Figure 5.5b: Timelines of symptoms in Donor D02 and Recipient R15. 
 
 
Footnote: The arrow indicates the 12 hours it took for illness to appear in 
R15. The shaded areas represent the Exposure Event periods. In R15, 
Rhinovirus was detected on Day 4 and influenza on Day 6. am = 08.00, 
pm =20.00. 
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The detection of rhinovirus (by PCR) in two Recipient subjects (one of 
whom was also infected with influenza during the EE) was unexpected. 
These two subjects did not share a room or take part in the same EE. Mild, 
single, upper respiratory tract symptoms were recorded by four other 
Recipient subjects prior to the EEs, so it is possible that they introduced 
rhinovirus into the quarantine unit. No staff members reported any illness. 
It is crucial for the integrity of challenge studies that steps are taken to 
prevent the introduction of other infections into a quarantine unit. A 2 day 
observation period was included in this study for this purpose, but in the 
future, consideration should be given to screening for a panel of 
respiratory viruses in both subjects and staff on entry to the quarantine 
unit. 
 
Samples taken from the environment around infected subjects show that 
virus is deposited by experimentally infected individuals (swab positive 
rate 19%), validating the model for investigations into the role of contact 
transmission. The findings can be compared to other studies which have 
detected influenza virus (by PCR) on a number of surfaces in different 
settings with swab positive rates of 5.4% (Chapter 4 of this thesis), 3% 
(Simmerman et al, 2010) and >50% (Boone and Gerba 2005). Reasons 
for this variation may include study setting, presence of children and virus 
subtypes studied (see Chapter 4, page 144-145).  
 
Evidence supporting the potential for bioaerosol transmission of influenza 
infection has been reviewed (Tellier 2009). Corroborative evidence 
includes the detection of influenza virus (by PCR) in the air around 
patients in respirable sized particles (Blachere et al, 2009; Lindsley et al, 
2010a) and this study contributes new data. Detecting the presence of 
influenza in the environment is the first step in a chain of evidence needed 
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to confirm that influenza viruses, emitted from an infected individual and 
existing on surfaces or in aerosols, can initiate infection in a person 
exposed to them. The other steps in this sequence are; i) confirming that 
live i.e. infectious virus is present and ii) confirming that sufficient live 
virus exists to initiate infection. 
 
There are some limitations to this study. Firstly, there is an incomplete 
dataset for viral shedding as samples were not collected until 3 days post 
exposure in Donors and 2 days in Recipients. The primary outcome of the 
study was to confirm transmission; with this in mind we did not want to 
compromise transmission by performing sampling that may have 
interfered with the establishment of infection in subjects. Whilst there are 
no data to support such concerns, this was considered prudent. As a result 
it is likely that positive samples may have been missed.  In addition, 
information about virus shedding patterns (particularly in Donors) is not 
available for the early stages of illness.  
 
Secondly, the involvement in the quarantine phase of serologically 
immune subjects was unforeseen. All subjects were HAI negative at 
screening, for practical reasons this was performed up to 200 days in 
advance of the study. As a result subjects may have developed immunity 
between screening and quarantine (there was a range of between 86 and 
143 days between these time points in the four immune subjects) so this 
period ought to be minimised in the future. In addition MN was not 
performed at screening.  
 
Thirdly, we set an automatic start for the EEs, 44 hours after inoculation of 
Donors irrespective of symptom onset. Previous studies with the A/WI 
challenge virus showed maximal viral shedding on Day 2 and maximal 
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symptoms on Day 3 (personal communication: RVL). In the present study 
maximal symptoms also occurred on Day 3, but asymptomatic Donors 
needed to be randomly selected to take part in the EE on Day 2 because 
not enough were showing symptoms at this time. This led to Donors 
taking part who were subsequently found not to have been infected.  
 
Finally, the fact that the study was conducted in early summer may not 
have provided optimal conditions for influenza challenge/transmission.  It 
is interesting to note that high transmission rates of rhinovirus infection 
were seen in experiments conducted in the Antarctic (Holmes et al, 1976) 
and that responses to an influenza challenge differed between summer 
and winter; more symptoms and higher seroconversion rates were 
observed in winter (Shadrin et al, 1977). In the future, further 
consideration should be given to environmental conditions and the 
potential impact they have on infection and routes of transmission (Lowen 
et al, 2007; Shaman and Kohn 2009). 
 
Whilst the proof of concept is achieved, we had stated in our objectives 
that a SAR RIZRXOGEHQHFHVVDU\WRPDNHVXEVHTXHQWVWXGLHV
using this model feasible and cost effective. There is potential to adapt the 
model to achieve a higher SAR in Recipients; 
 Increase the number of Donor subjects either to ensure a minimum 
number with significant symptoms can be used in the EE or to increase 
the ratio of Donors:Recipients in an EE. 
 Prolonging the EE would allow more time for transmissions to occur. 
Starting on Day 1 would allow an opportunity for pre-symptomatic 
Donor transmission to occur. Continuing through day 4 would allow 
Recipient exposure to Donors who develop symptoms later and those 
who have longer periods of viral shedding. Prolonging the exposure 
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time to Recipients has been observed to be important in rhinovirus 
challenge studies (Meschievitz et al, 1984). A disadvantage of 
prolonging the EE is that Recipient to Recipient transmissions could 
theoretically occur. 
 Confirm infection and select Donors with the highest viral loads by 
using an influenza rapid test and/or PCR prior to the EE. High virus 
shedding in index cases has been cited as important for the 
infectiousness of rhinovirus (Fox et al, 1975; Meschievitz et al, 1984) 
and influenza (Ferguson et al, 2005; Cook et al, 2010), though it is 
interesting to note that symptoms alone in index cases have not been 
shown to be associated with transmission of influenza to household 
contacts (Viboud et al, 2004; Cauchemez et al, 2009a). Donors 
deemed to be the most infectious could be distributed across EE 
groups in an attempt to ensure that the infectiousness of Donors is 
evenly spread. 
 More detailed immunological screening to assess susceptibility to 
infection (e.g. MN) and confirmation of susceptibility nearer to the start 
of the study. 
 Performing the study in winter rather than summer time, or 
manipulate conditions such that temperature and humidity are 
favourable to virus survival and transmission.  
 
Incorporating some or all of these modifications will have a number of 
implications for future studies. First, the generation of sufficiently high 
SARs in challenge models may require a departure from attempts to 
VLPXODWHµQRUPDO¶KRXVHKROd conditions and interactions, for example using 
more Donors in the EE to overcome low SARs (which may be linked to the 
existence of minority populations of superspreaders). Whilst this might 
lessen the ability to translate findings to natural conditions, basic science 
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questions can still be addressed. Second, the use of more subjects will 
have logistical implications for staffing and space within a quarantine unit. 
Third, subject comfort must be considered during a 4 day EE, especially so 
if interventions are to be deployed to study routes of transmission. That 
having been said, it was evident that the subjects in the current study 
found that taking part in the EE was a highlight of their involvement. 
Finally, there will clearly be cost implications to use of more subjects, 
extra laboratory testing and manipulation of environmental conditions. 
 
A major reservation about human challenge studies is whether 
experimental infection can be used as a surrogate for natural (wild type) 
influenza infection. Comparisons between the two must take account of 
the strains of viruses involved, levels of host immunity and the routes of 
infection initiation and transmission. We will now discuss some specific 
issues and consider what data is available or needed to address these 
reservations; 
 Symptom severity with challenge studies involving nasal inoculation is 
generally perceived to be lower than with wild type infection, which in 
turn might affect the amount of viral shedding and reduce secondary 
attack rates. However, it is important to note that comparisons are 
often made with natural infections that present to medical services 
(Little et al, 1979); the clinical profiles of community cases (those who 
do not seek medical care) are probably more similar to those 
encountered during challenge studies (Carrat et al, 2002; Carrat et al, 
2008; Lau et al, 2010). There is some evidence that inoculation by 
inhalation produces more severe symptoms than does intranasal 
inoculation (Henle et al, 1946) but this currently poses ethical 
constraints.  
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 Is the profile of viral shedding in challenge models comparable to wild 
type infection? Recent data that describes the time course and peak of 
viral shedding from community influenza cases (Lau et al, 2010) 
appear similar to those seen in experimental challenge studies (Carrat 
et al, 2008). More uncertainty concerns the generation of bioaerosol 
loads. It appears likely that experimental infections induced via 
intranasal inoculation might not cause as much lower respiratory tract 
disease. If this is reflected as reduced coughing and viral load in the 
LRT then the generation of infectious aerosols maybe less. This would 
have implications for the study of routes of transmission in challenge 
models. 
 Questions can be raised about whether the relative contribution of 
droplet, aerosol and contact transmission might be different between 
experimental and wild type transmission and what impact 
environmental factors have in the different settings. There is no 
evidence for or against these issues at present although any potential 
differences could be overcome by carefully controlling the exposure 
conditions in experimental settings to mimic close household contact. 
 Heterogeneity in influenza infectiousness likely exists and may be 
related to variation in symptoms and viral loads contained in 
respiratory sprays. However, we do not know what proportion of 
individuals exist as super-spreaders or how to identify them. Thus, the 
capacity to take account of such variability is limited, especially in 
studies that employ small numbers of subjects. 
 The selection of subjects based on low levels of homotypic immunity 
(e.g. HAI titres) to the challenge virus helps to impart susceptibility to 
infection as occurs in natural infection. It is more difficult to assess 
heterotypic and T cell correlates of immunity (which may partly explain 
why not all inoculated subjects show clinical illness) but there is no 
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reason to suspect that a volunteer population would differ from the 
general healthy adult population in this respect. More detailed 
immunological screening for susceptibility would improve the efficiency 
of challenge studies but may have recruitment and cost implications. 
 
If the utility of influenza challenge studies are to be maximised and the 
findings applicable to natural influenza infection there is not only a need to 
implement some modifications of study design but also to address the 
issues referred to above and a number of studies currently underway or 
planned will help to achieve this. A large prospective community study of 
influenza (Flu Watch) has taken place over the last 5 years and should 
provide detailed information on the symptoms of influenza experienced by 
community cases who do not usually seek medical attention (Hayward 
2011). This data will allow a fairer comparison to be made with the 
symptoms experienced by experimentally infected subjects. Fluwatch is 
also collecting data on the immune correlates of protection against 
influenza infection. The composition of respiratory sprays (that include 
particles/aerosols) produced by subjects infected with influenza are being 
studied by investigators in the US (Lindsley et al, 2010b; Milton DK 2010) 
and this may provide data which can be used to address the issue on 
heterogeneity of  infectiousness. Future challenge studies should attempt 
similar work with experimentally infected subjects.  
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
Studying influenza transmission is difficult; seasonality, unpredictable 
attack rates, numbers of participants required, and confounding variables 
all present considerable obstacles to studying transmission of wild type 
infections. Experimental challenge infection can act as a proxy for natural 
infection and as such human influenza challenge studies could offer a 
promising approach to gain insights into both the mechanisms of influenza 
transmission and its prevention, so long as a reliable model of 
transmission can be developed. :HGHPRQVWUDWHDVXFFHVVIXOµSURRIRI
conFHSW¶IRUVXFKDQDSSURDFK 
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusions 
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6.1 Evidence Base 
 
The literature review conducted as part of this thesis and conclusions 
drawn by international stakeholder organisations including WHO, CDC and 
IOM have identified a number of evidence gaps in our understanding of 
human influenza transmission. Broadly these gaps include the relative 
significance of the different routes of transmission, the efficacy of personal 
protective equipment to reduce transmission, the optimal deployment of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions such as school closures and appreciation 
of the factors that influence infectivity, including the molecular markers 
that promote transmission. In addition, they have highlighted the need for 
new and improved research methods.  
 
Understanding the routes of transmission and factors that influence them 
has been the focus of this thesis. This is an important area with major 
implications for infection control and public health policy. At present 
infection control guidance is based on relatively weak evidence and tends 
WREHUDWKHUJHQHULFDGRSWLQJWKH³LWFDQ¶WGRDQ\KDUP´SULQFLSOHUDWKHU
WKDQEHLQJEDVHGRQNQRZOHGJHWKDW³LWGHILQLWHO\PDWWHUV´RU³LWGHILQLWHO\
ZRUNV´)XUWKHUPRUHFRQVLGHUDEOHUHVRXUFHVDQGILQDQFHVDUHFRQVXPHG
during outbreaks of influenza as attempts are made to reduce spread and 
this is especially true of pandemics.  Strengthening the evidence base to 
show which interventions work and when, is therefore vital to better 
protect public health and reduce unnecessary costs.  
 
A series of postulates have been put forward to help establish whether 
proposed routes of microbial infection occur. These postulates are: 1) The 
infectious microorganism must be produced in the infected host at the 
proposed anatomic site of origin; 2) the organisms must be present in 
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secretions or tissue which are shed from the site of origin; 3) the microbe 
must be present and survive in or on the appropriate environmental 
substance or object; 4) the contaminated environmental substance or 
object must reach the proposed portal of entry; and 5) interruption of 
transmission by the proposed route must reduce the incidence of natural 
infection (Gwaltney and Hendley 1978). I have constructed a chain of 
evidence for influenza which follows the essence of these postulates. 
Research must progress down this chain to enable us to achieve a better 
understanding of influenza transmission (Figure 6.1).  
 
Indirect evidence exists to suggest that all routes of transmission are 
plausible, but definitive answers to a number of key questions remain 
unanswered. For example; i) can a particular route be proven to occur? ii) 
is this route likely to occur in real life settings? and iii) what is the relative 
significance of this route compared to the others?  Reasons for this include 
the fact that many studies have not sought to investigate routes of 
transmission as a primary objective and that fieldwork in natural settings, 
specifically assessing the dynamics and determinants of transmission 
amongst humans, has been limited. To move forward, a range of studies 
are needed to address and satisfy each level. Research involving humans 
is crucial as these are the only studies that can take the physical and 
social aspects of human behaviour and interactions into account. However, 
important contributions have been made and will continue to be made 
through laboratory, modelling and animal studies. 
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Figure 6.1: A chain of evidence to support the existence of routes of 
transmission. 
Is the route of transmission scientifically 
plausible?
Can the route of transmission be demonstrated in 
humans?
Is the route likely to occur in real life settings? 
e.g. are infectious doses commonly encountered?
What is the importance of this route relative to 
others?
 
 
This thesis contributes new data to the evidence base on routes of 
influenza transmission. Data on virus shedding and environmental 
contamination has been collected from infected patients in natural 
settings. It also proposes the human challenge model as a study design to 
investigate transmission; this follows the conduct of the first human to 
human influenza transmission study in modern times. In this concluding 
section, the findings and implications of my work will be considered in 
conjunction with the latest published material. Conclusions will then be 
drawn about our current understanding of transmission and the direction 
that future studies should take. 
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6.2 Shedding and environmental deposition of influenza virus  
 
Findings in this thesis relating to nasal shedding and environmental 
deposition of influenza virus add to the debate about the relative 
significance of the routes of transmission and have relevance for both the 
timing and nature of infection control strategies. 
 
6.2.1 Viral shedding 
Viral shedding data provides estimates of the amount of virus present in 
the URT of an infected patient and can be monitored over time. This data 
can be used to assess infectious potential and in determining which routes 
of transmission may act. In general studies show that; i) viral shedding 
(detected by PCR) peaks early in the course of illness, typically over days 
2-3 and lasts for approximately 6 days; ii) trends in viral shedding and 
symptoms over time are similar; iii) a proportion of individuals shed virus 
for prolonged periods. Factors associated with prolonged shedding include 
younger age (Cao et al, 2009; To et al, 2010), delayed antiviral use (Cao 
et al, 2009), major co-morbidity (Lee et al, 2009), hospitalisation (Leekha 
et al, 2007) and immunosuppression (Hayden 1997; Lee et al, 2009). 
Despite these findings, it has not been shown that the duration of 
shedding equates to the infectious period. Two factors may help explain 
this. First, shedding when measured by PCR is unable to differentiate 
between viable and non-viable virus. Second, even when culture 
techniques detect viable virus, the ability of live virus to reach new hosts 
in an infectious dose cannot be guaranteed. Whilst there is some recent 
data to show that viral load (measured from the URT) is associated with 
infectiousness (Cook et al, 2009), it is possible that the different routes of 
transmission will depend on viral loads in both the URT and the LRT. 
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Future studies should seek to clarify the relationships between the 
duration and intensity of viral shedding with infectiousness. Index cases 
need to be identified and followed up on a daily basis with assessments of 
viral shedding and symptoms whilst secondary infections in their close 
contacts are captured to give a measure of their infectiousness. We should 
be looking for the social and biologic features than create a super-
spreader. Such studies could be conducted in community or challenge 
study settings. 
 
6.2.2 Fomite contamination 
A role for fomites in the transmission of influenza appears widely accepted 
but limited data are available to directly support the possibility of contact 
transmission of influenza. Influenza can survive and remain viable on 
fomites long enough to permit transmission, however, the ability to 
survive does not necessarily equate to the ability to infect; sufficient virus 
must be transmitted to initiate infection. In support of the contact route of 
transmission are two studies that have shown significant effects of hand 
hygiene on the incidence of laboratory confirmed influenza and 
absenteeism due to ILI. In a study performed in Egypt by Taalat et al, an 
intensive hand hygiene programme was introduced to 30 schools over a 
12 week period; 30 different schools acted as controls. In the control arm 
there were 0.5 episodes per 100 student weeks of absence due to an 
influenza-like illness (ILI), in the intervention arm the rate was 0.3. This 
gave a risk reduction of 40% (p<0.0001). The incidence of laboratory 
confirmed influenza (both A and B) between the control and intervention 
group was also significantly reduced (Talaat et al, 2011). A study by 
Stebbins et al was conducted across ten primary schools in the US. 
Children in five intervention schools received instruction and hand 
sanitizers to promote hand and respiratory hygiene. Children who 
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developed an ILI over the course of the study (which lasted 6 months in 
total though testing was only performed over the latter 4 months) were 
tested for influenza. Although no significant effect of the intervention on 
the primary outcome (number of all confirmed influenza cases) was found, 
significantly fewer influenza A infections (incidence rate ratio 0.48; 95% 
CI: 0.26 - 0.87; p<0.02) and school absence episodes (0.74; 95% CI: 
0.56 - 0.97) were observed in the intervention schools.  Interestingly 
influenza B infections were not reduced (Stebbins et al, 2011).  
 
Despite the findings above, consideration of the transmission pathway for 
the indirect contact route does raise doubt about its plausibility. How likely 
is it that an infectious dose of virus can persist whilst passing along the 
transmission chain shown in Figure 6.2? 
 
Figure 6.2: Chain of transmission for the indirect contact route. 
Initiation of infection
Mucous membranes
Finger tips of recipients
Surfaces
Finger tips of donors
Infected secretions
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A small number of studies have assessed and documented the presence of 
influenza virus on fomites around infected individuals. Work in this thesis 
found swab positive rates of 19% around experimentally infected subjects 
in a challenge study setting (Chapter 5) and 5.4% around naturally 
infected subjects (Chapter 4). Live virus was only recovered on two 
occasions. It is tempting to conclude that infectious virus does not 
contaminate the vast majority of surfaces but we must first be sure that 
our sampling and detection methods are fit for purpose; as discussed 
previously  there is clearly room for improvement in this area (see Chapter 
4 page 146). An interesting finding from Chapter 4 is that those who have 
high viral loads and the most prominent respiratory symptoms are the 
most likely to contaminate fomites. Such super-spreaders are the 
individuals most likely to initiate any successful chains of transmission.   
 
New data on fingertip contamination comes from the second year findings 
of a study in Thailand. The fingertips of children with influenza were 
swabbed on Day 3 of their illness; over the course of 2 years 38 out of 
191 (20%) children had positive swabs. The fingers of 9 out of 127 (7%) 
household contacts were also positive. Live virus could only be recovered 
from one swab (0.3%) (taken from an index case) (Suntarattiwong et al, 
2011). The finding of virus on fingers of close contacts in this study does 
take us further down the chain but on only one occasion could live virus be 
detected and we do not know whether this represented an infectious dose. 
 
I do not believe that the data currently available lend support to the idea 
that this chain of transmission plays a significant role in the spread of 
influenza. This mirrors conclusions drawn by investigators who have 
studied the indirect contact route of rhinovirus transmission. In a range of 
experiments they find that; i) transmission of infection via fomites under 
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µQDWXUDO¶FRQGLWLRQVis difficult to achieve (Reed 1975; D'Alessio et al, 
1984; Dick et al, 1987); ii) the transfer of virus from the start to the end 
of a transmission chain  is negligible (Jennings et al, 1988); and iii) 
individual transfer steps were more efficient with inocula that were damp 
and contained a high viral titre (Reed 1975; Gwaltney and Hendley 1982; 
Jennings et al, 1988). 
 
Further studies of fomite and fingertip contamination are needed to 
improve the evidence base but a necessary requirement is to improve the 
efficiency of sampling and laboratory techniques. To a greater or lesser 
extent, the transmission chain for the indirect contact route could be 
tested in a challenge model. An infectious dose of virus could be 
inoculated onto surfaces and the chain set in motion. Conversely, it should 
be possible to eliminate the contact route of transmission amongst 
individuals by preventing face touching. Rates of infection could then be 
compared between one group with face touching and another without; 
reduced rates in the no face touching group could imply that indirect 
contact transmission is operating in the other. 
 
6.2.3 Air  
Evidence backing up at least the potential for bioaerosol transmission of 
influenza is accumulating. Supporting evidence comes from the detection 
of influenza virus (by PCR) in the air of natural settings (Blachere et al, 
2009; Lindsley et al, 2010a; Goyal et al, 2011; Yang et al, 2011), the 
demonstration of bioaerosol transmission in animal models (Mubareka et 
al, 2009; Munster et al, 2009) and mathematical modelling techniques 
which suggest a role for bioaerosol spread (Nicas and Sun 2006). 
Detecting the presence of influenza in the air is the first step in a chain of 
evidence needed to confirm that influenza viruses, emitted from an 
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infected individual and existing as bioaerosols, can initiate infection in a 
person exposed to them. The other steps in this sequence are i) 
confirming that live virus is present and ii) confirming that inhaled live 
virus can initiate infection. 
 
Findings in this thesis demonstrate for the first time that influenza can be 
detected in the air around identifiable influenza patients (as opposed to 
detection in buildings where multiple cases may contribute and to 
detection in exhaled breath captured directly into specialised devices). 
Recent work from other groups begins to take the evidence to the next 
level: 
 Particle production from individuals with influenza has been assessed. 
0LOWRQHWDOFROOHFWHGH[KDOHGSDUWLFOHVPDQG± 4.9µm) from 
37 volunteers with seasonal influenza using a specially designed 
collection device. Sixteen out of 37 and 34 out of 37 subjects were 
positive for influenza in the larger and the smaller particles 
respectively. Virus numbers decreased rapidly between day 1 and day 
2 of illness. Virus was detected by culture from two subjects (Milton et 
al, 2010).  
 Lindsley et al collected cough particles from 47 volunteers with 
influenza; influenza was detected by PCR from 38 (81%) volunteers 
and 65% of the positive samples were from particles PLQ
diameter. Viable virus was isolated from 2 out of 21 samples tested. 
Significant heterogeneity between individuals in the amount of virus 
detected during coughing was observed. They also found that the 
amount of virus detected (by PCR) from nasopharyngeal swabs 
correlated well with the amount of virus found during coughing 
(Lindsley et al, 2010b). This is interesting because we assume that 
coughs generate a sample from the LRT whilst nasopharyngeal swabs 
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sample the URT. Furthermore, both this study and the one mentioned 
above found more virus in the smaller particles than the larger ones. 
This is counter intuitive as one might expect the larger particles to 
contain more virus as they make up the majority of the volume of a 
sample. A possible explanation is that the majority of virus shed into 
aerosols comes from the LRT, not the URT where larger particles 
originate. 
 Aerosol inoculation of ferrets has been found to simulate natural 
infection more closely than intranasal inoculation and viable virus has 
been detected in exhaled aerosols (Gustin et al, 2011). 
 Influenza has been detected in air samples obtained from around 
infected patients in a hospital setting. More virus was detected in the 
air from patients who had higher nasal viral loads. Furthermore 19% of 
patients (5 out of 26) were described as super-emitters of virus ± a 
group who shed significantly more virus than the average (Bischoff, 
personal communication 2012). 
 
As for fomite sampling, methodological limitations exist in detecting 
influenza in air samples. Collecting samples early in the course of illness, 
preserving virus viability (to allow culture) and the detection of low titres 
of virus present in air can be difficult. Sampling in well ventilated areas 
compounds this problem. These issues need to be considered in the design 
of future study protocols. Further study of the production of bioaerosols by 
infected individuals is needed, with identification of the traits associated 
with super-emitters. Work also needs to be done to confirm that 
individuals can transmit influenza via aerosols. Again, the challenge model 
could be used for such investigation; a) donors could be separated from 
recipients by a certain distance e.g. 2m so that the droplet and contact 
routes are eliminated; b) the aerosols from a room containing Donors 
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could be vented into a different room containing Recipients; c) an 
intervention could be deployed to only allow exposure to aerosols in one 
group whilst another group are exposed to all transmission routes ± a face 
shield or a face mask that allow aerosols to pass could be used; or d) an 
intervention is deployed to reduce the amount of viable virus in aerosols, 
e.g. ultraviolet light. Again secondary attack rates could be compared 
between this intervention group and a control group. One must consider 
though whether the interventions used can interrupt SRAT. 
 
6.2.4 Implications for routes of influenza transmission 
I consider it likely that all routes of transmission have a role to play, but 
their relative significance will depend on a set of circumstances acting at a 
certain time.  Dictating the process are factors related to the virus itself, 
the host and the environment. Transmission can likely occur through 
multiple routes in the same person; it is a dynamic and opportunistic 
process. 
 
Data to back up the potential for aerosol transmission has been 
accumulating over recent years, but direct evidence is lacking. Factors 
that might promote transmission via aerosols include; the generation of 
bioaerosols by medical procedures, the existence of bioaerosol super- 
emitters, environmental conditions that favour the survival of virus in air 
and the presence of directional air flows and/or a lack of ventilation. High 
virus shedding probably increases the risk of transmission by all routes, 
but the potential for aerosol transmission may depend on it because the 
viral load per aerosol particle is small. 
 
Direct evidence to support spread by droplets is also lacking. Assumptions 
that it plays a significant role have been based on epidemiologic 
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observations that transmission occurs at close range, but close range does 
not exclude a contribution from aerosols.  
 
The data regarding contact transmission is difficult to interpret. Live virus 
is rarely found to contaminate hands or commonly touched fomites in 
natural settings but we must acknowledge that our ability to demonstrate 
this is constrained by methodological limitations. Intuitively, contact 
transmission will be more likely to occur when large volume, high titre 
inocula are deposited on fomites but the stochastic nature of the 
remainder of the transmission pathway makes infection difficult to 
envisage. In spite of this, indirect evidence in support of a role for contact 
transmission has recently emerged in studies that have used a hand 
hygiene intervention. 
 
Circumstances are important in determining the route(s) of transmission 
that may occur. Consider some features that might be present in two 
common settings; hospitals and homes.  
Hospitals: 
 Patients requiring hospital treatment are likely to have severe 
symptoms and higher and/or prolonged virus shedding with an 
increased likelihood of transmission by all routes. 
 Patients in hospital are likely to be relatively more confined than those 
in the community which will allow higher concentrations of virus to 
build up as aerosols and on surfaces. Confined settings are a feature of 
many outbreaks. 
 A high number of susceptible individuals may come into contact with a 
hospitalised patient; e.g. HCWs, other patients, visitors, non-clinical 
hospital staff. 
 Aerosol generating procedures are largely confined to hospitals. 
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 Engineering controls are more likely to be in place in hospitals; e.g. 
negative pressure ventilation rooms which will reduce aerosol loads. 
However, this is a limited resource and many patients are nursed 
outside of these areas. Natural ventilation, for example via windows, is 
often not possible in hospital rooms. 
Homes: 
 Peak viral shedding usually occurs early in the course of infection when 
individuals are more likely to be in their own homes, increasing the 
likelihood of transmission by all routes. 
 Caregivers (family/friends) are often not vaccinated and do not usually 
have the use of personal protective equipment which could protect 
against transmission. 
 Children in households are often identified as being transmitters. 
 
6.2.5 Implications for infection control 
$QLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQIHFWLRXVSRWHQWLDOLVUHODWHGWRWKHDPRXQWGLVSHUVDO
pattern and duration of infectious virus release and their interaction with 
other susceptible individuals. The ability to identify those who are most 
infectious (super-spreaders) would be a major advance. 
 
Influenza infection control isolation guidelines are largely based on data 
obtained during observations of households where most infection 
transmission appears to happen within 2 days of illness onset in an index 
case (Cowling et al, 2009b; France et al, 2010; Donnelly et al, 2011). 
Current guidelines from &'&UHFRPPHQGWKDW³SHRSOHZLWKLQIOXHQ]D-like 
illness remain at home until at least 24 hours after they are free of fever 
RUVLJQVRIIHYHUZLWKRXWWKHXVHRIIHYHUUHGXFLQJPHGLFDWLRQV´This 
JXLGDQFHKRZHYHUGRHVQRWDSSO\WRKHDOWKFDUHVHWWLQJVZKHUH³WKH
isolation period should be continued for 7 days from symptom onset or 
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until the resolution of symptoms, ZKLFKHYHULVORQJHU´(CDC 2009a). This 
reflects data on shedding from hospital cases and the fact that the hospital 
houses a vulnerable (to the complications of influenza) population. It is 
important that guidelines are practical and adaptable. At the beginning of 
the 2009 pandemic when data on the dynamics of transmission and 
severity of disease were sparse, CDC guidelines recommended that an 
isolation period of 7 days be observed in all cases. However, as data 
became available the recommendations were altered. The impact that 
recommendations have on the community at large must be considered, 
especially during a pandemic. Days off work, particularly for those 
involved in the delivery of essential services (e.g. emergency services, 
energy supplies) because of enforced isolation, including the need to take 
time off to care for others, need to be safely minimised. 
 
Viral shedding data provides a less useful approximation of infectiousness, 
especially if based on PCR, primarily because our knowledge of what 
constitutes an infectious dose is lacking. Knowing that live virus can be 
shed from cases for 5 days and that virus may persist in the environment 
for up to 2 days does not necessarily mean that infection can be 
transmitted for up to 7 days; only the presence of an infectious dose 
would validate this statement. Viral shedding data might have more use in 
determining risk of transmission if one could show that a relationship 
between the amount of virus shed and the risk of infection existed. 
Measures other than conventional nasal viral shedding need to be further 
H[SORUHGHJµVKHGGLQJ¶RIYLUXVLQDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKDFRXJKRUVQHH]HDQG
the physical properties of particles released i.e. those which settle quickly 
and those which remain suspended in air as bioaerosols. This might allow 
for the identification of individuals who release large amounts of virus into 
the environment, so called super-emitters. A study of rhinovirus infected 
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patients found that just under a quarter of individuals were responsible for 
over 80% of the exhaled particle load (Fabian et al, 2011). Super-emitters 
may in turn (if they are shown to be more infectious than others) become 
super-spreaders. The existence of super-spreaders would have profound 
implications for our understanding of influenza transmission and for 
control strategies. High heterogeneity in infectiousness implies that 
relatively few individuals generate most of the transmission ² or 
conversely, that many individuals hardly transmit at all. The practical 
implications of this would be that control efforts should aim to identify 
highly infectious super-spreaders (and circumstances that favour their 
creation) and target vaccination or other interventions at them.  
 
There are several other issues related to infection control practice where 
the route that transmission takes might impact upon guidance: 
 What is the safe distance from an infectious case? 
 What interventions should be used to reduce transmission? 
 Which medical procedures generate significant bioaerosols? 
 Can influenza transmit through the conjunctiva? 
 What advice about interventions should be given to the general public? 
 
Some evidence is emerging to help refine infection control practice, for 
example the delineation of medical procedures that are aerosol 
generating, but at the same time the emergence of other evidence, e.g. 
the implication of the aerosol and/or conjunctival routes of transmission, 
might dictate significant changes. At present, with limited evidence on 
routes of transmission, we still rely on historical perspectives and common 
sense for many recommendations. 
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6.3 Human challenge studies 
 
Human challenge studies offer the potential to investigate various aspects 
of transmission. As well as assessing the effectiveness of interventions to 
reduce transmission (which may be used to make inferences about routes 
of transmission), they also provide the opportunity to address questions 
about virus survival in the environment, the effects of temperature and 
humidity on survival/transmission and the effectiveness of engineering 
controls e.g. ventilation and UV light to reduce transmission. In addition, it 
could also be possible to study both pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic 
influenza infection and how transmission is affected by the presence and 
degree of specific symptoms. The generation of such information is 
fundamental to better understanding routes of transmission and their 
relative significance. 
Whist there are clear advantages to using an experimental human 
challenge model, there are also a number of hurdles to overcome. The 
advantages of the model include; i) the provision of symptomatic subjects 
at a specific time; ii) the aELOLW\WRFRQWUROVXEMHFW¶VEHKDYLRXUDQG
environment; iii) viral shedding and symptoms can be recorded 
prospectively; iv) the numbers of subjects needed for adequate powering 
of studies is greatly reduced; v) the studies are repeatable and can be 
conducted at convenient times; and vi) pre-screening is possible to assess 
susceptibility to infection based on serologic testing, this increases study 
efficiency and in immunological terms is the closest one can get to a 
pandemic situation. 
 
The drawbacks of the challenge model include the facts that; i) the 
development of a satisfactory challenge virus, manufactured in accordance 
with GMP is not straightforward; ii) although the viruses used are closely 
213 
 
derived from wild-type, they tend to be less virulent than most naturally 
occurring influenza infections that present to medical services because the 
nasal route of administration affects illness severity. This in turn may have 
an effect on infection transmission between humans; iii) creation of 
symptomatic illness in humans using a GMP challenge virus is well proven 
but a successful and robust model of person-to-person transmission with a 
GMP challenge virus has yet to be established; iv) transmission would 
need to occur above a given rate to enable the practical design of follow 
on studies, for example a low secondary attack rate would mean that 
larger numbers of volunteers are needed to adequately power the studies. 
Although more efficient in numbers than a community study, the numbers 
required for a randomised intervention study are still relatively large; v) 
given the quarantine and safety features required for these experiments 
the costs are considerable; vi) the recreation of natural, e.g. household 
conditions, in a quarantine facility is challenging. 
 
The proof of concept study (Chapter 5) demonstrates for the first time that 
transmission can be achieved following infection initiation with a challenge 
virus in a quarantine setting. Modifications to the study design may allow 
the development of a reliable model where secondary attack rates are 
sufficient to allow logistically feasible and cost effective studies to take 
place. 
 
Groups in the US ceased to use the influenza human challenge model 
approximately 10 years ago; reasons included the lack of availability of 
new challenge viruses and the occurrence of a serious adverse event 
during a trial. This concerned a subject who developed myocarditis 
following experimental challenge with influenza, but who recovered fully. A 
subsequent study to investigate cardiac findings during natural influenza 
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infection revealed that although ECG abnormalities were common, they 
were also clinically insignificant and resolved promptly without intervention 
(Ison et al, 2005). Safety remains of paramount concern, and an 
extensive review of the literature (covering a total of 56 different studies 
with 1,280 healthy participants) which concludes that experimentally 
induced infection is a mild disease is therefore reassuring (Carrat et al, 
2008). 
 
A balance must be struck when performing influenza challenge studies 
between producing infection of realistic severity compared with wild type 
infection, whilst on the other hand demonstrating an acceptable safety 
profile that permits ethical approval. Some compromise of the former is 
inevitable and occurs through the use of a well characterised challenge 
virus and the intranasal route of inoculation as opposed to the aerosol 
route which has been associated with more severe disease. Guidance on 
the conduct of microbial challenge studies in humans in the UK was issued 
in 2005 (The Academy of Medical Sciences 2005) and a review of the 
ethics of infection inducing challenge experiments suggests that the 
following questions be asked when evaluating studies (Miller and Grady 
2001); 
 Is the scientific rationale for using a challenge model acceptable? 
 Are the risks of challenge studies acceptable? 
 Are the discomforts of challenge experiments acceptable? 
 Does the study enrol subjects from vulnerable populations? 
 Does the informed consent process adequately inform potential 
subjects about the risks and discomforts? 
 Does the amount of financial compensation offered to volunteers 
constitute undue inducement? 
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Given the positive outcome of the proof of concept study, as long as 
ethical and safety concerns continue to be addressed and satisfied, the 
challenge model could have an important role to play in the study of 
human influenza transmission. 
 
 
6.4 Looking ahead 
 
Based upon the all the work considered and presented in this thesis, I 
judge the following to represent important gaps in our knowledge with 
regard to influenza transmission and where future research efforts should 
be directed; 
 Heterogeneity of infectiousness; there is a need to confirm the 
existence of super-spreaders of influenza infection, understand the 
factors involved and learn to identify such individuals. An 
understanding RIWKHFRQWULEXWLRQPDGHE\DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSK\VLRORJ\
behaviour, symptoms and viral loads in the upper and lower 
respiratory tracts in relation to the amount of virus emitted in 
respiratory sprays is needed.  
 Infectious dose(s) needed to initiate infection via the different routes. 
Whilst some data from experimental challenge models is available, the 
methods and routes of inoculation differ from natural infection. Sound 
estimates of the infectious doses for each route would substantially 
improve the outputs of bio-mathematical transmission modelling. 
 The effect of variations in temperature and humidity. 
 Viral determinants of transmission; the ability to predict the 
transmissibility of a virus, e.g. a future pandemic virus, would be 
invaluable. 
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 Virus emission and deposition data from infected patients and their 
near environments. 
 Methods and technologies to reliably sample, detect and quantify 
influenza virus. 
 The risk of transmission from asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic 
individuals. 
 Transmission distances; both close and prolonged contact with 
infectious cases are often identified as risk factors for transmission. 
Aerobiology suggests that droplet transmission is unlikely to occur 
beyond 2m because droplets fall out of the air before reaching this 
distance. There is little evidence for long range transmission by 
aerosols and although safe distances are not known the risk is 
expected to fall as distance from a source increases. 
 Efficacy and effectiveness of interventions e.g. face masks, UV light; in 
healthcare settings the main debate concerns the relative importance 
of aerosol transmission and whether respirators should be used instead 
of SFMs. Two randomised controlled trials have failed to show a benefit 
of respirators over SFMs. If it were possible to identify the 
circumstances in which aerosol transmission becomes likely then a 
range of mitigation strategies could be employed. These might include 
the use of a respirator, administrative (isolation rooms, movement 
restriction) and engineering controls (UV light, negative pressure 
rooms, manipulation of humidity) and prescription of saline nebulisers 
to index cases to decrease aerosol production (Edwards et al, 2004). 
Currently the only circumstance where respirators (as opposed to 
SFMs) are recommended for protection against influenza in the UK is 
during the conduct of aerosol generating procedures. 
Recommendations may change however, if the risk vs. cost vs. benefit 
assessment alters such as may be the case with a virulent virus. 
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 Aerosol generating procedures; better characterisation of AGPs will 
improve risk management. For example a study has recently shown 
that chest physiotherapy and non-invasive ventilation are droplet (not 
aerosol) generating procedures (Simonds et al, 2010). 
 Transmission via the conjunctiva; the recent finding that the eyes 
permit the passage of bioaerosols to the nasopharynx raises the 
question of whether eye protection is a necessary measure (Bischoff et 
al, 2011). 
 
In order to address these questions a variety of studies with different 
designs are required, no one study will be able to provide all the answers. 
Basic science laboratory based research is necessary to underpin and 
direct research in the field; outbreak investigations may be able to focus 
more on whether particular circumstances favoured specific routes of 
transmission and could look for evidence of super-spreading events; 
animal models are providing insights into the viral determinants of 
transmission and the effects of environmental conditions; and it is hoped 
that the generation of new and reliable data can be fed into increasingly 
sophisticated transmission modelling approaches. An exciting prospect is 
that of experimental challenge studies which may be able to overcome 
many of the problems faced by other studies (Killingley et al, 2011a). 
They could be used to demonstrate that specific routes of transmission 
occur by selectively blocking others, measure the effectiveness of 
intervention strategies, assess the effects of environmental conditions and 
be used as a rich source of data for measurements of viral shedding and 
deposition. However, studies of patients with natural infection and in 
natural settings will remain the gold standard in many respects and 
provide reference points for data obtained during experimental challenge 
studies. Intervention studies in natural settings will continue to have an 
218 
 
important role and are likely to be more successful in the future following 
reflections on those conducted to date (Aiello et al, 2010a; Klick et al, 
2011).  
 
The main challenge when it comes to conducting research in natural 
settings is to be able to gather data in a timely manner. As peak viral 
shedding and infectiousness usually occurs within 2 days of illness, being 
able to recruit sufficient numbers of subjects and collect data or execute 
interventions within this time frame is critical. Unfortunately the majority 
of studies done to date [including the study presented in this thesis 
(Chapter 4)] have not always been able to meet this challenge. The usual 
method of recruitment has been to enrol cases that present to medical 
services, but presentation is often delayed, and even if recruitment occurs 
within 48 hours the time to intervention or data collection is longer. An 
alternative approach which can overcome this problem is to follow up a 
cohort of individuals recruited before illness begins, but this is far more 
resource intensive. Innovative recruitment approaches to potential 
patients (that are approved by ethics committees) are needed. Use of 
social media, advertising and publicity before and during an influenza 
season should be explored. 
 
To move forward and meet the challenges addressed above, those 
involved in influenza transmission research and those concerned with 
public health and infection control policy must work together to develop a 
research agenda that will lead to a strengthening of the evidence base. We 
should then be better able to mitigate the impact of influenza in the 
future.  
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Closing Remarks 
 
In the early years of my specialist registrar training programme, 
performing research was often talked about and aspired to, and something 
which many of my more senior colleagues were doing. I must admit 
WKRXJKWKDWLWGLGQ¶WVHHPSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWRUDWWUDFWLYHWRPHDWWKDW
time; I was too busy and caught up in my clinical training and I derived all 
my satisfaction and drive from looking after patients. As my training 
progressed however, the attraction of academia grew. Taking on a new 
challenge was part of it, but there was also a growing realisation that 
there was more to being a good doctor than just treating the patient in 
front of you. Being able to influence and improve the quality of care 
provided to a population of people seemed to be the next step up. It is not 
just through research endeavour that such improvements are made. 
Asking questions and pushing boundaries are important, and as these 
became more tangible to me I wanted to get involved. It also became 
clear that the skills one develops and acquires through conducting 
research would help make me a better doctor, more able to positively 
engage with the healthcare system at large. 
 
It was during my third year that I began to consider what research options 
might be available. A six month secondment at the Department of Health, 
working within the infection control team, raised my awareness of hospital 
associated infections and reflecting on my own clinical experiences I 
became interested in the use of face masks to prevent the spread of 
infection. At the time (2006) influenza pandemic preparedness planning 
was well underway, but the role that face masks could play in this was 
uncertain. At this point I knew that I wanted to undertake clinical as 
RSSRVHGWRODERUDWRU\EDVHGUHVHDUFKDV,GLGQ¶WZDQWWRORVHFRQWDFWZLWK
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patients. I had some initial discussions with prospective supervisors and it 
was Professor Jonathan Van-Tam who showed both enthusiasm and 
commitment towards me and who was poised to start up a research group 
in Nottingham with interests aligned to mine. It took some time to develop 
and build a line of enquiry that would satisfy a PhD but this we did and the 
funding from the MRC that followed was the green light to make things 
happen. 
 
I have thoroughly enjoyed the journey that completing this PhD has taken 
me on. As I reflect on this, two things stand out as having contributed to 
my personal development. The first is the people I have encountered 
along the way; national and international influenza experts; staff at 
agencies such as the Department of Health, WHO, CDC; colleagues at the 
University of Nottingham, volunteers involved in my studies, collaborators 
from other academic institutions and all those involved in the research 
process from ethics committees to research nurses. Learning to interact 
and to work with such people has been an important experience and the 
contacts made and friends forged will remain invaluable throughout my 
career.  
 
The second has been my exposure to the research process. Research plays 
a key role in continually improving healthcare. Having an appreciation of 
ZKDW¶VLQYROYHGHJDSSO\LQJIRUIXQGLQJVHWWLQJXSDSURMHFWZRUNLQJ
with ethics committees, adhering to the principles of GCP and research 
governance will again be invaluable as my career progresses and will allow 
me to interact positively and usefully with colleagues from all disciplines. 
 
The topic of influenza transmission although close to my heart is perhaps 
RIVHFRQGDU\LPSRUWDQFHLW¶VWKHSHUVRQDOGHYHORSPHQWMRXUQH\WKDWKDV
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been key.  Meeting new people, learning new skills and gaining an 
experience of academic work will serve me well in my future career, 
whatever path that takes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222 
 
Glossary 
 
 
A(H1N1)pdm09 - The pandemic A(H1N1)2009 virus has become a 
seasonal influenza virus, continuing to circulate with other seasonal 
viruses since August 2010 when the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared the end of the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic. However, the 
nomenclature of this virus has never been standardized resulting in the 
use of diverse names for the same virus. In order to minimize confusion 
and to differentiate the virus from the former seasonal A(H1N1) viruses 
circulating in humans before the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic, the 
advisers to the WHO technical consultation on the composition of influenza 
vaccines for the southern hemisphere 2012 season advised WHO to use 
the nomenclature above (WHO 2011b). 
 
Aerosol - A gaseous suspension of fine solid or liquid particles. An aerosol 
can consist of a range of particle sizes; small particles will remain 
suspended in the air for prolonged periods of time (droplet nuclei) whilst 
larger particles (droplets) will quickly settle to the ground. In this review 
the term aerosol transmission will refer to the transmission of infection by 
droplet nuclei only. 
 
Aerosol transmission - Transmission of influenza through the air by 
droplet nuclei (particles <10µm). Particles are respired and penetrate 
proximal airways to reach the lung where they can initiate infection.  
 
Airborne ± Carried by or through the air. 
 
Bioaerosol - A gaseous suspension of fine solid or liquid particles that are 
living, contain living organisms or were released from living organisms. 
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Contact transmission ± the transfer of an infectious agent from one 
being to another by touch; 
 Direct Contact ± transmission via direct physical contact; for example a 
kiss. 
 Indirect Contact ± transmission via intermediate objects (fomites) e.g. 
door handle or hand. 
 
Droplet ± A particle >20µm and <500µm. 
 
Droplet nuclei ± A particle <10µm. 
 
Droplet transmission - Transmission of influenza through the air by 
droplet particles (>20µm) emitted by an infected host (e.g. by coughing) 
which deposit on mucous membranes either directly or by inhalation.  
 
Face mask (medical or surgical) ± A protective covering for the mouth 
and nose. Whilst it provides a physical barrier to large projected droplets, 
it does not provide full respiratory protection against droplet nuclei. 
 
Fomite - An inanimate object or substance capable of carrying infectious 
organisms. 
 
Inhalable - Particles that enter the body through the nose and/or mouth 
during breathing. They do not travel further than the tracheobronchial 
tree. 
 
Respirable - Inhaled particles that penetrate to the alveolar region of the 
lung. 
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Respirator - A protective covering for the mouth and nose. It provides a 
high level of filtering capability and face fit 
 FFP2/N95 ± respirators that are able to filter out particles of >0.3µm 
with an efficiency of 95% 
 FFP3/N99 ± respirators that are able to filter out particles of >0.3µm 
with an efficiency of 99% 
FFP 2/3 (Filtering Face Piece) is a European classification system whereas 
as N95/99 is the US equivalent (although testing protocols are not 
identical and the ratings are not directly interchangeable). 
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Appendix 2.1: Summary of studies that inform the biologic plausibility of the proposed routes of transmission 
Author 
(Year) 
Study / Investigation Main Findings 
Bean 
(1982) 
 
Virus survival on surfaces 
and hands 
Virus survives for 24-48 hours on hard surfaces, 8-12 hours on soft surfaces and for up to 5 minutes 
after virus transfer to hands. The authors conclude that a person shedding large quantities of virus 
(>105.0 TCID50/mL) could transmit infection via stainless steel for 2 hours and via tissues for a few 
minutes. 
 
Thomas 
(2008) 
Virus survival on 
banknotes 
Survival time of viruses on banknotes was directly related to inoculum size. The addition of 
respiratory mucus to inoculums increased the duration of infectiousness, e.g. 8 days vs. 2 hours for 
an H3N2 virus. The authors then went on to show that virus contained in nasopharyngeal secretions 
obtained from ill children survived on banknotes for at least 24 hours in 50% and at least 48 hours 
in 36%. 
 
McDevitt 
(2010) 
Virus survival on steel 
and the effect of 
temperature and 
humidity 
 
Influenza virus survival is affected by temperature, relative humidity (RH) and exposure time after 
being deposited on a stainless steel surface. Drying in ambient conditions (temperature 240C, 
relative humidity 35%) for an hour resulted in a reduction of 63%. It was shown that viral 
inactivation increased with rising temperature (55 ї 60 ї 650C) and RH (25 ї 50 ї 75%). 
 
Greatorex 
(2011) 
Virus survival on 
household surfaces 
Virus survival on a range of representative household surfaces was studied. Viable virus could be 
recovered from most surfaces 4 hours after inoculation although differences between porous (less 
survival) and non porous surfaces were evident. However, viable virus could not be detected on any 
surface other than the plastic (Petri dish) control 9 hours after inoculation. Similar results were 
found when a 2009 pandemic H1N1 strain was tested. 
 
Thomas 
(2010) 
Virus survival on hands Viable virus could be detected on fingertips for up to 30 minutes. Bigger volumes of inoculum led to 
more virus being detected and it was shown that if the viral inoculum was spread on the fingertip 
(rather than being left as a drop) survival time was less. 
 
Grayson  
(2009) 
Virus survival on hands A relatively high dose of an H1N1 virus (107 TCID50/0.1mL) was used to contaminate the hands of 
20 volunteers. After 2 minutes, a reduction in virus as measured by PCR was seen and virus was 
cultured from the fingertips of 14 volunteers (a 3-4 log reduction in virus TCID50 was seen). Eight 
volunteers were assessed after 60 minutes; little further reduction in virus levels (assessed by both 
culture and PCR) was seen. 
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Simmerman 
(2010) 
Virus detection on hands 
during natural infection 
The hands of infected children and secondary cases within households were swabbed. The hands of 
15/90 (16.6%) index cases were positive by PCR, one (1.1%) was culture positive, whilst 1/59 
(1.6%) secondary cases were PCR positive and none were culture positive. 
Simmerman  
(2010) 
Virus detection on fomites 
during natural infection 
 
540 swabs were collected from fomites in households with an index case. 3% were positive by PCR 
and 17.8% households had at least one positive swab. No swabs were culture positive. Households 
in which the index case was <8 years old had a significantly higher prevalence of contamination. 
 
Killingley 
(2010) 
Virus detection on fomites 
during experimental 
infection 
Fomites were swabbed during a study that involved subjects who were experimentally infected with 
an H3N2 influenza virXVVZDEVWDNHQIURPDVXEMHFWV¶URRPVUHYHDOHGLQIOXHQ]DE\
PCR); no live virus was found. 
 
Killingley 
(2010) 
Virus detection on fomites 
during natural infection 
704 swabs were collected from fomites in the homes and hospital rooms of confirmed influenza 
patients as part of a study during the 09/10 and 10/11 seasons. Virus was detected by PCR on 25 
occasions (3.5%). Live virus was recovered from two surfaces. 
 
Weber  
(2008) 
Review: Influenza 
survival in aerosols 
A number of authors have attempted to measure the survival of influenza virus in air and most find 
that survival is prolonged (up to 24 hours) at low RH. 
 
Fabian 
(2008) 
Detection of influenza in 
aerosols from patients 
Patients with influenza were asked to directly breathe into a device that collected filtered samples 
and employed optical particle counting and airflow data. Influenza was detected by PCR in 4/13 
samples collected. 
 
Lindsley 
(2009 and 
2010) 
Detection of influenza in 
aerosols in medical care 
facilities 
 
Air samples were collected from urgent care medical facilities during 2 influenza seasons. Both 
stationary and personal samplers collected air particles containing influenza A virus. 
 
Milton 
(2010) 
Detection of influenza in 
aerosols from patients 
Exhaled breath particles were collected from 37 volunteers with seasonal influenza using a specially 
designed collection device. PCR and culture were used to detect virus. Virus numbers decreased 
rapidly between day 1 and day 2 of illness. Virus was detected by culture from two subjects. 
 
Tseng 
(2010) 
Detection of influenza in 
aerosols 
Air samples were collected from a paediatric department and aerosol fractions were found to contain 
influenza (by PCR). 
 
Lindsley 
(2010) 
Detection of influenza in 
aerosols from patients 
Cough particles from 47 volunteers with influenza were collected; influenza was detected by PCR 
from 38 (81%) volunteers, 65% of the particles were of a respirable size and viable virus was 
isolated from 2/21 samples tested. Significant heterogeneity between individuals in the amount of 
virus detected during coughing was revealed. 
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Yang 
(2011) 
Detection of influenza in 
aerosols 
Air samples were collected from a health care facility, a day care centre and aeroplanes. Based on 
the concentrations of virus found a model is created which finds that over an hour enough virus can 
be inhaled to induce infection. NB the amount of virus was quantified by PCR which may not reflect 
the amount of infectious virus present. 
 
Bischoff 
(2011) 
Demonstration of the 
ocular transmission route 
Volunteers were exposed to an aerosolised live attenuated vaccine influenza virus. When only the 
eyes were exposed, virus could be detected 30 minutes later from the nasopharynx. Infection itself 
was not demonstrated (this was not the aim) but it does appear that nasolacrimal ducts can 
transport virus to its target cells. 
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Appendix 2.2: Summary of studies examining the epidemiology of disease in closed or semi-closed settings 
Author 
 
Setting Virus 
(year) 
Special features / identified risks Likely dominant 
route(s)  of 
transmission 
 
Blumenfeld Hospital ward H2N2 (1957) Pandemic virus All routes possible 
McLean Hospital Ward H2N2 (1957) UV light, pandemic virus Aerosol 
Moser  
 
Aircraft H3N2 (1977) 
 
Point source, no ventilation Aerosol 
Klontz  
 
Barracks and 
aircraft 
H1N1 (1986) 
 
Outbreak amongst a squadron All routes possible 
Morens  Nursing Home H3N2 (1989) High level care patients Contact 
Cunney   Neonatal Unit H3N2 (1998) Twins, mechanical ventilation Contact / Droplet 
Awofeso  
 
Prison H3N2 (2000) Infection introduced into a closed community All routes possible 
Han  
 
Tour group + 
aircraft 
H1N1 (2009) 
 
Talking with index case, pandemic virus 
 
All routes possible 
Baker  Aircraft H1N1 (2009) Pandemic virus All routes possible 
Apisarnthanarak  Hospital ward H1N1 (2009) HCW providing direct care, pandemic virus Contact / Droplet 
Wong  
 
Hospital ward H3N2 (2008) Aerosol generating procedure and airflows 
 
Aerosol 
Cui  Train H1N1 (2009) Close contact and prolonged exposure 
associated with transmission 
All routes possible 
Piso  
 
Bus H1N1 (2009) Very low secondary attack rate All routes possible 
Magill 
 
Hospital H1N1 (2009) Transmission amongst HCWs significant All routes possible 
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Appendix 2.3: Summary of prospective non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) studies 
 
 
 
Study 
(Year) 
Study design Study aim 
(n=subjects 
analysed) 
Study setting / 
randomisation 
unit 
 
Study arms Main findings 
Talaat 
(2010) 
Cluster RCT Primary prevention 
(n=44451) 
Schools Hand hygiene / 
control 
Significant reductions in ILI absenteeism and lab 
confirmed influenza (A+B) 
Stebbins 
(2011) 
Cluster RCT Primary prevention 
(n=3360) 
Schools Hand + Respiratory 
Hygiene / Control 
Significant reductions in absenteeism and lab 
confirmed influenza A 
Aiello 
(2008) 
 
Cluster RCT Primary prevention 
(n=1297) 
University 
residences 
SFM / hand 
hygiene + SFM / 
control 
No difference in cumulative incidence of ILI. 
During study weeks 4-6, weekly ILI incidence 
reduced in SFM + hand hygiene vs. control 
Cowling 
(2009) 
Cluster RCT Secondary prevention 
(n=794) 
Households 
(including index 
cases) 
Hand hygiene / 
SFM + hand 
hygiene / control 
No difference in lab confirmed SAR between study 
arms. Some effect seen if interventions (hand 
hygiene + SFM) implemented within 36 hrs 
 
MacIntyre 
(2009) 
Cluster RCT Secondary prevention 
(n=286) 
Households SFM / respirator / 
control 
No difference in rate of ILI between arms. If 
compliant with mask use reductions in ILI seen 
with both masks 
Larso 
(2010) 
Block RCT Primary and secondary 
prevention 
(n= 2788) 
Households hand hygiene / 
hand hygiene + 
SFM / control 
No difference in rates of clinical infection (upper 
respiratory infections and influenza). SFM use 
associated with reduced SARs 
Simmerman 
(2011) 
RCT Secondary prevention 
(n=887) 
Households Hand hygiene / 
SFM + hand 
hygiene / control 
No difference in lab confirmed SAR between study 
arms 
Loeb 
(2009) 
RCT Comparative non-
inferiority (n=446) 
HCWs (in hospitals) SFM / Respirator SFMs were non-inferior to respirators in relation to 
rates of lab confirmed influenza 
MacIntyre 
(2011) 
Cluster RCT Comparative efficacy 
(n= 1441) 
Hospitals (HCWs) SFM / Fit tested 
Respirator / Non fit 
tested respirator 
Respirators were associated with an approximate 
halving of risk for all infection outcomes compared 
to SFMs, but after adjustment for clustering, the 
only significant finding was that non-fit-tested 
respirators were more protective against clinical 
respiratory infection. 
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Appendix 2.4: Summary of human influenza challenge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author 
(year) 
Study / 
Investigation 
 
Main Findings 
 
Henle  
(1946) 
Experimental 
infection 
Findings from over 200 volunteer exposures identified the route of inoculation as 
important; infection by inhalation led to fever much more frequently than did nasal 
instillation (89% vs. 13%). 
 
Alford 
(1966) 
Experimental 
infection initiated 
via aerosols 
23 volunteers inhaled 10 litres of an H2N2 aerosol delivered via a facemask. The dose 
of virus delivered ranged between 1-126 TCID50. Four volunteers developed clinical 
illness; virus was isolated from these and one other volunteer, whilst seroconversion 
was seen in seven including all those who exhibited illness. Noting limitations of the 
study design and making an assumption that only 60% of the aerosol load inhaled will 
reach the lower respiratory tract the study reports that half of the volunteers with very 
low pre-existing antibody titres were infected with 0.3-6 TCID50. 
 
Little 
(1979) 
Comparison of 
natural and 
experimental 
influenza 
 
Natural infections produced more fever, more cough and had a more marked effect on 
pulmonary function tests. 
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Appendix 2.5: Summary of animal transmission studies 
Author 
(date) 
Study / Investigation Main Findings 
 
Andrewes 
(1941) 
Experimental infection 
in ferrets 
 
Transmission occurred between ferrets housed in different cages and separated by distances that would 
arguably only permit aerosol spread. 
Schulman  
(1968) 
Experimental infection 
in mice 
Transmission was demonstrated between mice housed in the same and separate cages and the frequencies of 
transmitted infection were similar. One experiment allowed the ventilation in a cage housing Donors and 
Recipients to be altered; when ventilation was increased, infection rates decreased. These findings were 
interpreted as signifying that aerosol transmission was active. 
Lowen 
(2006) 
 
Transmission in guinea 
pigs 
A human H3N2 virus was shown to replicate well in guinea pigs after intranasal inoculation and transmission 
from infected to recipient animals occurred when animals were housed together or in separate cages (side by 
side and separated by 91cm). 
Lowen 
(2007) 
Investigation of the 
effect of humidity and 
temperature on 
transmission in ferrets 
Experiments on guinea pigs housed in an environmental chamber were conducted that only allowed for droplet 
or aerosol transmission. Low RH (20-30%) seemed to favour transmission while higher RH (80%) inhibited it. 
In another set of experiments transmission occurred at low temperature (50C) more frequently than higher 
temperatures (20 and 300C). 
Lowen 
(2008) 
Investigation of the 
effect of temperature on 
contact transmission in 
ferrets 
Recipient guinea pigs were placed in cages that had housed infected ones with ambient temperatures of 20 and 
300C. Transmission was seen to occur equally at both temperatures; the authors suggest that whilst droplet 
and aerosol transmission is reduced by high temperatures, contact transmission is not (as virus can be passed 
directly between animals it is not exposed to the outside environment). 
Mubareka 
(2009) 
Routes of transmission 
in guinea pigs 
The relative contributions of droplet/aerosol and fomite (contact) transmission were studied. Infected and 
recipient animals were placed in separate cages >80cm above each other and transmissions occurred. 
However, when recipient animals were placed in the cages of infected animals (infected animals were removed 
but fomites were not) less infection transmission was seen. 
Belser  
(2010) 
Review of molecular 
determinants of 
transmission  
The importance of the heamagglutinin and polymerase proteins in influencing transmission are highlighted 
Gustin  
(2011) 
Comparison of aerosol 
and intranasal 
inoculation of ferrets 
An aerosol inoculation system was devised. Aerosol inoculation caused a more natural influenza infection. 
Onward transmission was dependent on the level and duration of virus shedding. Viable virus was detected 
from infected ferrets in exhaled aerosols. 
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Appendix 2.6: Summary of modelling investigations 
Author 
(date) 
Study / Investigation Main Findings 
 
Atkinson 
(2008) 
Model to quantify role of 
aerosol, contact and droplet 
routes based on a household 
scenario 
7KH\IRXQGWKDWLPRVWWUDQVPLVVLRQVRFFXUHDUO\LQDQLQIHFWHGSHUVRQ¶VLOOQHVVLQIDFWRYHUKDOIRFFXULQWKHSUH-
symptomatic period; ii) a caregiver is twice as likely to be infected than a non-caregiver; iii) a very small 
proportion of virus exits on small aerosol particles; iv) virus survives in air longer than it does on hands and v) the 
infectious dose for virus in aerosols is much smaller than that in either droplets or settled particles. The model 
leads them to conclude that aerosol transmission is far more dominant than contact transmission. With regard to 
droplet transmission, they find that a well directed cough or sneeze carries an infection probability of 0.011 and 
0.981 respectively, though it must be stated that a well directed cough or sneeze may be a rare event. 
 
Nicas 
(2008) 
 
Investigation of the hand to 
face contact route of 
transmission 
The scenario was a caregiver attending a sick family member in a bedroom for 30 minutes. An infection risk due to 
hand contact of 0.011% was generated. 
 
Nicas 
(2009) 
Model to quantify routes of 
transmission based on a 
VFHQDULRRIYLVLWLQJDSDWLHQW¶V
room 
Important variables were considered to be i) infectious doses and ii) viral titres. When the URT:LRT infectious dose 
ratio is 3200:1 contact, aerosol and droplet routes all contribute substantially to infection risk. With rising viral 
titres contact and aerosol become more significant. When the ability of virus to reach target cells is taken into 
account aerosol transmission assumes dominance. 
 
Wagner 
(2009) 
Risk assessment of aerosol 
transmission aboard an 
airplane 
The authors find that proximity and duration of exposure to the source and passenger density are important 
factors. Up to 17 infections could be caused during a 17 hour flight. 
 
Spicknall 
(2010) 
Model to quantify routes of 
transmission 
The indirect contact mode of transmission appeared dominant. However, the authors explain that this is not 
necessarily the case in all settings. Out of 10,000 model runs indirect contact was dominant in 3079, respiratory in 
121 and droplet in 66. Furthermore, considerable overlap is also seen where modes appear co-dominant, this 
occurred in 1969 sets. Further analyses were then performed to identify specific parameters that determine 
transmission intensity; these included infectious doses, shedding magnitude (amount of virus present in the 
environment) and host density. 
 
Myatt 
(2010) 
Model to assess the effect of 
humidity on virus survival 
Based on 2 storey house, portable humidifiers could potentially increase absolute and relative humidities to achieve 
reductions in airborne influenza virus survival of up to 31% in a single room and 14% in the entire house. 
 
Teunis 
(2011) 
Model to quantify routes of 
transmission 
Infectious dose data from influenza challenge studies are used in the construct of a model that simulates infection 
from a patient in a poorly ventilated room. Infection droplets and aerosols are approximately equal. 
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Appendix 2.7: Summary of evidence for routes of influenza transmission 
Evidence Indirect Contact Droplet Aerosol 
Direct Contact Inhalation 
Plausibility Virus can survive on fomites and 
hands but transmission must 
overcome several hurdles to occur 
and because of this the process 
appears tenuous. Few data are 
available to show viable virus exists 
on hands or fomites in natural 
conditions 
 
Virus is present and can survive on 
droplets. The bigger the droplet the 
higher the titre of virus that can be 
present. This is important as the URT 
requires a high infectious dose. 
However, the chance of a droplet 
reaching its target cell is low 
Virus is present and can survive on 
droplets. The bigger the droplet the 
higher the titre of virus that can be 
present. This is important as the URT 
requires a high infectious dose. 
However, it would require a perfectly 
directed cough or sneeze to enable 
this route. Larger droplets cannot 
penetrate the LRT 
 
Virus is present and can survive on 
aerosols. Low titres of virus may be 
present but this may be compensated 
by the ability to penetrate the LRT 
where lower infectious doses are 
required.  Few data are available to 
show viable virus exists on aerosols 
in natural conditions 
Outbreak 
investigations 
µ&ORVHFRQWDFW¶LGHQWLILHGDV
important but difficult to distinguish 
between routes as all can act at 
short range 
µ&ORVHFRQWDFW¶LGHQWLILHGDVLPSRUWDQWEXWGLIILFXOWWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ
routes as all can act at short range 
µ&ORVHFRQWDFW¶LGHQWLILHGDVLPSRUWDQW
but difficult to distinguish between 
routes as all can act at short range. 
However, circumstances in three 
studies appear to support the 
existence of the aerosol route 
Interventions The HAND HYGIENE study by Talaat 
et al provides convincing data that 
this route of transmission is 
significant 
 
SFMs show some effectiveness at reducing transmission but we are unable to 
say whether droplet, indirect contact or both are interrupted 
Respirators appear no more effective 
than SFMs at reducing transmission 
suggesting a minor role for aerosol 
Challenge studies Virus has been recovered from 
fomites around experimentally 
infected volunteers but no studies 
have been done specifically 
assessing contact transmission 
Infection can be initiated following direct nasal inoculation. The URT appears 
to need a higher infectious dose than the LRT. Nasally applied zanamivir does 
not prevent infection 
Infection can be initiated by 
inhaling/respiring aerosols. The URT 
appears to need a higher infectious 
dose than the LRT. Inhaled zanamivir 
prevents experimental (intranasal) 
infection but not natural infection. 
Animal studies Does not appear significant but 
cannot infer that this is the case in 
humans 
µ&ORVHFRQWDFW¶LGHQWLILHGDVLPSRUWDQWEXWGLIILFXOWWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ
routes as all can act 
Convincingly shown to be active in 
several studies 
Modelling Support for this route is apparent 
but relies heavily on assumptions 
 
Support for this route is limited based on assumptions made that reaching 
target cells is problematic 
Support for this route is apparent but 
relies heavily on assumptions 
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Appendix 4.1: Recruitment Leaflet 
 
 
      
 
If you or any of your family have flu 
we need your help! 
 
Should you or other members of your family / household become unwell 
with symptoms such as cough, fever, sore throat, tiredness and runny 
nose over the next few weeks, we would like to invite you to take part in 
some medical research being run by the University of Nottingham. 
 
The Department of Health has provided funding for this vital research. The 
study involves a nurse or doctor visiting daily to collect a nose swab and 
swabs from some surfaces in your home. Your help is really important to 
us. We hope to improve our understanding of how swine flu is spread 
which may lead to fewer people becoming infected. 
 
So, if you or any family or household member develops flu-like symptoms 
and you/they feel able to take part in our study, please ring us and speak 
to one of our team. We are looking for people who have had symptoms for 
no more than 2 days so please call as soon as you think you are unwell. It 
does not matter whether medication is being taken or not. 
 
 
Keep this card and call 0115 823 1813 anytime 
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Appendix 4.2: Eligibility criteria 
 
 
DATE:  ____ /____ / 2009 Participant Code =  
 
 Yes / Positive No / Negative 
   
Consent   
   
Symptoms;   
Fever   
Cough   
Sore throat   
Headache   
Fatigue    
Runny nose   
 Fever + 1 other 
          or 
 2 of the above 
  
   
Symptoms for <48 hrs  
(Community) 
  
Symptoms for < 96 hrs  
(Hospital) 
  
   
Near Patient Test for 
influenza done? 
  
 If Yes, positive or 
negative? 
  
Specific test for  swine flu   
 If Yes, positive or 
negative? 
  
   
Any other household member 
with symptoms? 
  
   
Taken part in other influenza 
research testing medicinal 
products in last 3 months? 
  
   
 
If only Green Boxes ticked = Eligible 
Any Red boxes ticked = Not Eligible 
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Appendix 4.3A: Adult Information Sheet 
 
Study title;  
Virus shedding and environmental deposition of influenza virus 
 
You are being invited to take part in this University of Nottingham 
sponsored medical research.  Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully.  
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the research project? 
There are some things that we do not know about how influenza is passed 
from person to person, for example how much virus exists on surfaces and 
how much is carried in the air. Such things are important to know because 
they might affect the advice that is given to healthcare workers about 
controlling the spread of infection to themselves and other patients. 
Similarly, this information is important for people who look after others in 
the home environment.  
 
One way to try and gain information is to ask patients who get flu to help 
us by agreeing to give a daily nose swab sample for just over 1 week so 
we can see how much virus is in the nose day by day and how quickly this 
disappears. At the same time we will take samples from hard surfaces in a 
SDWLHQW¶VURRPRUKRPHDQGVDPSOHWKHDLUXVLQJDVSHFLDOILOWHUGHYLFH:H
can then work out how much virus is being released, how long the 
infectious period is and whether surfaces are more or less important than 
the air that we breathe (in terms of catching the virus). 
 
The study involves a simple daily nasal swab and subjects who agree to 
take part will be inconvenienced to some extent. However, the technique 
of sampling from the nose is quick and not painful and should not present 
any problems. Normal medical care will not be affected in any way.  
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The team has been performing this kind of work for some time and is well 
qualified and experienced to carry out the study. Several members of the 
study team are leading international experts on influenza.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen as you may have influenza.  
This trial will include about 100 adults and children from Nottingham, 
Leicester and Sheffield. We are recruiting patients both from the 
community and in hospital. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. If you do, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be 
asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision 
not to take part, will not affect the standard of care you receive. If you do 
withdraw, we will ask why, as it might be important for other people, but 
\RXGRQ¶WKDYHWRJLYHDUHDVRQLI\RXGRQ¶WZDQWWR  
 
What will happen to me if we agree to take part? 
If you choose to take part, the care you receive will not be different from 
that should you choose not to take part. You will be asked to sign a 
consent form. You will be given a copy of the information sheet and signed 
consent form to keep for your records. 
 
We will confirm your entry into the study following a few questions. We 
will ask about your symptoms and their duration and if anyone else in your 
household has been ill. If your answers fit our criteria we will do two tests 
to try and confirm that you have influenza. Both tests involve a nose 
swab; one test will be done whilst we are with you. These tests are only 
being done for research purposes, though they might be helpful to your 
doctor. If so, we will let them know the results (with your consent). 
 
If eligible, you will be involved in the trial for a maximum of 10 days and a 
minimum of 7. The number of days will depend on how long you have had 
symptoms before we meet you. If we meet on the day your symptoms 
begin we would like to visit every day for 10 days. If we meet 2 days after 
symptoms begin we will visit every day for 8 days. A member of the 
research team will carry out the visit; the person will usually be a nurse 
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but maybe another healthcare professional. All staff will have undergone 
the necessary checks and training needed to conduct such work. We will 
arrange appointment times with you.  
 
We would like to visit you every day during the study and perform the 
following procedures (in addition to what has been mentioned above 
already); 
¾ Symptom assessment ± At the first visit you will be asked to 
complete a number of assessment forms that cover your medical 
history and current symptoms. Subsequently we will ask you to 
complete a diary of your symptoms. You will complete a simple 
chart which asks whether you are feeling certain symptoms and 
how severe they are. In addition to this we will take an oral 
temperature reading. 
¾ Nose swab ± A large cotton bud will be used to take a swab from 
the inside of the nose; it does not need to go very far back! This 
will be collected once every day (except on the first day when it 
might be done three times). 
¾ Surface sampling ± We have already chosen a number of common 
household and hospital room surfaces that we would like to swab, 
e.g. taps, door handles, remote control. We want to see if we can 
find influenza virus on these surfaces. We will take swabs every 
other day when we visit. You will be randomly split into two groups 
for this; Group 1 will have swabs done on Days 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9. 
Group 2 will be done on Days 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10. 
 
¾ Air sampling ± For a few patients we would like to conduct some air 
sampling in the room in which they spend most time. This involves 
running 2 small machines that suck in air and collect air particles. 
We want to see if we can find influenza virus in these particles. The 
machines will stand in a room and run for a maximum of 3 hours. 
They do make a small amount of noise. This will be done every 
other day during the study. A member of the research team will be 
present to set the machine up and collect it afterwards. 
 
Each of the visits will last for up to 1 hour except when air sampling is 
performed (see above) which will take longer. The researcher may set up 
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the air sampling equipment, leave it running and then return before if 
finishes. 
 
If you have been recruited in hospital and are later sent home, we would 
wish to follow you up at home for the remainder of the study period. 
Similarly, if you have been recruited in the community and need to be 
admitted to hospital we would follow you up in hospital. 
 
This study will not interfere with the normal medical care you may receive. 
This includes the use of any medicines, e.g. antivirals  
 
If for any reason you lose the capacity to consent during the study (e.g. 
the remote possibility that they are admitted to hospital and need to be 
sedated to help with breathing) we have included a box in the consent 
form to tick if you are happy for us to continue with our sampling during 
this period. 
 
Initially your diagnosis of flu is likely to have been made on clinical 
grounds, i.e. the symptoms that you have. Doctors may have done a test 
to confirm this diagnosis (this may be different from the test we might 
have done initially on the nose swab). If flu is confirmed you will remain in 
the study but should this test come back negative for flu we will not 
perform any further sampling on or around you and you will be excluded 
from the study. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no specific treatment benefit as we will not influence your normal 
care. The work as a whole is seeking to provide information on influenza 
infection that could improve the way we deal with it, particularly from an 
infection control point of view and the public will benefit from this. You 
may gain some reassurance from the fact that a member of the research 
team will be visiting each day. However, as stated above they would not 
interfere directly with normal medical care. Of course, should there be any 
concerns they will raise them with you or your family so that you can 
contact your GP or other responsible medical professional. 
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Contact details 
If you have any problems, concerns or other questions about this trial, you 
should contact the research member of staff who visits each day. If you 
have any complaints about the way the research staff are carrying out the 
study you can make a complaint to the study Chief Investigator, Professor 
Jonathan Van-Tam, Clinical Sciences Building, City Hospital, Hucknall 
Road, Nottingham, NG5 1PB. Tel 0115 823 0276. 
 
:KDWZLOOKDSSHQLI,GRQ¶WZDQWWRFDUU\RQZLWKWKHWULDO" 
You can withdraw from the study at any time but it would be best to stay 
in contact with us and keep to the study assessments if possible. We will 
ask for your reasons for withdrawing, as they might be important for other 
SHRSOH<RXGRQ¶WKDYHWRJLYHDQ\UHDVRQVLI\RXGRQ¶WZDQWWR 
 
What if there is a problem? 
In the event that something goes wrong and you are harmed during the 
trial the University of Nottingham carries insurance to make sure that if 
any participant incurs any unexpected adverse event that leads to their 
being harmed and that the event occurred as a consequence of the 
protocol (i.e. non-negligent harm), then the participant will be 
compensated. In addition, all research staff have their own professional 
indemnity insurance which will cover any unexpected adverse event that 
leads to participant harm caused by negligence. 
 
This study will be conducted in accordance with International 
Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) Good Clinical Practice (GCP) 
guidelines (directive CPMP/ICH/135/95), local regulatory requirements 
and the declaration of Helsinki, and all relevant local laws and 
regulations. 
 
Will my participation in this trial be kept confidential? 
When you enter the trial the researcher will record information about your 
illness, medical history and the subsequent course of the illness. Some of 
this information may be taken from your medical notes (if you are in 
hospital). Collection and analysis of this information is an important part of 
the research. Your contact details will also be recorded but will be kept 
separate from the study data on a secure database.  
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The results of the trial will be published in medical journals and sent to 
regulatory authorities. However, all identifying personal details will be kept 
strictly confidential and no information will be published or given out 
through which you could be identified. 
 
What will happen to the results of the trial? 
Any results will be presented to the Department of Health in the first 
instance. Subsequently, results may be presented at scientific medical 
meetings and published in a leading medical journal and possibly in 
national and local media too. You will not be individually identified in any 
report or publication. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The University of Nottingham is organising this study. The NHS Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA) Programme has provided the research 
grant and no member of the research team are being directly paid for 
including you in this study. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The trial was peer reviewed before funding by the HTA. This study was 
given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct in the public-health sector 
by the Leicester 1Research Ethics Committee, and was approved by the 
local NHS Trust Research & Development departments. 
 
You will be given a copy of this Adult Information Sheet and a copy 
of the signed Consent Form to keep. 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO READ THIS INFORMATION 
SHEET
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Appendix 4.3B: Young person information sheet 
 
Young Person Information Sheet (9-15 year olds) 
A Study To Find Out How Much Flu Is Around You
 
What is research?  
Research helps us to improve 
how much we know about things. 
This study is research to find out 
how much flu people carry 
around with them when they are 
ill. 
 
Your invitation: 
Would you like to be in this trial?  
 
Before you decide, read this 
leaflet carefully. Talk about it 
with your family, friends, doctor 
or nurse.   
 
$VNXVLIWKHUHLVDQ\WKLQJWKDW¶V
not clear or if you want to know 
more. 
 
Why have I been asked to 
help? 
Because you are unwell with flu. 
50 children aged 0 to 16 years 
will be helping. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
1R,W¶VXSWR\RX If you do help, 
you can still pull out at any time. 
If you do decide to stop this 
ZRQ¶WXSVHWDQ\RQH,I\RXGR
pull out, we will ask you why, as 
it might be important for other  
 
 
\RXQJSHRSOH<RXGRQ¶WKDYHWR
JLYHDUHDVRQLI\RXGRQ¶WZDQW
to.  
 
What will happen to me? 
We would like to take a sample 
from your nose using a cotton 
bud and we will take some 
samples from objects and even 
the air around you. When we 
take samples from your nose it 
ZRQ¶WKXUW 
 
 
 
We will also ask you to answer 
some questions about how you 
are feeling each day and we will 
take your temperature. 
 
We will visit you every day, for 
about 10 days. You may be in 
hospital or at home, we will 
follow you wherever you go! 
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You will be visited by a member 
of our team, usually a nurse. 
They will make appointments to 
see you and your parents. 
 
Might anything else about the 
research upset me? 
:HGRQ¶WWKLQNVR 
 
Will joining in help me? 
,WZRQ¶WKHOSWRPDNH\RXEHWWHU
faster but the information we get 
might help us prevent other 
people from catching flu. 
 
What happens when the trial 
stops? 
Nothing! You should be feeling 
better and we have the samples 
we need. 
 
What if something goes 
wrong? 
Any trouble you or your parents 
have will be looked into. Details 
about this are in the Parent / 
Guardian Information Sheet. 
 
Will my medical details be 
kept private? Will anyone else 
know? 
Yes. Some people (called 
research inspectors) may see 
your medical notes to make sure 
the study is done properly.  
 
:KDWLI,GRQ¶WZDQWWRGRWKH
trial anymore? 
You and your parents can pull out 
of the trial treatment at any time. 
 
You will have a copy of this 
Information Sheet to keep. 
 
THANKS FOR READING THIS ± 
please ask us anything you want. 
 
Contact details: 
If you have any worries or 
questions, please tell your 
parents.  
 
You can also contact; 
Study Doctor:  
Prof Jonathan Van-Tam 
0115 823 0276
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Appendix 4.3C: Child information sheet
 
Child Information Sheet (0-8 year olds) 
 
A Study To Find Out How Much Flu Is Around You 
 
Your invitation: 
Can you help us do this study?  
 
Talk about it with your family, 
friends, doctor or nurse.   
 
And ask us lots of questions! 
 
Why have I been asked to 
help? 
Because you are unwell with flu. 
50 children aged 0 to 16 years 
will be helping.  
    
 
Do I have to take part? 
No! ,W¶VXSWR\RX If you do help, 
you can change your mind later. 
7KLVZRQ¶WXSVHWDQ\RQH 
 
What will happen to me? 
We would like to take a sample 
from your nose using a cotton 
bud and we will take some 
samples from objects and even 
the air around you. When we 
take samples from your nose it 
ZRQ¶WKXUW 
 
We will visit you every day, for 
about 10 days. You may be in 
hospital or at home, we will 
follow you wherever you go! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You will be visited by a member 
of our team, usually a nurse. 
They will make appointments to 
see you and your parents. 
 
Will joining in help me? 
,WZRQ¶WKHOSWRPDNH\RXEHWWHU
faster but the information we get 
might help us prevent other 
people from catching flu. 
 
What if something goes 
wrong? 
Any trouble you or your parents 
have will be looked into. Details 
about this are in the Parent / 
Guardian Information Sheet. 
 
Will my medical details be 
kept private? Will anyone else 
know? 
Yes. Some people (called 
research inspectors) may see 
your medical notes to make sure 
the study is done properly. 
 
 
:KDWLI,GRQ¶WZDQWWRGRWKH
trial anymore? 
You and your parents can pull out 
of the trial treatment at any time. 
 
You will have a copy of this 
Information Sheet to keep 
 
 
 
THANKS FOR READING THIS ±  
please ask us anything you want. 
 
Contact details: 
If you have any worries or 
questions, please tell your 
parents. You can also contact; 
 
Study Doctor: Prof Jonathan Van-
Tam - 0115 823 0276. 
 
 
 247 
 
Appendix 4.4A: Adult consent form 
 
 
CONSENT FORM (adults) 
 
Virus Shedding Study 
 
Virus shedding and environmental deposition of influenza virus  
 
 
Patient Identification Number for this trial: ____________        Please 
Initial Boxes 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information 
sheet for the above study dated 21 October 2010 (version 
1.2). I have had the opportunity to consider the information, 
ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily 
 
2. I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I am 
free to pull out at any time, without giving any reason, 
without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and 
data collected during the study may be looked at by 
members of the research team, responsible individuals from 
the University of Nottingham (inspectors) or regulatory 
authorities where it is relevant to my taking part in this 
research. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my records. 
 
4. I agree that should I lose the capacity to consent during the 
study, my full participation in it can continue. 
 
5. I agree to my GP/hospital clinician being informed of my 
taking part in the study. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the study. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________      _____________    ________________ 
Name of person             Date          Signature 
 
 
_________________________      _____________    ________________ 
Name of person taking consent       Date          Signature
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Appendix 4.4B: Parent/Guardian consent form 
 
 
CONSENT FORM (Parent / Guardian) 
 
Virus Shedding Study 
 
 
Virus shedding and environmental deposition of influenza virus  
 
 
Patient Identification Number for this trial: _______    Please Initial Boxes 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information 
sheet for the above study, dated 21 October 2010 (version 
1.2). I have had the opportunity to consider the information, 
ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily 
 
2. ,XQGHUVWDQGWKDWP\FKLOG¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVYROXQWDU\DQG
that they are free to withdraw at any time, without giving 
any reason, without their medical care or legal rights being 
affected 
 
3. ,XQGHUVWDQGWKDWUHOHYDQWVHFWLRQVRIP\FKLOG¶VPHGLFDO
notes and data collected during the study may be looked at 
by members of the research team, responsible individuals 
from the University of Nottingham (inspectors) or regulatory 
authorities where it is relevant to his / her taking part in this 
research. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to their records 
 
4. ,DJUHHWRP\FKLOG¶V*3KRVSLWDOFOLQLFLDQEHLQJLQIRUPHGRI
their taking part in the study. 
 
5. I agree to my child taking part in the study. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________      _____________        _______________ 
Name of person                   Date      Signature 
 
 
_________________________      _____________        _______________ 
Name of person taking consent       Date      Signature
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Appendix 4.5: Symptom Diary Card 
Subject Number 
    
 
Subject Initials 
   
 
Date  
    2 0   
 
Time of Day:   ____:____   (24 hour) 
Day: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 10 11 12 
WůĂĐĞĂŶ ?y ?ŝŶƚŚĞďŽǆŝŶĞĂĐŚsymptom row that best describes how you have felt since completing your last diary card.  Grade your symptoms based on the descriptions provided.  
Use the space to the right to note down any other symptoms you have. 
Level 0 1 2 3 Other Symptoms: 
Symptoms: I have NO 
symptoms 
Just noticeable /ƚ ?ƐĐůĞĂƌůǇďŽƚŚĞƌƐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵ
ƚŝŵĞƚŽƚŝŵĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐƚŽƉ
me from participating in 
activities 
/ƚ ?ƐƋƵŝƚĞďŽƚŚĞƌƐŽŵĞŵŽƐƚŽƌĂůůŽĨ
the time, and it stops me from 
participating in activities 
 
Runny Nose      
Stuffy Nose      
Sneezing       
Sore Throat      
Earache      
Sinus Tenderness      
Malaise (tiredness)      
Cough      
Shortness of breath      
Diarrhoea      
Vomiting      
Headache      
Muscles and/or joint ache      
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Appendix 4.6: Laboratory methods 
 
PCR 
Nucleic acid was extracted from the samples using the Qiagen Symphony 
SP extractor mini kits, including on-board lysis and a bacteriophage (MS2) 
internal control. A novel influenza A H1N1 pentaplex assay was devised to 
detect virus genome in the samples. The assay was designed to detect 
novel H1N1 influenza A, seasonal H1 influenza A, seasonal H3 influenza A, 
influenza B and the internal control, MS2. Reactions were carried out on a 
RotorgeneTM 6000 (Corbett Research) real-time DNA detection system. 
Viral load data were generated using the PCR assay and plasmids 
containing the gene target to create a standard curve, such that the 
concentration of genome present in each sample could be calculated. 
 
The primers and probes used were as follows: 
Primers 
Novel H1N1 influenza A (Metabion): 
 +)256:¶-TCA ACA GAC ACT GTA GAC ACA GTA CT-¶ 
 +5(96:¶-GTT TCC CGT TAT GCT TGT CTT CTA G-¶ 
Seasonal H1 influenza A (MWG Biotech): 
 $+)RUZDUG¶-GGA ATA GCC CCC CTA CAA TTG-¶ 
 $+5HYHUVH¶-AAT TCG CAT TCT GGG TTT CCT A-¶ 
Seasonal H3 influenza A (MWG Biotech): 
 $+)RUZDUG¶-CCT TTT TGT TGA ACG CAG CAA-¶ 
 $+5HYHUVH¶-CGG ATG AGG CAA CTA GTG ACC TA-¶ 
Influenza B (Metabion): 
 BNP-)¶-GCA GCT CTG ATG TCC ATC AAG CT-¶ 
 BNP-5¶-CAG CTT GCT TGC TTA RAG CAA TAG GTC T-¶ 
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MS2 control (MWG Biotech): 
 06)RUZDUG¶-TGG CAC TAC CCC TCT CCG TAT TCA CG -¶ 
 065HYHUVH¶-GTA CGG GCG ACC CCA CGA TGT=A C-¶ 
 
Probes 
Novel H1N1 influenza A (Metabion): 
 +6:S¶-Cy5-AAT GTA ACA GTA ACA CAC T CTG TTA ACC BHQ-
¶ 
Seasonal H1 influenza A (ABI): 
 $+3UREH¶)$0CGT TGC CGG ATG GA-MGBNFQ-¶ 
Seasonal H3 influenza A (ABI): 
 $+3UREH¶9,&-CCT ACA GCA ACT GTT ACC-MGBNFQ-¶ 
Influenza B (Biosearch Technologies): 
 Flu-%3UREH¶4XDVDU-CCA GAT CTG GTC ATT GGR GCC CAR 
AAC TG-BHQ-2-¶ 
MS2 control (Metabion): 
 063UREH¶52;-CAC ATC GAT AGA TCA AGG TGC CTA CAA GC-
BHQ-2-¶ 
 
RT-PCR protocol: 
RT - PCR reactions comprised of 5µl of RNA and 20µl of mastermix (see 
table below). Primer probes were present at concentrations of 0.04 (AH1), 
0.08 (Flu-B) and 0.08 (MS2) pmol/µl in the reaction mix. Cycles were 
performed as follows: reverse transcription at 50°C for 30 minutes, 
denaturation at 95°C for 2 minutes and then 50 cycles of 95°C for 15 
seconds and 60°C for 60 seconds. 
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Stock concentration (pmol/µl) Volume of stock/reaction 
(µl) 
H1FORSW (20pmol/µl) 0.5 
H1REVSW (20pmol/µl) 0.5 
AH1 Forward (50pmol/µl) 0.45 
AH1 Reverse (50pmol/µl) 0.45 
AH3 Forward (50pmol/µl) 0.45 
AH3 Reverse (50pmol/µl) 0.45 
BNP-F (20pmol/µl) 0.25 
BNP-R (20 pmol/µl) 0.25 
MS2 Forward (20pmol/µl) 0.1 
MS2 Reverse (20 pmol/µl) 0.1 
H1SWp3 (10pmol/µl) 0.2 
AH1 Probe (10pmol/µl) 0.1 
AH3 Probe (10pmol/µl) 0.1 
Flu-B Probe (10pmol/µl) 0.2 
MS2 Probe (10pmol/µl) 0.2 
2 x RT Platinum buffer (Invitrogen) 12.5 
Superscript III Platinum enzyme 0.5 
Water 2.7 
Total volume: 20 
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Culture 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 did not readily form plaques on MDCK cells so 
an immunofluorescence (IF) assay was used to detect the influenza A/B 
nucleoprotein in order to demonstrate the presence of live replicating virus 
in the swab samples.  Assays were performed on samples that were PCR 
positive. On occasions if a swab was IF positive on a given day (e.g. Day 
5) then an assumption was made that previous days (e.g.1-4) would also 
have been positive and no testing on these days was done. 
 
Madin Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cells were used to propagate the 
virus.  Initially, cells were plated onto 6 well tissue culture dishes at a 
concentration of 7.5 x 105/well; after 24 hours incubation the samples 
were defrosted. The cells were washed x2 in serum free medium (SFM, 
Dulbeccos Modified Eagles Medium, DMEM) and 400 µl of each sample 
applied to the respective well. After 30 minutes the cells were overlaid 
with 2mL serum free medium containing 0.14% Foetal Calf Serum (FCS) 
DQG:RUWKLQJWRQ¶V7U\SVLQGLOXWLRQVRILQIOXHQ]D$+1
human influenza virus A/PuertoRico/8/34) and a novel H1N1 influenza A 
isolate (A H1N1 Cambridge AHO4/2009) were also inoculated onto cells as 
positive controls. The cells were then incubated for 48 hours at 37°C. The 
following day, 24-well tissue culture dishes were seeded with 1 x 105 
MDCK cells per well; 48 hours later virus was harvested. Two dilutions 
were made in serum free medium, 1:2 and 1:10 (Yr1 only). After washing 
the cells in the 24-well dishes x 2 in SFM, 250 µl of each dilution was 
added to the appropriate well.  
 
Following 30 minutes incubation at 37°C, 1 mL of overlay (as before) was 
added to each well and the cells incubated overnight. After overnight 
incubation, the virus dilutions were aspirated off the cells. The cells were 
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washed x 2 with phosphate buffered saline (PBS) and then fixed with 250 
µl of 4% formaldehyde at room temperature for 20 minutes. The fix was 
aspirated off and the cells washed x3 with blocking solution (1% FCS in 
PBS). The cells were permeabilised in detergent (0.2% Triton x100 in PBS) 
and then washed x2 in block solution. 250 µl of a mouse monoclonal 
antibody (for influenza A = Abcam ab43821, 1:1000 dilution Year1, 1:500 
dilution Year2 ; influenza B = Abcam ab54142, 1:1000 dilution) was added 
to each well and the plates incubated 60 minutes before washing x3 with 
blocking solution. The secondary antibody (goat anti-mouse 488 IgG2a, 
Molecular Probes) was diluted 1:1000 in blocking solution, and 4, 6 
diamino-2-phenylindole (DAPI) diluted 1:2000. 250 µl of this mix was 
added to the cells. Incubation was in the dark for 30 ± 45 minutes. Cells 
were washed thoroughly with blocking solution, left in PBS and examined 
on the fluorescence microscope.
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Appendix 5.1A: Study Schedule ± Donors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDY DAYS 
Donors 
Panel 
Screen 
Study 
Specific 
Screen 
Day -2 
Quarantine 
start 
Day -1 Day 0 Pre 
Influenza 
challenge 
Day 0 Post 
Influenza 
challenge 
1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) Day 28 
Follow 
up 
Written consent X X             
Medical history /inclusion 
criteria 
X X X            
Admit to Quarantine   X            
Influenza serology blood   X*   X* X (X)          X 
Coagulation  X (X)      X  X  (X) X 
Cardiac iso-enzymes  X (X)      X  X  (X) X 
Interval medical history   X (X)           
Directed physical exam   X X X X** X X X X X X (X)  
Complete physical exam  X X X        X (X) X 
Symptom diary card   X BD X X BD BD BD BD BD BD (BD)  
Otoscopy   X X X X X X X X X X (X) X 
AEs + Con Meds   X X X X X X X X X X (X) X 
Nasal wash  X X  (X)   X X X X X X (X) X 
Throat swab  X X (X)   X X X X X X (X) X 
Clinical *haematology & 
*biochemistry 
 X (X) 
 
   
 
FBC 
only 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 (X) X 
Dipstick urine  X (X)      X  X  (X) X 
3UHJQDQF\ǃ+&*XULQH  X X  X        (X) X 
HIV, Hep B & C screening  X             
Pulse/BP/RR  X BD QDS X TDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS (X) X 
Oral temperature  X BD QDS X TDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS (X)  
ECG  X (X)    X X X X X X (X) X 
Spirometry  X (X)  X  X X X X X X (X) X 
Class A drug screening  X X (X) (X)  (X) (X) (X) (X)  (X) (X)   
Alcohol + Nicotine screening  X X (X) (X)  (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X)   
Oseltamivir administration          X X X X  
 
Challenge 
 
Discharge Exposure Event 
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Appendix 5.1B: Study Schedule - Recipients 
 
 
 
 
STUDY DAYS 
RECIPIENTS 
Panel 
Screen 
Study 
Specific 
Screen 
Day 0 
Quarantine 
starts  
 
Day 1 Day 2 Pre 
Influenza 
exposure 
Day 2 
 
  
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (11) 
 
Day 28 
Follow 
up 
Written consent X X               
Medical history /inclusion 
criteria 
X X X              
Admit to Quarantine   X              
Influenza serology blood X* X* X (X)            X 
Coagulation  X (X)    X  X  X  X  (X) X 
Cardiac iso-enzymes  X (X)    X  X  X  X  (X) X 
Interval medical history   X (X)             
Directed physical exam   X X X X X X X X X X X X (X)  
Complete physical exam  X X X          X (X) X 
Symptom diary card   X BD X X BD BD BD BD BD BD BD BD (BD)  
Otoscopy   X X X X X X X X X X X X (X) X 
AEs + Con Meds   X X X X X X X X X X X X (X) X 
Nasal wash  X X   (X) X X X X X X X X X (X) X 
Throat swab  X X  (X) X X X X X X X X X (X) X 
Clinical *haematology & 
*biochemistry 
 X (X)    
 
FBC 
only 
 
 
X  
 
FBC 
only 
 
 
X 
 
 (X) 
 
X 
 
Dipstick urine  X (X)      X    X  (X) X 
3UHJQDQF\ǃ+&*XULQH  X X  X          (X) X 
HIV, Hep B & C screening  X               
Pulse/BP/RR  X BD QDS X TDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS (X) X 
Oral temperature  X BD QDS X TDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS QDS (X)  
ECG  X (X)    X X X X X X X X (X) X 
Spirometry  X (X)  X  X X X X X X X X (X)  
Class A drug screening  X X (X) (X)  (X) (X) (X) (X)  (X) (X) (X) (X)   
Alcohol + Nicotine 
screening 
 X X (X) (X)  (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X)   
Oseltamivir 
administration 
           X X X X  
Key: (X) = conducted at discretion of Study Physician; X = once daily; X* = conducted either at Panel screening &/or Study Specific screening visit; X** = 8 hours after  
challenge / exposure; QDS = 4 times a day; TDS = 3 times a day; BD = 2 times a day; FBC = Full Blood Count; *haematology & *biochemistry = abnormal results may be 
followed up by additional blood draws as deemed necessary by the CI 
Discharge Exposure Event 
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Appendix 5.2: Participant information sheet 
 
Protocol title:  STUDY 1 Proof of concept: Confirming the 
Transmissibility of Experimentally Induced 
Influenza Infection Using an Approved GMP 
Challenge Virus 
Protocol No.:   ITSDG 001, Final Version 4.0 20Jan2009 
Protocol Sponsor:  University of Nottingham 
Chief Investigator:  Professor Jonathan Van-Tam 
Study Coordinating Site: Retroscreen Virology Limited 
                                                
 
Introduction 
You have been invited to participate in a research study involving a virus 
that causes influenza in healthy adults. The virus is called Influenza A. 
Before agreeing to participate, it is important that you take time to read 
and understand this form. It describes why the study is being done, what 
will happen to you if you participate, what the risks or benefits may be, 
and what your rights are, whether or not you choose to participate. This 
study is carried out under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Van-Tam. 
Other professional persons (doctors, nurses, and technical persons) will 
assist him. If you have any questions, now or later, be sure to ask for an 
explanation. 
 
Influenza A (H3N2) virus 
7KHGLVHDVHEHLQJVWXGLHGLV,QIOXHQ]D$DOVRNQRZQDVWKH³IOX´
Influenza is a viral disease of the respiratory tract. Typical influenza illness 
is characterised by an abrupt onset of fever, headache, myalgia (muscle 
aches), sore throat and cough. In healthy adults the illness usually 
resolves without any treatment, with relief of symptoms occurring 
naturally within 5 to 7 days.  
 
Influenza virus is spread by inhaling droplets that have been coughed or 
sneezed out by an infected person or by having direct contact with an 
infected person's secretions from the nose. Handling household items or 
surfaces that have been contaminated by an infected person or an infected 
person's secretions may also spread the virus. Influenza causes annual 
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worldwide epidemics which in England typically occur from October to 
April. There is also currently concern about the possible emergence of 
pandemic influenza which would have a global impact. The virus infects all 
age groups; but the elderly, the weak or individuals with breathing 
difficulties or heart disease are at most danger. There are effective 
treatments and vaccines for Influenza. Approved treatments for Influenza 
include antiviral medications called Tamiflu (oseltamivir), Relenza 
(zanamivir) and amantadine. Retroscreen Virology has conducted 
Influenza studies in over 250 people to date in order to further study the 
Influenza virus and to conduct research into additional effective 
WUHDWPHQWVDQGYDFFLQHVDJDLQVWµ)OX¶ 
 
What is the purpose of this research study? 
The aim of this study is to find out whether the influenza virus we use to 
infect subjects is transmissible to other subjects. Some volunteers will be 
infected with the virus by instilling droplets in the nose (Donors). When 
Donors develop symptoms of flu, other volunteers (Recipients) will then be 
exposed to them by occupying the same room and taking part in certain 
procedures. If transmission of infection from Donors to Recipients can be 
demonstrated, it will allow for further studies looking at the mechanisms 
and routes of transmission and ways to reduce it. 
 
What organisation reviews the study?  
The Plymouth Independent Ethics Committee has reviewed the proposed 
research project and consent form and have given their favourable opinion 
for the project to take place. 
 
What organisation is paying for the study? 
This study is sponsored by the University of Nottingham and funded by the 
UK Department of Health. Retroscreen Virology Ltd will be carrying out the 
study. 
 
Procedures during the study 
 Up to 60 healthy adult volunteers will be entered into this study to 
ensure that a maximum of 24 healthy adult volunteers are available to 
enter a residential quarantine facility (an area separated from 
members of the public) and be given/exposed to the virus. Of these, 
XSWRZLOOEHDOORFDWHGWRWKHµ'RQRU¶JURXSDQGXSWRWRWKH
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µ5HFLSLHQW¶JURXS 
 Screening assessments before the quarantine stay will have been 
performed on two or three occasions. 
 The duration of the quarantine stay will be approximately 8 days for 
Donors and 12 days for Recipients. 
 At approximately 28 days after the start of the quarantine stay, you 
will be asked to return to the Retroscreen Virology clinic for a check 
up. 
 
Assessments in this study will help ensure your safety. These include: 
 
Medical History- Detailed questioning by the study doctor about your 
present and past medical history. It also includes any history of 
medication or drugs taken. 
 
Physical Examination - a complete physical examination of the muscles, 
skin, heart function, lung, ears, nose, throat and eyes. 
 
Blood Pressure Measurement - This provides information on the condition 
of the heart and blood vessels. Electric or manual blood pressure meters 
requiring an inflatable cuff to be placed around your arm will be used. 
 
Lung Function Test (Spirometry) ± This is a measurement of breathing 
capacity, important for assessing how well your lungs are working and 
making sure you do not have a respiratory condition. You will be asked to 
take the deepest breath you can, and then exhale into the sensor as hard 
as possible, for as long as possible. 
 
Electrocardiogram (ECG) - This measures the electrical activity of the 
heart and aids the diagnosis of heart disease. 12 small self-adhesive 
electrodes will be attached to the skin of the arms, legs and chest. Areas 
such as the chest, where electrodes are placed, may need to be shaved. 
The ECG is painless and takes a few minutes to complete. 
 
Blood Test (Venepuncture) - Blood is taken by the doctor or nurse and is 
usually from a vein around the inside elbow. A flexible tube (known as a 
cannula) may be left in the vein to reduce the number of times a needle 
has to be inserted. 
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HIV and hepatitis screening 
We require that you have negative test results for Hepatitis B and C and 
HIV (human immunodeficiency virus, the virus that causes the acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome [AIDS]) before you take part in a study. We 
know that having certain infections such as HIV, Hepatitis B and Hepatitis 
&FDQGDPDJHWKHERG\¶VLPPXQHV\VWHPDQGPDNHWKHLQGLYLGXDl more 
vulnerable to infections. 
 
As the study involves challenging you with influenza, it is essential for 
safety reasons that we exclude conditions that might make your 
symptoms more severe. This is why we test all volunteers for HIV and 
Hepatitis B and C before they can take part. If you do not want to be 
tested for Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C or HIV then you should not agree to 
participate in this study. 
 
A specific consent form for HIV testing can be found at the end of this 
form (page 14). You will not have to make a final decision about having 
this test until we call you back for your next visit (when the test will be 
taken); this could be several days to weeks from now but you will always 
have at least 24 hours from now in which to make a final decision. In the 
meantime you should read the further information on HIV below and the 
enclosed leaflet. 
 
Further Information on HIV: 
Many people throughout the world, including the UK are infected with HIV 
and do not know about it. One explanation for this is that the early stages 
HIV infection may not produce symptoms. It is for this reason that we 
perform the test, even if you do not consider yourself to be at risk (see 
below for at risk groups). The Retroscreen medical staff will answer any 
questions you may have about HIV/AIDS before your blood is taken for 
testing.  
 
In the event of an unexpected positive test you will be informed and 
counselled by a study doctor. Arrangements can then be made (with your 
consent) to refer you to a specialist. Whilst HIV is not currently curable, 
effective medicines are available to keep the disease under control. You 
should be aware that any information given to us will remain completely 
confidential and this includes any test result. You should also be aware 
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that infection with HIV may have consequences for certain occupational 
groups and on the availability of health insurance/life assurance. Again, 
please free to discuss this further should you wish to. 
Certain population groups have an increased risk of exposure to HIV and 
therefore may indicate a need for further counselling. These include: 
- Gay or bisexual man. 
- Current or ex-IV drug user. 
- Unprotected sexual intercourse in a country of high HIV prevalence. 
- A partner who has an increased risk of exposure to HIV. 
 
Please inform a member of the medical staff if you are at increased risk or 
if your sexual history places you at an increased risk for HIV. They will 
then be able to answer any additional questions you may have. 
 
Urinalysis- Examination of urine measures various compounds that pass 
through the kidneys. It includes 
 Urine dipstick to pick up signs of infection or other conditions 
signifying ill health. 
 Drug and nicotine testing. 
 Pregnancy testing. 
  
Nasal Wash- a procedure performed by the study doctor or nurse by 
pushing a water solution into the nose - one nostril at a time, so as to 
wash out and collect nasal secretions for analysis. It is performed at the 
screening visit and once daily on most days of the quarantine phase of the 
study. 
 
Throat Swab ± a small swab will be taken from the back of your throat. 
 
Alcohol, drug and nicotine tests- performed randomly at the beginning and 
during the quarantine phase to help enforce a strict no alcohol, nicotine 
and drugs policy. 
 
Study Schedule: 
 Study specific screening visit 
Up to 45 days before the quarantine start, you will be asked to sign this 
consent form. You cannot participate in this study if you were recently 
hospitalised, have recently taken antibiotics, have a longstanding medical 
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condition, have been enrolled in another medical study and have received 
an investigational medication within the last 6 months, have a blood test 
positive for Influenza A infection, a nasal wash positive for a respiratory 
virus, have ever received chemotherapy, or if you are a pregnant or 
breast-feeding woman. All sexually-active women must agree to use 
medically acceptable contraceptives throughout the study, up to and 
including Day 28 follow up. Medically acceptable contraceptives include: 
(1) surgical sterilisation, (2) approved hormonal contraceptives (such as 
birth control pills, Depo-Provera, or Lupron Depot), (3) barrier methods 
(such as a condom or diaphragm) used with a spermicide, or (4) an 
intrauterine device (IUD).   
 
The following tests and procedures to make sure you are eligible to 
participate will take place: 
 Medical history. 
 Physical exam, to include heart rate, blood pressure, breathing rate 
and temperature 
 Review of medications you may be taking. 
 Blood sample (approximately 35mL, which is just over 3 tablespoons) 
for safety tests and to check your immunity to Influenza if this was not 
taken at pre-screening. 
 Urine sample for safety tests and the screening of drug and nicotine 
abuse. 
 Screening for alcohol. 
 Nasal wash (two teaspoons [8mL] of sterile water will be placed into 
each nostril of your nose and be sucked out). 
 A lung function test. 
 Throat swab. 
 An ECG (a tracing of your heart). 
 Females only - a urine pregnancy test. 
 Some blood taken will be used to screen you for HIV and hepatitis. 
 
Participation 
If all of the screening tests and assessments show that you are eligible, 
you may be asked to participate in the study. You may participate for 
approximately 3 months after the preliminary screening tests are 
FRPSOHWH:HZLOOUHTXLUHDJHQHUDOSUDFWLWLRQHU¶VRUGRFWRU¶V referral form 
from your GP/Doctor stating his or her opinion on your suitability for 
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participation in the study. The GP/Doctor may charge a small fee (usually 
£30-£50) for this documentation, which we will reimburse to you. This 
information will be handled in a confidential manner. 
 
 Quarantine phase of the Study 
Donors will be admitted 2 days before the virus is administered (Study 
Day -2) whilst Recipients will be admitted 2 days later (Study Day 0). 
To be admitted to the quarantine isolation facility you must agree not to 
smoke and not to consume any alcohol during this 8 to 12 day quarantine 
period. Using recreational drugs is also forbidden. Your belongings will be 
checked to ensure forbidden substances are not brought into the 
Quarantine Unit. We will conduct random alcohol, drug and nicotine 
WHVWLQJ,I\RXKDYHDIHYHURUV\PSWRPVVXJJHVWLQJD³FROGRUIOX-OLNH´
infection between your admission and the following morning in the 
isolation facility, you will be sent home. The study doctor will provide a 
referral for medical care if necessary. 
 ,QWKH5HWURVFUHHQ4XDUDQWLQH8QLW\RXZLOOEHSODFHGLQWR³GURSOHW
SUHFDXWLRQV´7KLVPHDQVYLVLWRUVWR\RXUURRPZLOOEHOLPLWHG² 
anybody visiting you will wear a gown and mask before entering your 
room.  All staff will be required to disinfect their hands thoroughly 
before and after entering your room.  You will remain in your room, or 
areas designated for your use or recreation by the study staff, 
throughout your stay. 
 Study diary: You will be asked to record your symptoms in a symptom 
diary card twice daily which will be collected by study staff daily. 
 A cannula (a very small plastic tube that remains in your arm) may be 
placed in your hand or arm to allow for easy sampling of your blood. 
Alternatively, blood will be taken by standard blood sampling methods 
using a sterile needle. 
 
The following assessments will take place on admission to the quarantine 
unit: 
 Medical history and review to ensure you can continue in the study. 
 Complete and directed physical examination including an ear 
examination. 
 Temperature, heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory (breathing) rate 
monitored twice daily. 
 Review of medications you may be taking. 
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 ECG. 
 Lung function test. 
 Blood sample (approximately 35mL) for antibodies and safety tests. 
 Nasal wash. 
 Throat swab sample. 
 Drugs of abuse, alcohol and nicotine tests. 
 Urine sample for safety tests. 
 Females only - a urine pregnancy test. 
 
If any of the above assessments need to be repeated, they will be done on 
the next day. 
 
The following assessments will take place on the day after admission: 
 Medical history and review to ensure you can continue in the study. 
 Complete and directed physical examination, including an ear 
examination. 
 Temperature, heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory (breathing) rate 
monitored twice daily. 
 Review of medications you may be taking. 
 A throat swab.  
 A lung function test.  
 Your symptom diary card will be checked ± twice daily. 
 
Donors Only - Administration of Influenza A virus (Day 0) 
In the morning: 
 Medical history and review to ensure you can continue in the study. 
 Your pulse, blood pressure, breathing rate and temperature will be 
checked four times daily. 
 Review of medications you may be taking. 
 A lung function test.  
 A direct physical examination and ear examination. 
 Your symptom diary card will be checked by a study doctor. 
 Urine samples will be collected for safety. 
 Females only - a urine pregnancy test. 
 Drug, alcohol abuse may be tested. 
 
Exposure to virus:  
 You will be asked to lie flat on your back. 
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 The study physician will place a few drops of a liquid solution into each 
of your nostrils. 
 After receiving the nose drops, you will be asked to continue to lie flat 
on your back for about 15 minutes. 
 You can then sit up after 15 minutes have passed. 
 The study clinical team must monitor you for 15 more minutes. 
 
Later in the afternoon / evening, you will have: 
 A direct physical examination and an ear examination. 
 A throat swab. 
 Your symptom diary card will be checked by the study doctor. 
 
Recipients Only ± Exposure to Influenza A virus (Day 2) 
In the morning: 
 Medical history and review to ensure you can continue in the study. 
 Your pulse, blood pressure, breathing rate and temperature will be 
checked four times daily. 
 Review of medications you may be taking. 
 A lung function test. 
 A direct physical examination and ear examination.  
 Your symptom diary card will be checked by a study doctor. 
 Urine samples will be collected for safety. 
 Females only - a urine pregnancy test. 
 Drugs, nicotine and alcohol may be tested for. 
 
Exposure Event (Day 2 ± 4); Involves Donors with Symptoms and 
Recipients 
The Exposure Event is a 48 hour period where volunteers (two Donors and 
five Recipients) will share living quarters, giving the opportunity for the 
virus to be passed from person to person. Each Event will start when two 
Donors develop symptoms of Flu. They will be joined by 5 Recipients 
making a total of 7 subjects per event. 
 
During the day, subjects will be asked to perform set tasks including; 
¾ Donor reading to a Recipient for 20 minutes. 
¾ Donors and Recipients playing cards / games. 
¾ Donors and Recipients eating meals together. 
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At night, some Recipients will sleep in the same room as a Donor. 
 
Donors who do not develop symptoms 
They will not take part in the Exposure Event but will remain in the 
quarantine unit and undergo the same tests and procedures as Donors 
with symptoms of flu (e.g. fever, cough, runny nose, sore throat). 
 
Procedures to be performed 1 day prior to and during the Exposure Event 
and the during remaining days in quarantine 
 You will continue to fill out your symptom diary cards twice daily.  
 The study doctor will ask you about any signs or symptoms you may 
be experiencing, measure your temperature, and examine your eyes, 
ears, nose, throat, and lungs. 
 Blood will be drawn on alternate days from Study Day 1-9 via a 
cannula or by a needle and syringe. On each occasion approximately 5-
20mL of blood (1-2 tablespoons) will be drawn from you. 
 An ECG and a test to monitor lung function will be performed daily. 
 You will undergo a daily physical examination. 
 Nasal wash & throat swab samples will be collected once a day. 
 A urine specimen will be collected on two occasions (males) and three 
occasions (females). 
 Random alcohol, drugs and nicotine tests may be conducted. 
 
Antiviral medication 
At a specified time point after you have been either challenged (Donor) or 
exposed (Recipient) to influenza virus you will be given an antiviral 
medication. The primary aim of this is to ensure that the virus is not 
spread to others when you leave the quarantine unit. However, this 
medication may also be used to treat signs and symptoms of influenza at 
the discretion of the study doctor. 
 
Environmental Sampling 
During the quarantine period we will be collecting samples from the 
environment. This will involve swabs taken from surfaces and air samples 
collected from an air sampling device. Some volunteers will be asked to 
carry a portable sampling device for a short period of time during the 
quarantine period. 
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Photography 
During the quarantine stay we will take a limited number of photographs 
in order that we may pictorially describe the set up of the unit and in 
particular demonstrate the arrangements for close living quarters that will 
occur during the Exposure Event. We may use these photographs in 
presentations and/or publications about the study. No volunteer will be 
identifiable in any photographs used. Consent will be obtained from you so 
that we may take photographs. 
 
Discharge from quarantine 
If you appear free of viral infection at Day 6 (Donors) or Day 10 
(Recipients) you will be permitted to leave quarantine. If some infection 
remains, you will be required to stay in quarantine for a further 24 hours 
or longer if required. 
 
Follow-XSYLVLW§'D\ 
You will return to the study doctor at the clinic 
 A complete physical examination will be performed. 
 Review of medications you may be taking will be recorded. 
 Approximately 50mL (just under 4 tablespoons) of blood will be drawn 
for antibody & safety tests. 
 A nasal wash will be performed. 
 An ECG will be performed. 
 A urine sample will be collected for safety tests. 
 Females only - a urine pregnancy test will be conducted. 
 
Storing and using samples and information from this study 
 Some of the samples and the information collected during this study 
will be kept by Retroscreen Virology Ltd or sent to the University of 
Nottingham for research analysis.  
 The University of Nottingham and Retroscreen Virology Ltd will store 
any samples and information in a secure place. 
 The samples will be identified by a unique and anonymous study 
number, which means that your name and other identifying 
information will not be on the sample. The University of Nottingham 
will not receive your name or other information about your identity. 
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Research Results 
The study described is for research purposes only.  Therefore, you will 
receive no results from this study. 
 
Risks for loss of confidentiality 
Maintaining confidentiality is important to the Retroscreen Virology Limited 
and the University of Nottingham. They will keep all your samples and 
information confidential and secure.  In addition the University of 
Nottingham will receive only your unique study number, not your name or 
other identifying information. Retroscreen Virology will not release your 
identifying information; therefore there will be no loss of confidentiality 
from information kept at the University of Nottingham. 
 
Potential Risks  
If you are chosen to participate in the study, you might experience 
symptoms of infection with Influenza A virus. 
 Donors have about a 90% chance of becoming infected with influenza 
IROORZLQJWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIWKHYLUXV:HGRQ¶WNQRZKRZPDQ\
Recipients will become infected. Influenza usually resolves without 
treatment and symptoms will normally go away after approximately 5-
7 days.   
 Influenza (flu) causes an infection of the lungs and airways. It causes a 
fever, runny nose, sore throat, cough, headache, muscle aches, and a 
general feeling of illness (malaise). Severe complications of Influenza 
tend to occur almost exclusively in children aged <12 months, the 
elderly, and persons of any age with chronic illnesses and with weak 
immune systems. Nevertheless, severe influenza infections are 
reported around the globe most years albeit in low numbers, amongst 
healthy adults. Occasionally, flu can progress to pneumonia, either 
caused by the virus itself or by a secondary bacterial infection. 
Qualified doctors and nurses will be in the quarantine unit with you at 
all times. Should you experience any symptoms, they will assess you 
and manage these symptoms. 
 Starting on evening of Day 4 (Donors) or Day 8 (Recipients) of the 
quarantine stay, you will be administered a course of an antiviral 
medicine called oseltamivir. This is an approved treatment for 
Influenza that can lessen the degree and duration of symptoms. You 
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will be required to take oseltamivir to prevent the possibility of 
re-infection of influenza and also to prevent transmission of influenza 
to others when you leave the unit. 
 Women will have a pregnancy test performed before receiving virus. 
Caution should be taken to avoid all infections during pregnancy. 
Therefore, any woman with a positive pregnancy test will not receive 
virus, and all women participating in this study must use a reliable 
birth control method consistently, to avoid becoming pregnant for the 
duration of the study. If you do become pregnant during this study, 
you must inform your study doctor immediately. 
 It is unlikely that you will transmit Influenza to your close contacts 
when you leave the quarantine unit. After infection with Influenza A, 
the virus will be present in your nose for several days. It is not 
expected that enough Influenza A will still be in your nose for you to 
transmit to others once you leave the isolation facility. This is because 
the usual duration of time that Influenza remains in adults is several 
days shorter than the time you will spend in quarantine in the isolation 
facility. Your secretions from your nose will also be tested for Influenza 
prior to discharge and you will only be discharged if there is no 
detectable Influenza present.  
 
To further reduce the risk of passing Influenza to others you should avoid 
contact with the following groups of people for 2 weeks after you leave the 
isolation facility: 
o Children less than 3 years of age. 
o Anyone with immune system problems or who has undergone an 
organ transplant. 
o Anyone being treated for or about to be treated for cancer. 
o Anyone with lung disease like emphysema. 
o Elderly persons. 
 
If you are a healthcare worker, nurse, doctor or medical student, you 
should not work with patients until 14 days after you have been 
challenged/exposed to the virus, or until your symptoms are fully 
resolved (whichever is the longer period).   
 
A similar type of Influenza has been given to over 200 people by 
Retroscreen Virology Limited. 
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 The throat swab and nasal wash procedures may be mildly 
uncomfortable and you may gag or cough, or your nose may sting a 
little for a short time. 
 Blood drawing causes momentary pain, sometimes a bruise, occasional 
lightheadedness and rarely fainting. 
 Placement of an intravenous cannula (small plastic tube into the vein) 
is a routine procedure that involves momentary discomfort at the time 
of insertion.  Minor bruising may occur.  In rare cases, phlebitis 
(irritation of the vein), extravasation (leaking of fluid outside the vein) 
and infection may occur. 
 The blood tests performed to assess your health may indicate that you 
have an infection you were not aware of (such as the HIV or hepatitis) 
or an unexpected illness.  
 You will be told of any significant findings that develop during the 
course of this study that may influence your willingness to continue 
your participation. 
 
If you have private medical insurance or life insurance, you should check 
that your participation in this study does not affect your insurance. 
 
Participation in multiple research studies 
You must not take part in too many or multiple studies because this may 
cause serious risk to your health. To avoid this, UK study units like ours 
keep a linked database of healthy volunteers and when volunteers take 
part in studies. We will enter the following details into the national 
database: 
 your National Insurance number (if you're a UK citizen); or  
 your passport number and country of origin (if you're not a UK citizen); 
and  
 the date of your last dose of study medicine/virus. 
 
If you withdraw from the study before you receive any study 
PHGLFLQHYLUXVWKHGDWDEDVHZLOOVKRZWKDW\RXGLGQRWUHFHLYHDµGRVH¶ 
Only staff at the Retroscreen Virology Clinic and other medicines research 
units can use the database. We may call other units, or they may call us, 
to check your details. We will check your information on the national 
database before you are admitted to the study.  
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Your details will be kept on the national database for at least 2 years. If 
we need to contact you about the study after you have finished it, but we 
can't because you have moved or lost contact with your GP, we might be 
able to trace you through the information in the database. 
 
Potential benefit of study participation 
It is not anticipated that any participant will derive personal benefit; 
however by taking part in this study you may contribute new information 
that may benefit patients in the future. 
 
Alternatives to Participation 
The alternative to participating in this study is to simply not to participate. 
 
Compensation for your involvement 
 During the isolation period of the study, if you are withdrawn either 
before the virus is administered (Donors) of before you are exposed to 
virus (Recipients), you will be compensated for your preceding visits 
and the nights spent at the isolation facility. This compensation will be 
£250.00 per night to a maximum of £500 and payable by 
BACS/cheque on your final visit. 
 
 If you complete the full study; 
o Donor: You will be compensated £1800 payable by 
BACS/cheque in installments; 1st payment of £1,000.00 on 
your final day at the quarantine unit, with the remaining 
£800.00 on your Day 28 final visit at the end of the study. 
o Recipient: You will be compensated £2100 payable by 
BACS/cheque in installments; 1st payment of £1,000.00 on 
your final day at the quarantine unit, with the remaining 
£1,100.00 on your Day 28 final visit at the end of the study. 
 If you are withdrawn from the study because of positive tests on 
alcohol, nicotine or drug screening, you will forfeit any compensation. 
 In order to receive full compensation, you are expected to be available 
for all visits, the Quarantine Phase and the final follow up visit. 
 If you believe you will be unable to attend all the required visits, then 
you should not participate in the study. If you fail to attend all 
scheduled clinic visits, your compensation will be reduced.  
 You may be issued with FluCamp.com kit on completion of the 
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Quarantine phase ± a FluCamp T-shirt, baseball cap, notepad, pen and 
water bottle may be given. 
 
Confidentiality 
Your name and identity will not be disclosed in any publications or reports 
resulting from this study. Professional employees of Retroscreen Virology 
Limited and the University of Nottingham will have supervised access to 
your study records. By signing this consent document, you agree to such 
inspection. These persons will use your study records only in connection 
with carrying out their obligations relating to the study. Your records will 
be kept as confidential as possible, within the limits of UK common law. 
How the information about you and your medical condition is stored and 
who has access to it, is governed by data protection laws (The Data 
Protection Act 1998). 
 
Data from this study, in which your name and identity will not be 
disclosed, will also be transferred outside of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). Some non-EEA countries may not offer the same level of privacy 
protection as in the UK. The data will be anonymised before it is sent to 
these parties and therefore your personal information will be confidential 
at all times.  
 
Right to withdraw from study 
 Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to 
participate in this study, or withdraw from this study at any time, 
without a penalty or loss of benefits to which you would normally be 
entitled. 
 If you withdraw from the study, any stored blood or tissue samples 
that can still be directly identified as yours will be destroyed if you so 
request. No further data relating to you will be collected. We will 
continue to use the data collected up to the point of your withdrawal 
for the purposes of this study only. 
 You must be aware that withdrawal after you have entered the 
isolation facility and received the Influenza A virus may result in risks 
to both your own health and that of people with whom you come in 
contact. You are very strongly advised to complete the full post-
challenge/exposure observation period. 
 In addition to providing study information, this observation period is 
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designed to detect any complications of Influenza early, so that you 
may receive treatment if needed. 
 The Influenza virus that you will receive is likely to be capable of being 
spread to other persons and causing illness. Accordingly, should you 
choose to withdraw after receiving the virus, but before the 
observation period is complete, you will be encouraged to remain in 
the quarantine unit as long as possible and if released early, you will 
be encouraged to keep in contact with us to let us know your progress. 
 
Involuntary withdrawal 
Your participation in this study may be stopped without your consent if: 
 You fail to comply with the requirements of the study. 
 In the opinion of a study doctor, continued participation poses a 
risk to your health or well-being. 
 The study is discontinued by Retroscreen Virology Limited, the 
University of Nottingham or the Research Ethics Committee. 
 Retroscreen Virology Limited reserves the right to withdraw any 
volunteer from the study during the quarantine period if that 
volunteer either: a) has symptoms of an illness before receiving the 
virus or b) behaves in a manner that is dangerous to his/her 
health, dangerous to the health of others, or disruptive to the 
proper conduct of the study. 
 Retroscreen Virology Limited staff will be the sole judge of 
inappropriate or dangerous behaviour. 
 
Freedom of information 
You are entitled to inspect your personal information stored by 
Retroscreen Virology Limited and are entitled to copies of such 
information. Copies will be provided within 40 days of a written request in 
accordance with The Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Contact for medical concerns or questions 
If you have any questions about this study, if you experience any 
symptoms which you think might be related to participating in this study, 
or if you have any other medical problems, be sure to report them 
promptly to Dr. Anthony Gilbert (Senior Investigator at Retroscreen 
Virology) on 020 7756 1300 during office hours or call the 24 hour number 
which will be given to you for your use during this study. 
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If you have questions about your rights as a research subject volunteer or 
if you have questions, concerns or complaints about the research, you 
may contact: 
Plymouth Independent Ethics Committee 
Tamar Science Park 
1 Davy Road 
Derriford 
Plymouth 
PL6 8BX 
 
Compensation for injury 
The University of Nottingham carries insurance to make sure that if any 
participant incurs any unexpected adverse event that leads to their being 
harmed and that the event occurred as a consequence of the protocol (i.e. 
non-negligent harm), then the participant will be compensated. In 
addition, all study doctors have their own professional indemnity insurance 
which will cover any unexpected adverse event that leads to participant 
harm caused by negligence. 
 
This study will be conducted in accordance with International 
Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) Good Clinical Practice (GCP) 
guidelines (directive CPMP/ICH/135/95), local regulatory requirements 
and the declaration of Helsinki, and all relevant local laws and 
regulations. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Professor Jonathan Van-Tam 
Chief Investigator 
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Appendix 5.3: Informed consent form
 
Protocol title:  STUDY 1 Proof of concept: Confirming the 
Transmissibility of Experimentally Induced 
Influenza Infection Using an Approved GMP 
Challenge Virus 
Protocol No.:   ITSDG 001, Final Version 1.0 23DEC2008 
Protocol Sponsor:  University of Nottingham 
Chief Investigator:  Professor Jonathan Van-Tam 
Study coordinating site: Retroscreen Virology Limited 
 
 
Please place your initials in each bracket to indicate your agreement with 
each point. 
 
[     ] I have read the information sheet form and believe that I have had 
 enough time to consider the decision to participate in this study 
 
[     ] I have asked and received satisfactory answers to all of my 
 questions 
 
[     ] I have received a copy of this form and am aware that a copy will 
 remain in the files at Retroscreen Virology Limited 
 
[      ] I understand that, by signing this form, I do not give up any of my 
 legal rights 
 
[      ] I hereby give my consent to participate in this research study 
 
[      ] I hereby give my consent to the taking of photographs of me 
 during the quarantine stay. I understand that any 
 photographs subsequently used will not identify me  
 
  
8 
Signature of Volunteer     Date 
 
8 
Printed Name of Volunteer 
 
8 
Signature of Study Doctor Obtaining Consent  Date 
 
8 
Printed name of Study Doctor 
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HIV testing consent form 
 
Protocol title:  STUDY 1 Proof of concept: Confirming the 
Transmissibility of Experimentally Induced 
Influenza Infection Using an Approved GMP 
Challenge Virus 
Protocol No.:   ITSDG 001, Final Version 1.0 23DEC2008 
Protocol Sponsor:  University of Nottingham 
Chief Investigator:  Professor Jonathan Van-Tam 
Study coordinating site: Retroscreen Virology Limited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
Signature of Volunteer     Date 
 
8 
Printed Name of Volunteer 
 
8 
Signature of Study Nurse/Doctor Obtaining Consent Date 
 
8  
Printed name of Study Nurse/Doctor
Consent to test YES NO 
Have you been previously tested for HIV?   
Have you been given more than 24 hours 
to consider the information provided? 
  
Do you consent to a blood test for HIV?   
 
Points covered in pre-test discussion: 
Tick if 
discussed 
Risk Assessment ± Unprotected sexual intercourse (number 
of partners since last test) 
 
Health implications of positive result  
Explain testing process & window period ± need to wait or 
re-test after 3 months 
 
Confidentiality maintained   
Consequences of HIV testing ± life assurance, employment 
etc. 
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Appendix 5.4: Exposure Event Schedule 
 
3 Events will happen simultaneously (Groups 1-3) 
Times are approximate 
 
Day 2;  
09.00 Symptomatic Donors (D1 & D2) and Recipients (R1 - 
R5) meet in designated quarantine area 
Each to spend minimum 30 minutes on computer 
each day (email / game) 
10.30   D1 reads to R1 (20 minutes) 
   D2 reads to R4 (20 minutes) 
13.00 ± 13.45 Sit down Lunch 
15.00   D1 reads to R2 (20 minutes) 
   D2 reads to R5 (20 minutes) 
16.00 ± 17.30 All play cards / monopoly at table 
18.00 ± 19.15 Sit down Dinner 
19.30   D1 reads to R3 (20 minutes) 
20.00 ± 20.30 All play game e.g. charades 
21.00   All watch film 
23.00   END 
    
Day 3; 
08.00   Sit down breakfast 
Each to spend minimum 30 minutes on computer 
each day (email / game) 
10.30   D1 reads to R4 (20 minutes) 
   D2 reads to R1 (20 minutes) 
13.00 ± 13.45 Sit down Lunch 
15.00   D1 reads to R5 (20 minutes) 
   D2 reads to R2 (20 minutes) 
16.30 ± 17.30 All play cards / monopoly at table 
18.00 ± 19.15 Sit down Dinner 
19.30   D1 reads to R3 (20 minutes) 
20.00 ± 20.30 All play game e.g. charades 
21.00   All watch film 
23.00   END 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 278 
 
Appendix 5.5: Directed Physical Examination Worksheet 
 
Subject Study ID Number: ___________ Subject Initials: ____________ 
 
Quarantine Phase Day (circle one):       
-2   -1    0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11  
 
Date: ___________ (day) ___________ (month) __    ___ (year)  
 
Time: (24 hour clock): __________ Initials: ____________ 
 
 
 LEVEL 
0 
LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3 
Upper 
Respiratory: 
    
Nasal 
discharge 
None Clear, serous; 
scant but 
slightly 
increased 
Clear to white, 
obvious 
increased 
volume, ± 
minor blood 
streaks on 
tissue 
Frankly 
purulent 
(yellow or 
green), or 
gross blood 
Otitis None Dulled 
tympanic 
membrane 
Inflamed, 
injected 
tympanic 
membrane 
Retracted or 
bulging 
tympanic 
membrane, 
obvious air-
fluid level Pharyngitis None Mild and / or 
patchy 
erythema 
Marked and /or 
confluent 
erythema 
Erythema and 
purulent 
exudate 
Sinus 
tenderness 
None NO LEVEL 1  Mild 
tenderness 
Severe 
tenderness or 
overlying 
erythema 
Lower 
Respiratory: 
    
New 
wheezes, 
râles, 
rhonchi, 
other 
None NO LEVEL 1 Scattered 
wheezes or 
rhonchi 
Widespread 
wheezes or 
rhonchi; 
râles, 
dyspnoea, or 
signs of 
consolidation 
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Appendix 5.6: Laboratory methods 
 
Challenge Virus Titre Determination 
Immediately post preparation of the individual inocula the virus was back 
titrated on MDCK cells. The virus was titrated in quadruplicate from an 
initial dilution of 1/10 (v/v) (11µL in first row) following a 1/10 (v/v) 
titration series (11µL titrated across into 100µL MDCK infection media). 
Both the neat stock virus, as well as an aliquot of the diluted virus, were 
back-titrated at this point. At the time that the first volunteer was 
infected, as notified by clinical staff, a second vial of the diluted individual 
inocula was titrated as described above. The virus was back-titrated a 
third time at the time that the last volunteer was infected. 
 The titre of the virus immediately post preparation was calculated to 
be 5.75 log10TCID50/mL. 
 The titre of virus at the time that the first volunteer was infected was 
calculated to be 6.00 log10TCID50/mL. 
 The titre of virus at the time that the last subject was infected was 
calculated to be 5.27 log10TCID50/mL. 
 The geometric mean of the virus titres at the time of the first and last 
subject infection was calculated to be 5.64 log10TCID50/mL. 
 
Retroscreen Haemagglutination Inhibition Assay 
The serum from each sample was separated into 3 aliquots and stored at -
20°C until required for analysis. 
Prior to commencing the assay, the following procedures were performed: 
 Challenge virus was diluted to 8 heamagglutination units (HAU). 
 Positive control antiserum (anti A/Wisconsin/67/2005: NIBSC; 05/236) 
was diluted to 40 haemagglutination inhibition units (HIU). 
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 Serum samples were treated with Receptor Destroying Enzyme (RDE) 
to remove any non-specific inhibitors of the influenza virus that may 
cause non-specific agglutination. 
 The HAI assay was performed as follows: 
- Serum samples and the positive control serum were titrated in PBS on 
V-bottomed 96-well plates following a 1/2 (v/v) dilution series. 
- An equal volume of challenge virus was added to each well and the 
plate incubated at room temperature for 30 minutes. 
- Turkey red blood cells were added to each well and the plate incubated 
at room temperature for 30 minutes. 
- The plates were read by eye to determine the presence or absence of 
agglutination for each sample. 
 
Controls used in the assay were i) positive control antiserum, ii) negative 
control challenge virus (A/Wisconsin/67/2005: RVL; AL 1764) and iii) PBS 
control. The assay was performed in duplicate for each sample. The 
duplicate endpoints for each sample were all within one two-fold (v/v) 
dilution of each other. Where the duplicate endpoints were not identical, 
but within one two-fold (v/v) dilution of each other, the geometric mean of 
each endpoint was calculated.  
 
CDC Serology Methods  
Sera were tested by the hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) and/or 
microneutralization (MN) assays according to previously published 
procedures (Kendal et al, 1982; Rowe et al, 1999).  The following viruses 
were used: A/Wisconsin/67/2005 (H3N2), grown in Madin-Darby canine 
kidney cells; A/Brisbane/10/2007 (H3N2), A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1) 
and A/Mexico/4108/2009 (H1N1pdm), all grown in 10 to 11 day old 
embryonated chicken eggs.  HAI testing was performed using 0.5% turkey 
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erythrocytes. For the MN assay, sera were heat inactivated at 56oC for 30 
minutes prior to testing.  For the HAI assay, sera were treated with RDE 
(Denke-Seiken, Japan) followed by heat inactivation at 56oC for 30 
minutes and sera containing nonspecific agglutinins were pre-adsorbed 
with turkey erythrocytes prior to testing.  For both assays, serial two fold 
dilutions of serum (1:10 to 1:1280) were tested in duplicate.  HAI or MN 
titres were expressed as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum 
that gave complete hemagglutination or 50% neutralization, respectively. 
 
Nasal Wash and Throat Swab Sample Processing 
Samples were transported to the analytical laboratory on wet ice with the 
exception of the Day 3 and Day 4 samples; 
- Day 3 samples were frozen on dry ice immediately after collection at 
the quarantine site and transported to the analytical laboratory on dry 
ice. 
- Day 4 samples were processed directly at the quarantine site and the 
aliquots placed onto dry ice for transport to the laboratory and stored 
in a freezer set at -80°C upon arrival until required for analysis. 
 
Nasal wash samples were aliquoted into 6 cryovials. The cryovial aliquots 
and the sample collection vessel were kept on wet ice throughout the 
procedure. Aliquots 1, 2 and 3 were aliquoted directly into cryovials. Each 
aliquot contained approximately 2mL. These aliquots were designated for 
qPCR analysis. Aliquots 4, 5 and 6 were aliquoted by transferring 500µL 
sample into a cryovial containing 500µL 50% (w/v) sucrose solution such 
that the final concentration of sucrose in the sample is 25% (w/v). The 
50% (w/v) sucrose solution was prepared by dissolving sucrose in PBS 
[Gibco; 10010] and sterilizing by filtration prior to use. These aliquots 
were designated for the infectivity assay. 
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Throat swabs were taken out of the collection tube and rotated in the bijou 
containing a 4mL 1% (v/v) penicillin streptomycin solution. Prior to 
removal of the swab from the bijou, the swab was pressed against the side 
of the vial and turned to ensure excess liquid was removed. Samples were 
aliquoted into 3 x ~1mL aliquots in cryovials. The cryovials and the bijou 
were placed on wet ice throughout the procedure. 
 
All aliquots were placed into a monitored freezer set at -80°C until 
required. 
 
Retroscreen Influenza Infectivity Assay 
MDCK cells were seeded at a density of ~ 5 x 104 cells/mL into 96-well 
plates the day prior to use in the assay. On the day of the assay the cell 
monolayers were washed twice with 100µL of PBS and 100µL of MDCK 
infection media was added to each well. The nasal wash and throat swab 
samples were thawed and vortexed. 11µL of the sample was added in 
quadruplicate to the first row of wells on the plate. A suitable control virus 
was used as a titration control in quadruplicate on every plate. The 
samples and control virus were titrated following a 1/10 (v/v) titration 
series (11µL titrated across into 100µL MDCK infection media). The last 
row of wells was used as the cell only control. The plates were incubated 
in at 37oC (±2oC); 5% CO2 for 3 days and the end point was determined 
by haemagglutination assay. After the 3 day incubation period 50µL of the 
supernatant from each well on the 96-well titration plate was transferred 
to the corresponding well on a fresh v-bottomed 96-ZHOODVVD\SODWHǋ/
of 0.5% (v/v) turkey red blood cells in PBS was then added to each well 
on the v-bottomed assay plate to give a total volume of 100µL. The plates 
were incubated at room temperature for approximately 30 minutes before 
being read visually for the presence of virus in each well. Each well was 
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scored positive or negative. Haemagglutination of the red blood cells 
indicated a positive result and sedimentation of the red blood cells into the 
apex of v-shaped well indicated a negative result. The qualitative 
haemagglutination results were used to calculate the virus titre using the 
Karber Calculation. 
 
PCR protocols  
 HPA Laboratory Cambridge; Influenza ± National Standard Method 
VSOP 25 
 HPA Laboratory Cambridge; Respiratory virus PCR protocol - VSOP 
086: 
The virus panel includes; Influenza A + B, parainfluenza, rhinovirus, 
adenovirus, metapneumovirus, coronavirus and RSV. 
 Lab 21 Healthcare; Influenza A: 
Primer sequences were initially obtained unmodified. Since 2009 
modified versions of these primers, in which mismatches to pandemic 
H1N1 strains have been corrected, have been added to the assay.  The 
assay is a nested PCR and is interpreted by electrophoresis and UV 
transillumination in the presence of ethidium bromide. 
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Appendix 5.7: Influenza PCR results on nasal wash and throat swab 
samples 
 
 Study Day 
 3 4 5 6 7 
Laboratory   ї 
 
Specimen     ї 
HPA 
 
NW 
Lab 
21 
TS 
HPA 
 
NW 
Lab 
21 
NW 
HPA 
 
NW 
HPA 
 
NW 
HPA 
 
NW 
 
D01 + - + + + + ND 
D02 + + + + + + ND 
D03 + - + + - - ND 
D04 -  - - - - - ND 
D05 + + + + + + ND 
D06 - - - - - - ND 
D07 + - + + + - ND 
D08 - - - - + + ND 
D09 - + - + - - ND 
R01 ND - - - - - - 
R02 ND - - - - - - 
R03 ND - - - - - - 
R04 ND - - - - - - 
R05 ND - - - - - - 
R06 ND - - - - - - 
R07 ND - - - - - - 
R08 ND - + - - - - 
R09 ND - - - - - - 
R10 ND - - - - - - 
R11 ND - - - - - - 
R12 ND - - - - - - 
R13 ND - - - - - - 
R14 ND - - - - - - 
R15 ND - - - - + - 
 
Footnote: HPA = Health Protection Agency laboratory, Lab 21 = 
Laboratory 21, Cambridge, NW = Nasal Wash, TS ± Throat Swab, + = 
Positive, - = Negative, ND = Not Done 
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Appendix 5.8: Retroscreen virology Ltd influenza serology (HAI) results  
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